... a default condition of unthinkingly taking metaphysical solipsism to be false (without even knowing what it is). We have no grounds for declaring it either true or false. That is why it represents a "transcendental choice point." We are free to opt for either alternative, and we will necessarily do so on some grounds other than the truth or falsity of the proposition. Upon subsequently recognizing that the question has no ...

... the grounds for rejecting solipsism (either variety). We reject solipsism for methodological reasons (because it fruitless). When neither deductive nor compelling inductive evidence for a proposition or its denial exists, then we have a "transcendental choice point" (a Kantian idea). We are free to postulate either option. So we choose the one which appears will gain us the most explanatory mileage. I use the term "substantially ...

... reference to an object (which is the way that "possibility" presents its objects) is equivalent to the object itself. Modus ponens, in that case, is a convoluted form of the transcendentally real notion that reference and self-reference are the same. Accordingly, (Godellians take note) any proof which employs modus ponens and which also relies on the distinction between self-reference and reference is ...

... says that reference to an object (which is the way that "possibility" presents its objects) is equivalent to the object itself. Modus ponens, in that case, is a convoluted form of the transcendentally real notion that reference and self-reference are the same. Accordingly, (Godellians take note) any proof which employs modus ponens and which also relies on the distinction between self-reference and reference is ...

... which we may be expected to presume may provide the possibility of exalted purification, culminating in a transcendental experience whereby, with some great effort, our fantastic escape may be accomplished. the methods to attain .... the identification with divinity (in the case of the sacrifice and sinner, with Siva) is a transcendental event. it is the entire difference between the sacrificed human being and the sacrificed god. In the...

On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 21:55:26 +0100, John Jones wrote: Modus ponens, in that case, is a convoluted form of the transcendentally real notion that reference and self-reference are the same. Accordingly, (Godellians take note) any proof which employs modus ponens and which also relies on the distinction between self-reference and reference is scuppered from the outset. ============================ If today is Tuesday, then I will...

... says that reference to an object (which is the way that "possibility" presents its objects) is equivalent to the object itself. Modus ponens, in that case, is a convoluted form of the transcendentally real notion that reference and self-reference are the same. Accordingly, (Godellians take note) any proof which employs modus ponens and which also relies on the distinction between self-reference and reference is scuppered ...

... says that reference to an object (which is the way that "possibility" presents its objects) is equivalent to the object itself. Modus ponens, in that case, is a convoluted form of the transcendentally real notion that reference and self-reference are the same. Accordingly, (Godellians take note) any proof which employs modus ponens and which also relies on the distinction between self-reference and reference is scuppered ...

... also says that reference to an object (which is the way that "possibility" presents its objects) is equivalent to the object itself. Modus ponens, in that case, is a convoluted form of the transcendentally real notion that reference and self-reference are the same. Accordingly, (Godellians take note) any proof which employs modus ponens and which also relies on the distinction between self-reference and reference is scuppered from...

...but I'm in broad agreement with the paragraph quoted above. I'm rather suspicious of the analogy of container and contained, as though the container were substantially distinct from the contained and could therefore be empty (contrary to Brentano's 'intentionality'). A "possibility" is all it is for me. I'm just avoiding a positive certainty/dogmatism that I KNOW there is no transcendental container. posted by Ecce