> www.NO2ID.net
>
> More than a card - a new way of life
>
> The ID Card scheme is not just a harmless new bit of plastic in your
> wallet.
> It requires a massive and intrusive database that changes the nature of UK
> Citizenship and shifts the balance of power further away from the citizen
> to
> the State. With the National Identity Register (NIR) and ID Card, the
> Government will control your identity. It will decide who you are. Showing
> ID to officials will become an everyday part of British life. Although
> other
> Europeans are used to ID Cards the NIR is much more controlling than their
> ID Card systems and they have legal safeguards we do not. It will open
> your
> life to inspection by thousands of bureaucrats.
>
> Spiraling costs
>
> Even the Government admits the minimum cost is E5.8 billion - that's six
> domes! That estimate has doubled since 2004. And it only counts Home
> Office
> costs and not the penalties for errors, or the cost of policing many new
> offences. The Government is reducing the Civil Service but is building a
> whole new Identity Service. Taxpayers and businesses will have to pay yet
> more for special scanners in doctors' surgeries, benefit offices, banks
> and
> even hotels.
>
> The biggest ever White Elephant
>
> Big Government computer systems are a catalogue of disaster. Yet this is
> the
> biggest and most complicated government computer scheme anywhere, ever.
> Even
> if it works perfectly, the ID scheme cannot meet the problems it is
> supposed
> to solve. The Government admits that the NIR will not stop terrorism.
> Almost
> all benefit fraud is lying about circumstances, not who
> you are. A single master document makes identity theft easier, and more
> worthwhile, not harder. Criminals don't play by the bureaucratic rules. ID
> Cards won't cut crime.
>
> A tool for bullies
>
> With a wink to racism, the Government says ID will stop illegal
> immigration. But it doesn't in the rest of Europe. Asians and black people
> often feel they are unfairly stopped and searched by police already. ID
> will
> give more reasons to "check" people. What's more, demands to prove you are
> British will creep into more and more public and private services, with
> the
> system as an excuse. How does a divided society make you safer?
>
> And when it goes wrong? -- You, the suspect
>
> You are about to be fingerprinted, eye-scanned and tagged like a criminal.
> Any errors will be your responsibility. The Home Office will have the
> final
> say. Even now about 100 people a month (out of a few thousand checked) are
> wrongly marked as criminals by the Criminal Records Bureau. The NIR could
> mean several checks a day for everybody. What happens to your life when
> the
> scanner fails or there's a mistake?
>
> Say NO to ID
>
> The ID scheme is expensive and socially destructive. Either it will help
> make Britain a police-state, or it will be a bigger white elephant than
> the
> poll tax. Help us stop it.
>
> This briefing summarises N02ID's key concerns with the Governments
> proposals. More detailed discussion and research references are available
> on
> request. You can find more information at www.no2id.net
>
>
> The government ID scheme: what you need to know
>
> 1. Not just a card. The card is the least of it...
>
> - The proposed identity management system has multiple layers: The NIR
> (National Identification Register) - individual checking and numbering of
> the population - marking many personal details as "registrable facts' to
> be
> disclosed and constantly updated - collection and checking of biometrics
> (e.g. fingerprints) - the card itself - a widespread scanner network and
> secure (one hopes) infrastructure connecting it to the central database -
> provision for use across the private and public sectors - datasharing
> between organisations on an unprecedented scale.
>
> - Massive accumulation of personal data: 50 categories of "registrable
> fact''' are set out in the Act, though they could be added to. Effectively
> an index to all other official and quasi-official records, through
> cross-references and an audit trail of all checks on the Register, the NIR
> would be the key to a total life history of every individual, to be
> retained
> even after death.
>
> - Lifelong surveillance and the meta-database: Every registered individual
> will be under an obligation to notify any change in registrable facts. It
> is
> a clear aim of the system to require identity verification for many more
> civil transactions, the occasions to be stored in the audit trail.
> Information verified and indexed by numbers from the NIR would be easily
> cross-referenced in any database or set of databases The "rneta-database"
> of
> all the thousands of databases cross-referenced is much more powerful and
> much less secure than the NIR itself
>
> - Overseas ID cards are not comparable: Many western countries that have
> ID
> cards do not have a shared register. Mostly ID cards have been limited in
> use, with strong legal privacy protections. In Germany centralisation is
> forbidden for historical reasons. and when cards are replaced, the records
> are not finked. Belgium has made use of modern encryption methods and
> local
> storage to protect privacy and prevent data-sharing, an approach opposite
> to
> the Home Office's. The UK scheme is closest to those of some Middle
> Eastern
> countries and of the People's Republic of China-though the latter has
> largely given up on biometrics.
>
> 2. The Government has not made a case. There is no evidence the system
> will
> produce the stated benefits. Less liberty does not imply greater security.
>
> - Terrorism: ID does not establish intention. Competent criminals and
> terrorists will be able to subvert the identity system. Random outrages by
> individuals can't be stopped. Ministers agree that ID cards will not
> prevent
> atrocities. A blank assertion that the department would find it helpful is
> not an argument that would be entertained for fundamental change in any
> other sphere of government but national security. Where is the evidence?
> Research suggests there is no link between the use of identity cards and
> the
> prevalence of terrorism and in no instance has the presence of an identity
> card system been shown a significant deterrent to terrorist activity.
> Experts attest that ID unjustifiably presumed secure actually diminishes
> security.'
>
> - Illegal immigration and working: People will still enter Britain using
> foreign documents-genuine or forged-and ID cards offer no more deterrent
> to
> people smugglers than passports and visas. Employers already face
> substantial penalties for failing to obtain proof of entitlement to work,
> yet there are only a handful of prosecutions a year. Benefit fraud and
> abuse
> of public services: Identity is "only a tiny part of the problem in the
> benefit system."' Figures for claims under false identity are estimated at
> £50 million (2.5%%) of an (estimated) £2 billion per year in fraudulent
> claims.
>
> - `Identity fraud': Both Australia and the USA have far worse problems of
> identity theft than Britain, precisely because of general reliance on a
> single reference source. Costs usually cited for of identityrelated crime
> here include much fraud not susceptible to an ID system. So-called
> "secure",
> trusted, ID is more useful to the fraudster. The Home Office has not
> explained how it will stop identity thieves registering as other people.
> Coherent collection of all sensitive personal data by govemment, and its
> easy transmission between departments, will create vast new opportunities
> for data-theft.
>
> 3. Overcomplicated, unproven technology
>
> - Computer system: IT providers find that identity systems work best when
> limited in design. The Home Office scheme combines untested technologies
> on
> an unparalleled scale. Its many inchoate purposes create innumerable
> points
> for failure. The government record with computer projects is poor, and the
> ID system is likely to end up a broken mess.
>
> - Biometrics: Not all biometrics will work for all people. Plenty are
> missing digits, or eyes, or have physical conditions that render one or
> more
> biometrics unstable or hard to read. All systems have error. Deployment on
> a
> vast scale, with variably trained operators and variably maintained and
> calibrated equipment, will produce vast numbers of mismatches. leading to
> potentially gross inconvenience to millions.
>
> 4. Identity Cards will cost money that could be better spent
>
> - No ceiling: The Government has not ventured figures for the cost to the
> country as whole of the identity management scheme. That makes evaluation
> difficult. Civil Service IT experience suggests current projections are
> likely to be seriously underestimated. Home Office figures are for
> internal
> costs and have risen sharply where they are not utterly obscure. Industry
> estimates suggest that public and private sector compliance costs could
> easily be double whatever is spent centrally.
>
> - Opportunity costs: The Government has not even tried to show that
> national
> ID management will be more cost-effective than less spectacular
> alternative,
> targeted. solutions to the same problems (whether tried and tested or
> novel)
> We are to trust to luck that it is.
>
> - Taxpayer pain: Even at current Home Office estimates, the additional tax
> burden of setting up the scheme will be of the order of £200 per person.
> The
> direct cost to individuals (of a combined passport ;,and iD card package)
> is
> quoted as £.93. The impact on other departmental and local authority
> budgets
> is unknown. The scope and impact of arbitrary penalties would make speed
> cameras trivial by comparison.
>
> 5. Unchecked executive powers.
>
> - Broad delegated power: The Home Office seeks wide discretion over the
> future shape of the scheme. There are more than 30 types of regulatory
> power
> for future Secretaries of State would change the functions and content of
> the system ad lib. The scope, application and possible extension are
> extra-parliamentary decisions, even if nominally subject to approval.
>
> - Presumption of accuracy: Data entered onto the National Identity
> Register
> (NIR) is arbitrarily presumed to be accurate, and the Home Secretary is
> the
> judge of whether information provided to him is a, :curate. Meanwhile, the
> Home Office gets the power to enter information without informing the
> individual. But there's no duty to ensure that such data is accurate, or
> criterion of accuracy. Personal identity is implicitly made wholly subject
> to state control.
>
> - Compulsion by stealth: Even during the so-called `voluntary' phase, the
> Home Secretary can add any person to the Register without their consent,
> and
> categories of individuals might be compelled selectively to register using
> powers under any future legislation. Anyone newly applying for a passport
> or
> other "designated document", or renewing an existing one, will
> automatically
> have to be interviewed and submit all required details. This is less a
> "phased" introduction than a clandestine one. There is to be no choice.
> And
> the minimum of notice to the public about the change in the handling of
> their registrable information.
>
> - Limited oversight: As proposed, the National Identity Scheme
> Commissioner
> would have very limited powers and is excluded from considering a number
> of
> key issues. He does not even report directly to Parliament. The reliance
> on
> administrative penalties means severe punishments may be inflicted without
> judicial process. The onus is on the individual to seek relief from the
> courts, at a civil standard of proof. Those who most require the
> protection
> of a fair trial are the least likely to be able to resort to legal action.
>
> - Individuals managed by executive order: Without reference to the courts
> or
> any appeals process, the Home Secretary may cancel or require surrender of
> an identity card, without a right of appeal, at any time. Given that the
> object of the scheme is that an ID card will be eventually required to
> exercise any ordinary civil function, this amounts to granting the Home
> Secretary the power of civic life and death.
>
> 6. The National Identity Register creates specific new threats to
> individuals
>
> - Discrimination-no guarantees: There have been vapid "assurances" made to
> some minority groups". That underlines the potential for threat. The
> system
> offers a ready-made police-state tool for a future government less
> trustworthy than the current one. A Home Secretary could create
> classifications of individuals to be registered as he sees fit,
> introdcuing
> onerous duties backed by severe penalties for fractions of the population.
> Religious or ethnic affiliation, for example, could be added to the
> Register
> by regulation-or be inferred by cross-referencing other information using
> a
> National Identity Register Number or associated data.
>
> - `Papers, please': ID cards in practice would provide a pretext for those
> in authority-public or private-to question individuals who stand out for
> reasons of personal appearance or demeanour. This is likely to exacerbate
> divisions in society. The Chairman of the Bar Council has asked, "is there
> not a great risk that those who feel at the margins of society - the
> somewhat disaffected - will be driven into the arms of extremists?
>
> - Third party abuse: The requirement that all those registered notify all
> changes in details risks creating the means of tracking and persecution
> through improper use of the database. A variety of persons have good
> reason
> to conceal their identity and whereabouts, for example: those fleeing
> domestic abuse; victims of "honour" crimes; witnesses in criminal cases;
> those at risk of kidnapping; undercover investigators; refugees from
> oppressive regimes overseas; those pursued by the press; those who may be
> terrorist targets. The seizure of ID cards (like benefit-books and
> passports
> now) will become a means for extortion by gangsters.
>
> - Lost identity, becoming an un-person: By making ordinary life dependent
> on
> the reliability of a complex administrative system, the scheme makes
> myriad
> small errors potentially catastrophic. There's no hint from the government
> how it will deal with inevitably large numbers of mis-identifications and
> errors, or deliberate attacks on or corruption of what would become a
> critical piece of national infrastructure. A failure in any part of the
> system at a check might deny a person access to his or her rights or
> property or to public services, with no immediate solution or
> redress-"license to live" withdrawn.
>
> Visit www.no2id.net today!
>
>
>
>
>