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Author: tankfixertankfixer Date: Sep 15, 2008 07:47
> To David Johnson,
>
>> Why? You haven't listened to any of them before.
>
> Only because I haven't yet read any criticisms here that I couldn't
> easily refute. Nor any good sources presented in support of those
> criticisms. All I seem to get is opinions that don't stand up very
> well to examination.
Thats rich.
You present scenarios that fly in the face of IJN doctrine and
capabilities and refuse to accept the valid criticize of them
>
> On Sep 14, 7:25 pm, J.J. O'Shea wrote:
>
>>Why are the Japanese literally throwing men away? What possible reason could >they have for so completely wasting men's lives, and the time and effort...
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Author: J.J. O'SheaJ.J. O'Shea Date: Sep 15, 2008 13:07
On Mon, 15 Sep 2008 01:47:10 -0400, tankfixer wrote
(in article nntp.earthlink.net>):
>> To David Johnson,
>>
>>> Why? You haven't listened to any of them before.
>>
>> Only because I haven't yet read any criticisms here that I couldn't
>> easily refute. Nor any good sources presented in support of those
>> criticisms. All I seem to get is opinions that don't stand up very
>> well to examination.
>
> Thats rich.
> You present scenarios that fly in the face of IJN doctrine and
> capabilities and refuse to accept the valid criticize of them
It's simply impossible for most of his ideas to fly without extensive ASB
support, and difficult even then.
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Author: dabrobdabrob Date: Sep 15, 2008 16:35
To tankfixer and J.J.O'Shea,
I see that you two have whipped each other up into a fury while I was
asleep.
If I may, I believe that I can summarize your objections into the
following categories:
A.) Japan didn't have enough tankers to fuel a push on Hawaii
B.) Japan didn't have enough transports to lift all to Hawaii
C.) Japan didn't have enough fighting men to attack at Hawaii
D.) Japan historically wanted NEI oil so that it could expand into
China, not Hawaii.
E.) ?
As for point E.), I'm sure that you will both let me know what else
bothers you ...
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Author: kenneykenney Date: Sep 15, 2008 19:16
In article
i76g2000hsf.googlegroups.com>,
dabrob@gmail.com (dabrob) wrote:
> Marshalls until later in the war would have no significant results IF
> Hawaii had fallen instead.
That is the point you have failed to mention. Just taking Ohau is not
enough you need to take all the islands in the group. You then need to
garrison them and supply the garrisons. Even assuming there is food
available ammunition is not. The Japanese also needed to garrison
British and Dutch territory. Japanese planning assumed that given a fait
accompli the US would make peace. Pearl OTL was an attempt to make sure
that nothing the US did could interfere with getting this situation.
Still the biggest problem you have is the Japanese Army they were not
prepared to divert troops from the OTL targets and the Japanese navy had
nothing like the forces required. I really do not understand your
obsession with Pearl. It is certainly possible for the Japanese to do
better, no attack on Midway for a start but even flattening Pearl to
bare rock would not stop a US counter attack. By early 1942 The US would
have had nine BB available plus carriers.
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Author: Jack LinthicumJack Linthicum Date: Sep 15, 2008 19:37
> In article
> i76g2000hsf.googlegroups.com>,
>
> dab...@gmail.com (dabrob) wrote:>> Marshalls until later in the war would have no significant results IF
>> Hawaii had fallen instead.
>
> That is the point you have failed to mention. Just taking Ohau is not
> enough you need to take all the islands in the group. You then need to
> garrison them and supply the garrisons. Even assuming there is food
> available ammunition is not. The Japanese also needed to garrison
> British and Dutch territory. Japanese planning assumed that given a fait
> accompli the US would make peace. Pearl OTL was an attempt to make sure
> that nothing the US did could interfere with getting this situation.
>
> Still the biggest problem you have is the Japanese Army they were not
> prepared to divert troops from the OTL targets and the Japanese navy had
> nothing like the forces required. I really do not understand your
> obsession with Pearl. It is certainly possible for the Japanese to do ...
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Author: dabrobdabrob Date: Sep 16, 2008 01:36
On Sep 15, 1:16 pm, ken young wrote:
>> ... Marshalls until later in the war would have no significant results IF
>> Hawaii had fallen instead.
>
>. Just taking Oahu is not enough you need to take all the islands in the group
Why ? Other than an airfield or two that could be plowed up there is
little of military value on the other Hawaiian Islands. Certainly some
small observation detachments would be good to keep an eye on things
and I'd bet that in exchange for food and political power the local ex-
Japanese inhabitants could be (lightly) armed and asked to keep a
watch on the situations. In any case, once Oahu surrenders and the
heavy ground combat is over there, then there will surplus IJA troops
aplenty for the remaining Hawaiian Islands.
> You then need to garrison them and supply the garrisons. Even assuming there is > food available ammunition is not.
Small arms and ammunition are low volums items and I beilieve (from
the US archive numbers that I have) that Hawaii could be awash in
suddenly surplus US ammunition and small arms, if needed after an
invasion. Historicaly the Japanese were well known for recycling
anything at all useful. Oahu would be no different.
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Author: dabrobdabrob Date: Sep 16, 2008 01:45
On Sep 15, 1:37 pm, Jack Linthicum wrote:
> Add two factors, any U.S. submarines that escape the attack on Pearl
> will be available to blockade the Japanese in Hawaii,
Yoshikawa reported that there were only 6 actually based there and at
least two were caught opened up for repairs on Dec.7'41. A 3rd wave
airstrike or some good burning oil flooding into the harbor would
likely have finished the 4 moored at the subamrine base that morning.
Without working torpedoes they weren't much of a threat anyway
although the Japanese of the day couldn't yet know that.
>and that same victory disease will lead them to overturn war gaming results, as it
> did OTL.
I takes a string of victories to promote the development of victory
disease so the Japanese couldn't possibly be suffering from it on Dec.
7'41.
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Author: dabrobdabrob Date: Sep 16, 2008 01:53
To tankfixer and J.J.O'Shea,
First, I'd like to apologize for somehow screwing up the nice column
formating that I thought that I had done in my transports posting.
There doesn't seem to be a preview function at this newsnet so I had
no way to check my success before sending the post off into the
ether ... It is much harder to read now than I had intended it to be.
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Wrt to point C.) Japan didn't have enough fighting men to attack at
Hawaii
Historically Japanese Infantry units employed were:
Malaya:.............5th I.D., 18th I.D, Guards Division. (25th Army)
Philippines:......48th I.D., 16th I.D., 65th Brigade (14th Army)
Burma:..............33rd I.D., 55th I.D. (15th Army)
Hong Kong:......38th Division (South Expeditionary Army)
Guam:...............South Seas Detachment (from 55th Division)
Wake:...............Maizuru SNLF
Davao:..............Sakaguchi / Miura Detachments
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Author: tankfixertankfixer Date: Sep 16, 2008 06:23
In article news3.newsguy.com>, try.not.to@but.see.sig
says...> On Mon, 15 Sep 2008 01:47:10 -0400, tankfixer wrote
> (in article nntp.earthlink.net>):
> >>> To David Johnson,
>>>
>>>> Why? You haven't listened to any of them before.
>>>
>>> Only because I haven't yet read any criticisms here that I couldn't
>>> easily refute. Nor any good sources presented in support of those
>>> criticisms. All I seem to get is opinions that don't stand up very
>>> well to examination.
>>
>> Thats rich.
>> You present scenarios that fly in the face of IJN doctrine and
>> capabilities and refuse to accept the valid criticize of them
> ...
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Author: tankfixertankfixer Date: Sep 16, 2008 06:25
>
> As you can see, other than the 4 delayed invasions that I suggest
> there is no impact to the transport tonnages historically assigned by
> the Japanese to their other campaigns.
You seem to be ignoring why the Japanese were attacking in the first
place.
--
Meddle ye not in the Affairs of Dragons, for Thou art Crunchy and taste
Goode with Ketchup.
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