>Why you guys keep on blaming the CIA ?
>
>CIA's sole business to disrupt other countries. It's their duty to do
>that. Stop blaming them !
>
>If the dalai lama doesn't want to cooperate with CIA, CIA can't do
>anything at all !
>
>If dalai lama has enough dignity to be THE RELIGIOUS CHIEF for all
>Tibetians, and not do shitting things like what he has been doing, no
>one, not even the CIA, can do anything about it at all !
>
>If you guys want to blame, blame dalai lama for being an asshole !

>
>
>On Mar 26, 4:27 am, rst0wxyz yahoo.com> wrote:

>> As I have said from the very beginning of the Tibet riot, the CIA
>> fingerprints were everywhere in Tibet.
>>
>> The CIA fingerprints were shown during the Tiananmen Square Massacre
>> in the form of the "goddess of democracy".
>>
>> On Mar 25, 12:50 pm, Chen europe.com> wrote:> Tibet, the 'great game' and the CIA

>>> By Richard M Bennett

>>

>>> Given the historical context of the unrest in Tibet, there is reason
>>> to believe Beijing was caught on the hop with the recent
>>> demonstrations for the simple reason that their planning took place
>>> outside of Tibet and that the direction of the protesters is similarly
>>> in the hands of anti-Chinese organizers safely out of reach in Nepal
>>> and northern India.

>>

>>> Similarly, the funding and overall control of the unrest has also been
>>> linked to Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, and by inference to
>>> the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because of his close
>>> cooperation with US intelligence for over 50 years.

>>

>>> Indeed, with the CIA's deep involvement with the Free Tibet Movement
>>> and its funding of the suspiciously well-informed Radio Free Asia, it
>>> would seem somewhat unlikely that any revolt could

>>

>>> have been planned or occurred without the prior knowledge, and even
>>> perhaps the agreement, of the National Clandestine Service (formerly
>>> known as the Directorate of Operations) at CIA headquarters in
>>> Langley.

>>

>>> Respected columnist and former senior Indian Intelligence officer, B
>>> Raman, commented on March 21 that "on the basis of available evidence,
>>> it was possible to assess with a reasonable measure of conviction"
>>> that the initial uprising in Lhasa on March 14 "had been pre-planned
>>> and well orchestrated".

>>

>>> Could there be a factual basis to the suggestion that the main
>>> beneficiaries to the death and destruction sweeping Tibet are in
>>> Washington? History would suggest that this is a distinct
>>> possibility.

>>

>>> The CIA conducted a large scale covert action campaign against the
>>> communist Chinese in Tibet starting in 1956. This led to a disastrous
>>> bloody uprising in 1959, leaving tens of thousands of Tibetans dead,
>>> while the Dalai Lama and about 100,000 followers were forced to flee
>>> across the treacherous Himalayan passes to India and Nepal.

>>

>>> The CIA established a secret military training camp for the Dalai
>>> Lama's resistance fighters at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado, in
>>> the US. The Tibetan guerrillas were trained and equipped by the CIA
>>> for guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations against the communist
>>> Chinese.

>>

>>> The US-trained guerrillas regularly carried out raids into Tibet, on
>>> occasions led by CIA-contract mercenaries and supported by CIA planes.
>>> The initial training program ended in December 1961, though the camp
>>> in Colorado appears to have remained open until at least 1966.

>>

>>> The CIA Tibetan Task Force created by Roger E McCarthy, alongside the
>>> Tibetan guerrilla army, continued the operation codenamed "St Circus"
>>> to harass the Chinese occupation forces for another 15 years until
>>> 1974, when officially sanctioned involvement ceased.

>>

>>> McCarthy, who also served as head of the Tibet Task Force at the
>>> height of its activities from 1959 until 1961, later went on to run
>>> similar operations in Vietnam and Laos.

>>

>>> By the mid-1960s, the CIA had switched its strategy from parachuting
>>> guerrilla fighters and intelligence agents into Tibet to establishing
>>> the Chusi Gangdruk, a guerrilla army of some 2,000 ethnic Khamba
>>> fighters at bases such as Mustang in Nepal.

>>

>>> This base was only closed down in 1974 by the Nepalese government
>>> after being put under tremendous pressure by Beijing.
>>> After the Indo-China War of 1962, the CIA developed a close
>>> relationship with the Indian intelligence services in both training
>>> and supplying agents in Tibet.

>>

>>> Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their book The CIA's Secret War
>>> in Tibet disclose that the CIA and the Indian intelligence services
>>> cooperated in the training and equipping of Tibetan agents and special
>>> forces troops and in forming joint aerial and intelligence units such
>>> as the Aviation Research Center and Special Center.

>>

>>> This collaboration continued well into the 1970s and some of the
>>> programs that it sponsored, especially the special forces unit of
>>> Tibetan refugees which would become an important part of the Indian
>>> Special Frontier Force, continue into the present.

>>

>>> Only the deterioration in relations with India which coincided with
>>> improvements in those with Beijing brought most of the joint CIA-
>>> Indian operations to an end.

>>

>>> Though Washington had been scaling back support for the Tibetan
>>> guerrillas since 1968, it is thought that the end of official US
>>> backing for the resistance only came during meetings between president
>>> Richard Nixon and the Chinese communist leadership in Beijing in
>>> February 1972.

>>

>>> Victor Marchetti, a former CIA officer has described the outrage many
>>> field agents felt when Washington finally pulled the plug, adding that
>>> a number even "[turned] for solace to the Tibetan prayers which they
>>> had learned during their years with the Dalai Lama".

>>

>>> The former CIA Tibetan Task Force chief from 1958 to 1965, John
>>> Kenneth Knaus, has been quoted as saying, "This was not some CIA black-
>>> bag operation." He added, "The initiative was coming from ... the
>>> entire US government."

>>

>>> In his book Orphans of the Cold War, Knaus writes of the obligation
>>> Americans feel toward the cause of Tibetan independence from China.
>>> Significantly, he adds that its realization "would validate the more
>>> worthy motives of we who tried to help them achieve this goal over 40
>>> years ago. It would also alleviate the guilt some of us feel over our
>>> participation in these efforts, which cost others their lives, but
>>> which were the prime adventure of our own."

>>

>>> Despite the lack of official support it is still widely rumored that
>>> the CIA were involved, if only by proxy, in another failed revolt in
>>> October 1987, the unrest that followed and the consequent Chinese
>>> repression continuing till May 1993.

>>

>>> The timing for another serious attempt to destabilize Chinese rule in
>>> Tibet would appear to be right for the CIA and Langley will
>>> undoubtedly keep all its options open.

>>

>>> China is faced with significant problems, with the Uighur Muslims in
>>> Xinjiang province; the activities of the Falun Gong among many other
>>> dissident groups and of course growing concern over the security of
>>> the Summer Olympic Games in August.

>>

>>> China is viewed by Washington as a major threat, both economic and
>>> military, not just in Asia, but in Africa and Latin America as well.

>>

>>> The CIA also views China as being "unhelpful" in the "war on terror",
>>> with little or no cooperation being offered and nothing positive being
>>> done to stop the flow of arms and men from Muslim areas of western
>>> China to support Islamic extremist movements in Afghanistan and
>>> Central Asian states.

>>

>>> To many in Washington, this may seem the ideal opportunity to knock
>>> the Beijing government off balance as Tibet is still seen as China's
>>> potential weak spot.

>>

>>> The CIA will undoubtedly ensure that its fingerprints are not
>>> discovered all over this growing revolt. Cut-outs and proxies will be
>>> used among the Tibetan exiles in Nepal and India's northern border
>>> areas.

>>

>>> Indeed, the CIA can expect a significant level of support from a
>>> number of security organizations in both India and Nepal and will have
>>> no trouble in providing the resistance movement with advice, money and
>>> above all, publicity.

>>

>>> However, not until the unrest shows any genuine signs of becoming an
>>> open revolt by the great mass of ethnic Tibetans against the Han
>>> Chinese and Hui Muslims will any weapons be allowed to appear.

>>

>>> Large quantities of former Eastern bloc small arms and explosives have
>>> been reportedly smuggled into Tibet over the past 30 years, but these
>>> are likely to remain safely hidden until the right opportunity
>>> presents itself.

>>

>>> The weapons have been acquired on the world markets or from stocks
>>> captured by US or Israeli forces. They have been sanitized and are
>>> deniable, untraceable back to the CIA.

>>

>>> Weapons of this nature also have the advantage of being
>>> interchangeable with those used by the Chinese armed forces and of
>>> course use the same ammunition, easing the problem of resupply during
>>> any future conflict.

>>

>>> Though official support for the Tibetan resistance ended 30 years ago,
>>> the CIA has kept open its lines of communications and still funds much
>>> of the Tibetan Freedom movement.

>>

>>> So is the CIA once again playing the "great game" in Tibet?

>>

>>> It certainly has the capability, with a significant intelligence and
>>> paramilitary presence in the region. Major bases exist in Afghanistan,
>>> Iraq, Pakistan and several Central Asian states.

>>

>>> It cannot be doubted that it has an interest in undermining China, as
>>> well as the more obvious target of Iran.

>>

>>> So the probable answer is yes, and indeed it would be rather
>>> surprising if the CIA was not taking more than just a passing interest
>>> in Tibet. That is after all what it is paid to do.

>>

>>> Since September 11, 2001, there has been a sea-change in US
>>> Intelligence attitudes, requirements and capabilities. Old operational
>>> plans have been dusted off and updated. Previous assets re-activated.
>>> Tibet and the perceived weakness of China's position there will
>>> probably have been fully reassessed.

>>

>>> For Washington and the CIA, this may seem a heaven-sent opportunity to
>>> create a significant lever against Beijing, with little risk to
>>> American interests; simply a win-win situation.

>>

>>> The Chinese government would be on the receiving end of worldwide
>>> condemnation for its continuing repression and violation of human
>>> rights and it will be young Tibetans dying on the streets of Lhasa
>>> rather than yet more uniformed American kids.

>>

>>> The consequences of any open revolt against Beijing, however, are that
>>> once again the fear of arrest, torture and even execution will pervade
>>> every corner of both Tibet and those neighboring provinces where large
>>> Tibetan populations exist, such as Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan.

>>

>>> And the Tibetan Freedom movement still has little likelihood of
>>> achieving any significant improvement in central Chinese policy in the
>>> long run and no chance whatever of removing its control of Lhasa and
>>> their homeland.

>>

>>> Once again it would appear that the Tibetan people will find
>>> themselves trapped between an oppressive Beijing and a manipulative
>>> Washington.

>>

>>> Beijing sends in the heavies
>>> The fear that the United States, Britain and other Western states may
>>> try to portray Tibet as another Kosovo may be part of the reason why
>>> the Chinese authorities reacted as if faced with a genuine mass revolt
>>> rather than their official portrayal of a short-lived outbreak of
>>> unrest by malcontents supporting the Dalai Lama.

>>

>>> Indeed, so seriously did Beijing view the situation that a special
>>> security coordination unit, the 110 Command Center, has been
>>> established in Lhasa with the primary objective of suppressing the
>>> disturbances and restoring full central government control.

>>

>>> The center appears to be under the direct control of Zhang Qingli,
>>> first secretary of the Tibet Party and a President Hu Jintao loyalist.
>>> Zhang is also the former Xinjiang deputy party secretary with
>>> considerable experience in counter-terrorism operations in that
>>> region.

>>

>>> Others holding important positions in Lhasa are Zhang Xinfeng, vice
>>> minister of the Central Public Security Ministry and Zhen Yi, deputy
>>> commander of the People's Armed Police Headquarters in Beijing.

>>

>>> The seriousness with which Beijing is treating the present unrest is
>>> further illustrated by the deployment of a large number of important
>>> army units from the Chengdu Military Region, including brigades from
>>> the 149th Mechanized Infantry Division, which acts as the region's
>>> rapid reaction force.

>>

>>> According to a United Press International report, elite ground force
>>> units of the People's Liberation Army were involved in Lhasa, and the
>>> new T-90 armored personnel carrier and T-92 wheeled armored vehicles
>>> were deployed. According to the report, China has denied the
>>> participation of the army in the crackdown, saying it was carried out
>>> by units of the armed police. "Such equipment as mentioned above has
>>> never been deployed by China's armed police, however."

>>

>>> Air support is provided by the 2nd Army Aviation Regiment, based at
>>> Fenghuangshan, Chengdu, in Sichuan province. It operates a mix of
>>> helicopters and STOL transports from a frontline base near Lhasa.
>>> Combat air support could be quickly made available from fighter ground
>>> attack squadrons based within the Chengdu region.
>>> The Xizang Military District forms the Tibet garrison, which has two
>>> mountain infantry units; the 52nd Brigade based at Linzhi and the 53rd
>>> Brigade at Yaoxian Shannxi. These are supported by the 8th Motorized
>>> Infantry Division and an artillery brigade at Shawan, Xinjiang.

>>

>>> Tibet is also no longer quite as remote or difficult to resupply for
>>> the Chinese army. The construction of the first railway between 2001
>>> and 2007 has significantly eased the problems of the movement of large
>>> numbers of troops and equipment from Qinghai onto the rugged Tibetan
>>> plateau.

>>

>>> Other precautions against a resumption of the long-term Tibetan
>>> revolts of previous years has led to a considerable degree of self-
>>> sufficiency in logistics and vehicle repair by the Tibetan garrison
>>> and an increasing number of small airfields have been built to allow
>>> rapid-reaction units to gain access to even the most remote areas.

>>

>>> The Chinese Security Ministry and intelligence services had been
>>> thought to have a suffocating presence in the province and indeed the
>>> ability to detect any serious protest movement and suppress
>>> resistance.

>>

>>> Richard M Bennett, intelligence and security consultant, AFI
>>> Research.