The Portrait of an Olympic Host -- China's Me Generation

-- Micky's comment: Do we find anything remotely resemble the Olympic
spirit? ! --

http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1647228,00.html

Thursday, Jul. 26, 2007

Time Weekly

China's Me Generation

By Simon Elegant / Beijing

Six friends out on a friday evening, the seafood plentiful, the
conversation flowing. Maria Zhang ― big hoop earrings, tight velvet
jacket and a good deal of meticulously applied makeup ― starts to
describe an island that everyone is talking about off the east coast of
Thailand. It has great diving, she says, and lots of Chinese there so
you don't have to worry about language. Her friend Vicky Yang is hunched
over a borrowed laptop, downloading an e-mail from a pesky client on her
cell phone. An actuary at a consulting firm, Vicky needs to close a
project tonight. While she phones a colleague, the dinner-table
conversation moves on to snowboarding ("I must have fallen a hundred
times") to the relative merits of various iPods ("Shuffle is no good")
and the sudden onrush of credit cards in China. Silence Chen, an account
executive with advertising giant Ogilvy & Mather in Beijing, tells the
group he recently received six different cards in the mail. "Each one
has a credit limit of 10,000," he says, laughing. "So suddenly I'm
60,000 yuan richer!" The talk turns to China's online shopping business,
before that is interrupted by the arrival of razor clams, chili squid
and deep-fried grouper.

The one subject that doesn't come up ― and almost never does when this
tight-knit group of friends gets together ― is politics. That sets them
apart from previous generations of Chinese élites, whose lives were
defined by the epic events that shaped China's past half-century: the
Cultural Revolution, the opening to the West, the student protests in
Tiananmen Square and their subsequent suppression. The conversation at
Gang Ji Restaurant suggests today's twentysomethings are tuning all that
out. "There's nothing we can do about politics," says Chen. "So there's
no point in talking about it or getting involved."

There are roughly 300 million adults in China under age 30, a
demographic cohort that serves as a bridge between the closed,
xenophobic China of the Mao years and the globalized economic powerhouse
that it is becoming. Young Chinese are the drivers and chief
beneficiaries of the country's current boom: according to a recent
survey by Credit Suisse First Boston, the incomes of 20- to 29-year-olds
grew 34%% in the past three years, by far the biggest of any age group.
And because of their self-interested, apolitical pragmatism, they could
turn out to be the salvation of the ruling Communist Party ― so long as
it keeps delivering the economic goods. Survey young, urban Chinese
today, and you will find them drinking Starbucks, wearing Nikes and
blogging obsessively. But you will detect little interest in demanding
voting rights, let alone overthrowing the country's communist rulers.
"On their wish list," says Hong Huang, a publisher of several lifestyle
magazines, "a Nintendo Wii comes way ahead of democracy."

The rise of China's Me generation has implications for the foreign
policies of other nations. Sinologists in the West have long predicted
that economic growth would eventually bring democracy to China. As James
Mann points out in his new book, The China Fantasy, the idea that China
will evolve into a democracy as its middle class grows continues to
underlie the U.S.'s China policy, providing the central rationale for
maintaining close ties with what is, after all, an unapologetically
authoritarian regime. But China's Me generation could shatter such
long-held assumptions. As the chief beneficiaries of China's economic
success, young professionals have more and more tied up in preserving
the status quo. The last thing they want is a populist politician
winning over the country's hundreds of millions of have-nots on a
rural-reform, stick-it-to-the-cities agenda.

All of which means democracy isn't likely to come to China anytime soon.
And that poses challenges for Western policymakers as they try to engage
China without condoning the Communist Party's record of political
repression and its failures to improve the lives of the country's rural
poor. China watchers say the Me generation's reluctance to agitate for
reform is driven in part by a reluctance to tarnish China's moment in
the sun. "They are proud of what China has accomplished, and very
positive about the government," says P.T. Black, who conducts extensive
marketing research for a Shanghai-based company called Jigsaw
International. The political passivity of China's new élite makes sense
while the good times roll. The question is what will happen to the Me
generation ― and to China ― when they end.

For anyone who visited the workers' paradise when it was still the land
of Mao suits and communes, trying to reconcile that China to the one
that young élites live in today is disorienting. When I first visited
China in 1981, I went to the People's Park in Shanghai with two
traveling companions. Our obligatory Foreign Ministry "guide" ushered us
through a special gate reserved for "foreign friends." A knot of young
Chinese had gathered outside. As we passed, a few made loud comments
about the unfairness of having parts of the People's Park reserved only
for foreigners. One of my companions, a Mandarin speaker, agreed volubly
in Chinese. Immediately a group of young Chinese men and women
surrounded us and peppered us with questions that mixed naiveté and
aspiration: Are there still slaves in America? Where did you learn to
speak Chinese? Do all American families really have three cars? Can you
help me go to America?

That discussion took place 25 years ago, the span usually allotted to a
single generation. The naive, wary Chinese I met that day could be the
parents of the group gathered for the seafood feast in Beijing. But
there is almost nothing about the appearance, attitudes, life
experience, education or dreams for the future that those young people
in the Shanghai People's Park share with the likes of Vicky and her friends.

The most obvious change is demographic. Because of China's one-child
policy, instituted in 1978, this is the first generation in the world's
history in which a majority are single children, a group whose
solipsistic tendencies have been further encouraged by a growing
obsession with consumerism, the Internet and video games. At the same
time, today's young Chinese are better educated and more worldly than
their predecessors. Whereas the so-called Lost Generation that grew up
in the Cultural Revolution often struggled to finish high school, today
around a quarter of Chinese in their 20s have attended college. The
country's opening to the West has allowed many more of its citizens to
satisfy their curiosity about the world: some 37 million will travel
overseas in 2007. In the next decade, there will be more Chinese
tourists traveling the globe than the combined total of those
originating in the U.S. and Europe. Rather than fueling restlessness
among the Me generation, however, the ease of travel seems to provide
more evidence that the benefits of globalization can be had without
radical change.

There's another reason for the lack of political ferment: it's
exhausting. Like anyone else, members of the Me generation are shaped by
their experiences and those of their families. When their parents talk
about the Great Leap Forward (a disastrous Mao campaign in the late
1950s that left 20 million to 30 million dead of starvation) and the
subsequent chaos of the Cultural Revolution, they mostly tell horror
stories that would put anyone off politics forever. That chapter in
Chinese history, which officially ended with Mao's death in 1976, is
ancient history to today's young élites. They have known little but
peace and an ever increasing economic boom. "We have so much bigger a
desire for everything than [our parents]," says Maria Zhang, 27. "And
the more we eat, the more we taste and see, the more we want."

One event that the Me generation does remember is the crackdown on
student activists in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But to young Chinese like
Maria and Vicky, the Tiananmen protests are less a source of inspiration
than an admonishment. Were popular uprisings like Tiananmen allowed to
continue, Vicky believes, they would have provoked a counterreaction by
conservative forces and led to a return to fortress China: no more
iPods, overseas shopping trips or snowboarding weekends. "I think that
the students meant well," says Vicky, who was 11 at the time and has
only vague memories of what happened. But the crackdown that ended the
demonstrations "certainly was needed."

Vicky embodies the shift in the priorities of young Chinese. She's a
purposeful, 29-year-old actuary who rarely smiles but loves nothing
better than a party. She and her friends meet so regularly for dinner
and at bars that she says she never eats at home anymore. As the
pictures on her blog attest, they also throw regular theme parties to
mark holidays like Halloween and Christmas, and last year took a holiday
to Egypt.

Encouraged by her new boyfriend Wang Ning, a keen snowboarder, Vicky
decided earlier this year to take up the sport as well. To prime for it,
she went to a mall in south Beijing that specializes in pricey, imported
skiing gear. She chose a gleaming new snowboard made by the Colorado
company Never Summer, emblazoned with colorful, psychedelic paintings of
butterflies. Along with gloves, goggles and other paraphernalia, the new
gear set her back about $700. When asked about the wisdom of spending a
small fortune on equipment for a sport she may never take to, she says,
"I believe you have to be fully prepared and equipped before you decide
to start a new hobby." Besides, she adds, "even if I don't like skiing,
think how nice [the gear] will look in the hallway of my apartment.
Guests won't know that I don't use it." Vicky smiles to signal she's
joking. But she's dead serious when she explains, over coffee at
Starbucks, her lack of interest in politics. "It's because our life is
pretty good. I care about my rights when it comes to the quality of a
waitress in a restaurant or a product I buy. When it comes to democracy
and all that, well ..." She shrugs expressively and takes a sip of her
latte. "That doesn't play a role in my life."

People like Vicky and her friends represent the leading edge, the
trailblazers for a huge mass of young, eagerly aspirant consumers. All
over China, young professionals like these banter about blogging, travel
and work-life balance. ("Work hard, play harder," says Vicky several
times, repeating it in case she isn't heard.) If they can't afford to
blow $700 on skiing gear, they want to be able to soon.

And so for China's leaders, placating the Me generation is seen as
critical to ensuring the Communist Party's survival. By 2015, the number
of Chinese adults under 30 is expected to swell 61%%, to 500 million,
equivalent to the entire population of the European Union. From issues
of grave consequence to trivialities, the government has made clear that
it will do whatever it takes to keep the swelling middle class happy. In
Beijing, for example, newly prosperous residents are snapping up
automobiles at a rate of 1,000 a day. The number of vehicles on the
capital's sclerotic roads has doubled in the past five years, to 3
million. (By comparison, there are about 2 million vehicles registered
in all of New York City.) But despite a grim pollution problem (Beijing
air quality is among the world's worst) that could embarrass China
during next summer's Olympic Games, the central government has made no
move to curb vehicle purchases through regulation or taxes. And that, in
turn, has made it harder for governments in the developed world to make
progress in getting Beijing to do more to fight climate change.

That's just one example of the long-term impact of the government's
focus on the Me generation. In an article in the official mouthpiece
People's Daily published in February, Premier Wen Jiabao stressed that
economic growth should take precedence over democratic reforms for the
foreseeable future, a period that he appeared to indicate could stretch
to 100 years. And yet for all its machinery of control, the party is
vulnerable. Senior cadres from Wen on down have acknowledged in public
that growing unrest in the provinces, as farmers clash with police over
expropriated land or official corruption, could threaten the party's
grip on power.

As a result, China's rulers face a dilemma: the very policies that cater
to the urban middle class come at the expense of the rural poor. So far
the government is erring on the side of the rich. In March the
government pledged to address problems plaguing the country's peasants,
such as access to medical treatment and schooling, health insurance and
the disparity between urban and rural incomes. And yet a relatively
small portion of the budget was set aside to address the concerns of the
peasantry, with the bulk of spending still concentrated on stoking the
booming economy.

Even more telling was the passage of what was widely viewed as one of
the most important pieces of legislation to be put forward in several
decades of reform: the revised law on property ownership. Pushed through
despite objections from old-line conservatives, the law for the first
time gave equal weight to both state- and private-ownership rights. But
a look at the fine print shows that the law only protects things dear to
the rising middle class: real estate, cars, stock-market assets.
Farmers, on the other hand, will still be unable to purchase their land
and instead will be forced to lease plots from the government.

If left unchanged, such policies could exacerbate China's rich-poor
divide and create conditions for tumultuous social upheaval. The test
for China ― as the Me generation grows bigger, richer and more powerful
― will be whether it begins to push for the social and political reforms
that are necessary to ensure China's long-term prosperity and stability.
How likely is that? Though they're not exactly clamoring for free
elections, members of the new middle class have shown a willingness to
stand up to authority when their interests are threatened. Last October
police in Beijing attempted to enforce rules limiting each household to
a single, registered animal no taller than 14 in. (35 cm). The drive
sparked a rare public demonstration by hundreds of well-heeled Chinese,
mostly young dog owners. Within a month, according to Hong Kong's South
China Morning Post, President Hu Jintao had intervened, ordering the
Beijing authorities to back off. It was the first time most Beijingers
could remember a public protest drawing a direct intervention by China's
top leader.

It was hardly Tiananmen, but a small triumph for free expression
nonetheless. And if the West hopes to see China become democratic as
well as prosperous, it will have to find ways to encourage modest
breakthroughs like these, rather than expect sweeping change. At the
Gang Ji Restaurant, where the dishes have been cleared and fresh fruit
and more tea brought in, the mood is reflective. "We are lucky compared
to our parents," says Maria Zhang, who works as a membership manager in
one of the capital's most exclusive clubs. "My parents had nothing
themselves. They lived for me." Wang Ning, the snowboarder who runs his
own successful advertising company, agrees. "We are more self-centered.
We live for ourselves, and that's good. We need to have the strength to
contribute to the economy. That's our power. The power to contribute.
That's how our generation is going to help the country." China's future
will be defined by whether they realize that democracy can help China, too.

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* http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1647228,00.html