> Lao PDR is not the Hmong's enemy, the Hmong's enemy is VP and his
> Terror Network! According to the: �Recently published as
> "Transnational Adaptation: �An Overview of the Hmong of Laos" �in
> Hmong/Miao in Asia, edited by Nicholas Tapp, Jean Michaud, Christian
> Culas, and Gary Yia Lee (Chiangmai: �Silkworms Bookd, �2004)
>
> http://members.ozemail.com.au/~yeulee/Topical/hmong%%20of%%20laos.html
>
> "A small number of them have been adamant that they would not
> capitulate or give up their fear of the unknown and their love of
> independence. �This attitude of the "Chao Fa" Hmong has made life
> rather difficult for the larger Hmong population in the country."
>
> In contrary to VP Terror Network's allegation and myth of Genocide of
> Ethnic Hmong in the Lao PDR. The fact is that Majority of Hmong
> support and loyal to the Lao Government.
>
> "Those who stayed on in Laos after 1975 consisted of three groups. The
> first were those who lived in territories occupied by the Lao
> revolutionary forces, and are usually known as "thirty-years Hmong",
> meaning that they were supporters of the 30-year revolutionary
> struggle of the Pathet Lao. �The second group comprised of former
> soldiers or refugees on the side of the Royal Lao Government and who
> were unable to leave Laos or who decided not to. This groups is
> sometimes referred to as "Vang Pao Hmong" or former supporters of Gen.
> Vang Pao. �The third smaller component of the current Hmong population
> in Laos consists of small resistance groups, known as "Chao Fa" (or
> followers of the Lord of the Sky). �They are commonly labelled
> "bandits", and are found in inaccessible and rugged mountain areas,
> numbering probably no more than 500 to 1000 today. Some build make-
> shift houses hidden deep in the foliage of tropical forests while
> others reportedly live openly in traditional Hmong villages and
> practise normal subsistence farming."
>
> According the Lao National Census Report, Hmong-Lao are hard working
> people.
>
> "The 1995 census shows that of the 177 492 Hmong aged 10 years and
> over, 75%% are employed, 1.4%% unemployed and 23.6%% economically
> inactive (too young, at school or too old to work). � This compares
> with the national figures of 68.6%% being employed for a total working
> age population of 3 157 417 people, 1.7 unemployed and 29.6%%
> economically inactive (State Planning Committee, op.cit.: �53)."
>
> While in the United States, where job opportunity is abundant.
> However, for some unknown reason, Hmong-American find it hard to find
> work.
>
> "Enployment Among Hmong adults:
>
> Not in labor force......65%%
> Employed.................30%%
> Unemployed...............5%%
>
> It appeared to me that VP and his Terror Network are holding the Hmong
> down just so he they can continuing exploiting Hmong people for their
> personal gains.http://www.hmongnet.org/news/articles/article-2
>
> The Lao Government did not neglect Hmong-Lao's economic, educational
> and medical needs. As VP Terror Network would like you to believe. The
> fact is that Hmong's preference of residence is the root cause of
> their underdevelopement as the below statement indicated.
>
> "A �preference for rural and remote upland residence is usually seen
> as belonging to a community which is backward, traditional and poor,
> in contrast to urban, modern living. � On this score, the Hmong of
> Laos are obviously located among the lowest scale of the Lao social
> ladder."
>
> "By all accounts, there has been a huge growth in educational
> facilities in the Lao PDR in the last 20 years, judging from
> information provided by Hmong villagers and visitors to Hmong areas.
> This would have at least improved the literacy rate of tribal
> minorities, as there are now many primary schools of at least up to
> Grade 3 available in the bigger settlements along major arterial
> roads. Like the rest of the population, the older Hmong have not
> benefited much from modern education, due to the lack of access to
> schooling during their childhood and the remoteness of their
> villages. �Equally, women may not have gained much from the new
> education system, despite government introduction of gender equality
> as a policy, due mainly to the Hmong's patrilineal family values which
> favour sons over daughters or which tie daughters to household chores
> rather than sending them to school."
>
> "It is obvious that the Lao Government has made great attempts to
> allocate educational services to the general population, but still has
> not reached all sections the community, especially those in rural and
> remote mountain regions. Much of the growth in primary schooling has
> taken place across the country up to Grade 3, but secondary and
> tertiary education facilities still prevail mainly in urban and
> provincial capitals. The majority of Hmong simply do not have the
> means to send their children to pursue education in provincial
> capitals or the city of Vientiane. �Moreover, many parents with
> subsistence farming background still see education as a luxury which
> has little relevance to their urgent daily needs - the need for
> immediate survival and family labour. �As one government official
> recently stated to me, the Government may build a school and send a
> teacher to a remote settlement, but there is little point when parents
> will not send their children to learn. �This is all the more true when
> education is not �yet made compulsory in the Lao PDR."
>
> The Lao Government is a champion for Hmong advancement. In contrary to
> VP Terror Network's campaign of misinformation and out right lies.
>
> "The Lao PDR Government �has a policy of resettling hill tribespeople
> in the lowlands in order to bring development to them more easily and
> to avoid further forest and environmental destruction. It has not
> tried to implement the policy vigorously, due to land tenure problems
> in the lowlands and lack of space suitable for large scale
> resettlement."
>
> "The Lao PDR Government, through the UNDP and USAID, has initiated two
> opium replacement �projects with the Hmong: one in Vientiane province
> (UNDP) and the other in Samneua (USAID). �Three years after it began
> in 1991, �the UNPD project came to a complete stop �when road
> construction reached the site area in Pha Lavae �and project staff
> were unfortunately met with bullets instead of welcome banquets. The
> Government blamed "Chao Fa bandits" for this hostile reception."
>
> " Life for the majority of Hmong in the highlands continues to be a
> gruelling chore of seasonal farming, hunting and gathering. �Their
> living standard �is now low, but will likely improve once the current
> road infrastructures being put in place by the Lao PDR Government are
> completed. �Already, many Hmong villagers have managed to build
> themselves dirt tracks to connect their villages to the main road if
> the distance is not too great, thus allowing them to transport some
> farm produce to the local markets. Thus, the Government's road
> construction program remains the most positive factor in bringing
> communication and economic improvement to the highlanders. �In 1976,
> there were only 11,462 kilometres of roads of all categories in Laos,
> but this has increased to 22,321 kms by 1996 (Lao PDR Committee for
> Planning and Cooperation, 1995: 102; and 1997: 65).
>
> Hmong are not persecuted by the Lao Government as the VP Terror
> Network alleged. In contrary the Lao Government are propelling Hmong
> awareness and civil right to the national scene.
>
> "As stated by Stuart-Fox (1997: 79-80), the Pathet Lao revolutionary
> movement relied on ethnic minorities for its initial support bases,
> because it had "little opportunity to mobilize lowland Lao" which was
> firmly controlled by the Royal Lao Government, its opponent. Thus, the
> Pathet Lao, from the onset, had developed effective egalitarian
> relations with ethnic nationalities, as well as adopting well-defined
> policy regarding national identity and unity involving all ethnic
> minorities. �To inspire support, the movement capitalised on the
> mythical exploits of national and tribal leaders who resisted or led
> rebellions against domination by foreign powers such as the Thai,
> Burmese or French. �It also nominated �well-known ethnic leaders, such
> as Faydang Lobliayao in the case of the Hmong, �to be included as
> "Heroes of the Revolution".
>
> For these reasons, the "thirty-years" Hmong under Faydang's leadership
> fought vigorously alongside other supporters of the Pathet Lao. When
> victory came in 1975, �the euphora was well justified not only because
> peace was finally at hand but also because the promises of the
> revolution would be realised in the form of better living standards,
> or good positions in the new Government, the army or the public
> service. The major stumbling block, however, was that "For thirty
> years war had been the priority, but in 1975 the [Lao People's
> Revolutionary] Party was faced with the task of governing a modern
> state, complete with ministries, departments and technical
> requirements... a challenge for the best-organised and most far-
> sighted revolutionary movement" (Stuart-Fox, 1997: 171).
>
> "When compared to the old Royal Lao Government with only 2 Hmong
> deputies in the National Assembly, the Lao PDR with its current 7
> obviously has more Hmong representation on the nation's �law-making
> body."
>
> To pacify the resistance Hmong, the �Lao Government made �Saisomboun
> District (formerly known as Muong Cha) into a Special Zone in 1994.
> This is the area closest to Phu Bia, the base of �most of the "Chao
> Fa" groups. � The idea is to make �Saisomboun the �centre �for
> political and economic development to attract �resistance Hmong into
> the �folds of the authorities. �The Government �withdrew its lowland
> Lao personnel from the area, and put Gen. Bounchane (a Khmu who
> successfully suppressed many "Chao Fa" Hmong �in the late 1970's) �as
> the local military commander, �with Col. Lo Lu Yang as deputy
> commander �and Mr Siatou Yang (formerly the Chao Muong at Moung Hom)
> as the unification coordinator. �The Special Zone covers the following
> districts: �Muong Phoun, Muong Hom, Muong Cha and Long San. �The Hmong
> are now facing each other trying to build bridge �across a political
> divide.
>
> Despite Lao Government's sincere effort in integrating Hmong into Lao
> mainstream society, VP Terror Network has always maintain their
> hostility. The culprit here is cleary VP Terror Network.
>
> "There is no doubt that the Government believes it is best to have the
> Hmong deal with each other �over this long-standing political thorn.
> This �does not seem, however, to have assuaged �the anger of the �so-
> called Hmong " bandits". � They continue to ambush army convoys and
> even taxis travelling between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, or to and
> from Muong Saisomboun. �This has escalated �since May 1998 into �free-
> for-all �shooting �by Hmong government troops against �"Chao Fa"
> villages, with the resultant armed retaliations on Muong Saisomboun
> itself. �The Hmong are now killing each other, and it is said that
> many Hmong families have fled �Saisomboun to Kilometre 52 , the major
> Hmong settlement on the road linking Vientiane to Muong Phon Haung."
>
> "The most contentious issue remains political: the dilemma faced by
> the Lao PDR Government in dealing with Hmong expatriate leaders intent
> on stirring up the Hmong inside Laos, and in addressing the
> integration problem posed by the small pockets of Hmong who resist its
> rule deep in the jungles of central Northern Laos. �The "Chao Fa"
> Hmong, despite being few in number, have continued their armed
> skirmishes, and are creating problems for the majority of peace-loving
> Hmong in the country."