Lao PDR is not the Hmong's enemy, the Hmong's enemy is VP and his
Terror Network! According to the: Recently published as
"Transnational Adaptation: An Overview of the Hmong of Laos" in
Hmong/Miao in Asia, edited by Nicholas Tapp, Jean Michaud, Christian
Culas, and Gary Yia Lee (Chiangmai: Silkworms Bookd, 2004)

http://members.ozemail.com.au/~yeulee/Topical/hmong%%20of%%20laos.html

"A small number of them have been adamant that they would not
capitulate or give up their fear of the unknown and their love of
independence. This attitude of the "Chao Fa" Hmong has made life
rather difficult for the larger Hmong population in the country."

In contrary to VP Terror Network's allegation and myth of Genocide of
Ethnic Hmong in the Lao PDR. The fact is that Majority of Hmong
support and loyal to the Lao Government.

"Those who stayed on in Laos after 1975 consisted of three groups. The
first were those who lived in territories occupied by the Lao
revolutionary forces, and are usually known as "thirty-years Hmong",
meaning that they were supporters of the 30-year revolutionary
struggle of the Pathet Lao. The second group comprised of former
soldiers or refugees on the side of the Royal Lao Government and who
were unable to leave Laos or who decided not to. This groups is
sometimes referred to as "Vang Pao Hmong" or former supporters of Gen.
Vang Pao. The third smaller component of the current Hmong population
in Laos consists of small resistance groups, known as "Chao Fa" (or
followers of the Lord of the Sky). They are commonly labelled
"bandits", and are found in inaccessible and rugged mountain areas,
numbering probably no more than 500 to 1000 today. Some build make-
shift houses hidden deep in the foliage of tropical forests while
others reportedly live openly in traditional Hmong villages and
practise normal subsistence farming."

According the Lao National Census Report, Hmong-Lao are hard working
people.

"The 1995 census shows that of the 177 492 Hmong aged 10 years and
over, 75%% are employed, 1.4%% unemployed and 23.6%% economically
inactive (too young, at school or too old to work). This compares
with the national figures of 68.6%% being employed for a total working
age population of 3 157 417 people, 1.7 unemployed and 29.6%%
economically inactive (State Planning Committee, op.cit.: 53)."

While in the United States, where job opportunity is abundant.
However, for some unknown reason, Hmong-American find it hard to find
work.

"Enployment Among Hmong adults:

Not in labor force......65%%
Employed.................30%%
Unemployed...............5%%

It appeared to me that VP and his Terror Network are holding the Hmong
down just so he they can continuing exploiting Hmong people for their
personal gains.
http://www.hmongnet.org/news/articles/article-2

The Lao Government did not neglect Hmong-Lao's economic, educational
and medical needs. As VP Terror Network would like you to believe. The
fact is that Hmong's preference of residence is the root cause of
their underdevelopement as the below statement indicated.

"A preference for rural and remote upland residence is usually seen
as belonging to a community which is backward, traditional and poor,
in contrast to urban, modern living. On this score, the Hmong of
Laos are obviously located among the lowest scale of the Lao social
ladder."

"By all accounts, there has been a huge growth in educational
facilities in the Lao PDR in the last 20 years, judging from
information provided by Hmong villagers and visitors to Hmong areas.
This would have at least improved the literacy rate of tribal
minorities, as there are now many primary schools of at least up to
Grade 3 available in the bigger settlements along major arterial
roads. Like the rest of the population, the older Hmong have not
benefited much from modern education, due to the lack of access to
schooling during their childhood and the remoteness of their
villages. Equally, women may not have gained much from the new
education system, despite government introduction of gender equality
as a policy, due mainly to the Hmong's patrilineal family values which
favour sons over daughters or which tie daughters to household chores
rather than sending them to school."

"It is obvious that the Lao Government has made great attempts to
allocate educational services to the general population, but still has
not reached all sections the community, especially those in rural and
remote mountain regions. Much of the growth in primary schooling has
taken place across the country up to Grade 3, but secondary and
tertiary education facilities still prevail mainly in urban and
provincial capitals. The majority of Hmong simply do not have the
means to send their children to pursue education in provincial
capitals or the city of Vientiane. Moreover, many parents with
subsistence farming background still see education as a luxury which
has little relevance to their urgent daily needs - the need for
immediate survival and family labour. As one government official
recently stated to me, the Government may build a school and send a
teacher to a remote settlement, but there is little point when parents
will not send their children to learn. This is all the more true when
education is not yet made compulsory in the Lao PDR."

The Lao Government is a champion for Hmong advancement. In contrary to
VP Terror Network's campaign of misinformation and out right lies.

"The Lao PDR Government has a policy of resettling hill tribespeople
in the lowlands in order to bring development to them more easily and
to avoid further forest and environmental destruction. It has not
tried to implement the policy vigorously, due to land tenure problems
in the lowlands and lack of space suitable for large scale
resettlement."

"The Lao PDR Government, through the UNDP and USAID, has initiated two
opium replacement projects with the Hmong: one in Vientiane province
(UNDP) and the other in Samneua (USAID). Three years after it began
in 1991, the UNPD project came to a complete stop when road
construction reached the site area in Pha Lavae and project staff
were unfortunately met with bullets instead of welcome banquets. The
Government blamed "Chao Fa bandits" for this hostile reception."

" Life for the majority of Hmong in the highlands continues to be a
gruelling chore of seasonal farming, hunting and gathering. Their
living standard is now low, but will likely improve once the current
road infrastructures being put in place by the Lao PDR Government are
completed. Already, many Hmong villagers have managed to build
themselves dirt tracks to connect their villages to the main road if
the distance is not too great, thus allowing them to transport some
farm produce to the local markets. Thus, the Government's road
construction program remains the most positive factor in bringing
communication and economic improvement to the highlanders. In 1976,
there were only 11,462 kilometres of roads of all categories in Laos,
but this has increased to 22,321 kms by 1996 (Lao PDR Committee for
Planning and Cooperation, 1995: 102; and 1997: 65).

Hmong are not persecuted by the Lao Government as the VP Terror
Network alleged. In contrary the Lao Government are propelling Hmong
awareness and civil right to the national scene.

"As stated by Stuart-Fox (1997: 79-80), the Pathet Lao revolutionary
movement relied on ethnic minorities for its initial support bases,
because it had "little opportunity to mobilize lowland Lao" which was
firmly controlled by the Royal Lao Government, its opponent. Thus, the
Pathet Lao, from the onset, had developed effective egalitarian
relations with ethnic nationalities, as well as adopting well-defined
policy regarding national identity and unity involving all ethnic
minorities. To inspire support, the movement capitalised on the
mythical exploits of national and tribal leaders who resisted or led
rebellions against domination by foreign powers such as the Thai,
Burmese or French. It also nominated well-known ethnic leaders, such
as Faydang Lobliayao in the case of the Hmong, to be included as
"Heroes of the Revolution".

For these reasons, the "thirty-years" Hmong under Faydang's leadership
fought vigorously alongside other supporters of the Pathet Lao. When
victory came in 1975, the euphora was well justified not only because
peace was finally at hand but also because the promises of the
revolution would be realised in the form of better living standards,
or good positions in the new Government, the army or the public
service. The major stumbling block, however, was that "For thirty
years war had been the priority, but in 1975 the [Lao People's
Revolutionary] Party was faced with the task of governing a modern
state, complete with ministries, departments and technical
requirements... a challenge for the best-organised and most far-
sighted revolutionary movement" (Stuart-Fox, 1997: 171).

"When compared to the old Royal Lao Government with only 2 Hmong
deputies in the National Assembly, the Lao PDR with its current 7
obviously has more Hmong representation on the nation's law-making
body."

To pacify the resistance Hmong, the Lao Government made Saisomboun
District (formerly known as Muong Cha) into a Special Zone in 1994.
This is the area closest to Phu Bia, the base of most of the "Chao
Fa" groups. The idea is to make Saisomboun the centre for
political and economic development to attract resistance Hmong into
the folds of the authorities. The Government withdrew its lowland
Lao personnel from the area, and put Gen. Bounchane (a Khmu who
successfully suppressed many "Chao Fa" Hmong in the late 1970's) as
the local military commander, with Col. Lo Lu Yang as deputy
commander and Mr Siatou Yang (formerly the Chao Muong at Moung Hom)
as the unification coordinator. The Special Zone covers the following
districts: Muong Phoun, Muong Hom, Muong Cha and Long San. The Hmong
are now facing each other trying to build bridge across a political
divide.

Despite Lao Government's sincere effort in integrating Hmong into Lao
mainstream society, VP Terror Network has always maintain their
hostility. The culprit here is cleary VP Terror Network.

"There is no doubt that the Government believes it is best to have the
Hmong deal with each other over this long-standing political thorn.
This does not seem, however, to have assuaged the anger of the so-
called Hmong " bandits". They continue to ambush army convoys and
even taxis travelling between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, or to and
from Muong Saisomboun. This has escalated since May 1998 into free-
for-all shooting by Hmong government troops against "Chao Fa"
villages, with the resultant armed retaliations on Muong Saisomboun
itself. The Hmong are now killing each other, and it is said that
many Hmong families have fled Saisomboun to Kilometre 52 , the major
Hmong settlement on the road linking Vientiane to Muong Phon Haung."

"The most contentious issue remains political: the dilemma faced by
the Lao PDR Government in dealing with Hmong expatriate leaders intent
on stirring up the Hmong inside Laos, and in addressing the
integration problem posed by the small pockets of Hmong who resist its
rule deep in the jungles of central Northern Laos. The "Chao Fa"
Hmong, despite being few in number, have continued their armed
skirmishes, and are creating problems for the majority of peace-loving
Hmong in the country."