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Author: aboabo
Date: May 31, 2008 23:11
On 27 July 2008 I wrote:
>My brother tells me there is a blue plaque on 76 Storey's Way in
>Cambridge which says that Wittgenstein lived there. As I thought he
>lived in college when he returned to Cambridge from 1929 on, did
>Wittgenstein live there when he was a student (1908-1914) ?
My brother has now unearthed the answer. Wittgenstein's doctor, Dr.
Edward Vaughan Bevan, lived at 76 Storey's Way. W was diagnosed with
prostrate cancer; from February 1951 until his death that April, W
lived with his doctor.
So sadly the original thread title should be more like, "Wittgenstein
died here."
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Author: Michel.CoutourierMichel.Coutourier
Date: May 31, 2008 17:47
On p. 1 of the Handbook of Philosophical, Hodges writes matter-of-
factly of Aristotle's 24 schemas (as opposed to Boole's infinitely
many). Anybody know a modern study of Aristotle's schemas?
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Author: John JonesJohn Jones
Date: May 31, 2008 13:55
A totality of facts assumes that facts can be totalised, but there are
at least two sorts of fact that cannot be so processed. Such facts as
these can be found as -
1) Emergent properties. For example, the totality of cows may or may not
result in the fact of a herd. Again, a collection of knives, forks and
spoons may not appear as a set of cutlery. Finally, the aesthetic
experience we may get from a painting is not a totality or summation of
the paintings aesthetic, sensory properties.
2) Manifesting conditions. That is, conditions that need to be in place
for objects to arise. Possibly the best example I can give comes from
Kant whose 'intuition' is the name for the conditions through which
objects are made manifest. These conditions, appearing as space, allow
'differences'. Without difference objects could not appear.
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Author: sweet&softsweet&soft
Date: May 31, 2008 04:55
Alba had expressed interest in acting since the age of five. She took
her first acting class at age twelve, and an acting agent signed her
nine months later.[18][6]
Her first appearance on film was a small role in the 1994 feature Camp
Nowhere as Gail. She was originally hired for two weeks but her role
turned into a two-month job in a leading role when one of the
prominent actresses dropped out.[5]
Alba appeared in two national television commercials for Nintendo and
J.C. Penney as a child. She was later featured in several independent
films. She branched out into television in 1994 with a recurring role
as the vain Jessica in three episodes of the Nickelodeon comedy series
The Secret World of Alex Mack.[6] She then performed the role of Maya
in the first two seasons of the television series Flipper.[5][6] Under
the tutelage of her lifeguard mother, Alba learned to swim before she
could walk, and she was a PADI-certified scuba diver, skills which
were put to use on the show, which was filmed in Australia.[19][6]
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Author: John JonesJohn Jones
Date: May 29, 2008 14:11
There can be no negation of a single object or variable. There is no
legitimate proposition of the sort "not-x", or "not a car" or "a
non-car". Such expressions always imply a class to which, in this case,
the car belongs, such as the class of machines or red objects. Let us
make a rule: Rule 1) Negation moves an object or variable from one group
to another group, such as moving a car from a group of red cars to a
group of differently coloured cars.
However, this leads to an asymmetry between a proposition and its
negation, for while a red car is one colour, its colour negation could
be any number of colours.
We can resolve this asymmetry by marking out another rule: Rule 2)
Negation, in moving objects from one group to another, drops the
particular case. Thus "not a red car" or more awkwardly, "a non-red car"
stipulates no more than that the car that is this colour is now that
colour. The particular colour, in this case red, drops out of
consideration.
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Author: jonasgensakumillerjonasgensakumiller
Date: May 29, 2008 07:56
The Dare Institute is conducting a study to see how people reason
about problems. We are asking anonymous participants to complete
three instruments. The Helper-Person Problem instruments consists of
five short one-paragraph vignettes. You will be asked to read the
vignettes and answer a few multiple choice questions. This instrument
will take about 15 minutes to complete. The Politician-Voter
Instrument consists of 10 short one-paragraph vignettes. This
instrument will take about 15-20 minutes to complete. The Short
Laundry Instrument asks you to view a sequence of steps that will
either lead to a piece of laundry being clean or dirty. After viewing
the sequence, you are asked to predict whether a new sequence will
lead to a piece of laundry being clean or dirty. This instrument will...
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Author: conesetterconesetter
Date: May 28, 2008 23:23
Occam's razor can be presented as a heuristic maxim: do not use more
than you need. It may be that it can be usefully complemented: do not
discard more than you have to. For an example consider how division by
zero has always been treated. If it is allowed it leads to
inconsistency. But we do not discard either zero or division. We just
rule that the function divide by is not defined on the argument zero.
The second maxim might be useful in set theory where a distinction
is made between sets and classes and some operations are permitted on
sets and forbidden on classes. This seems an unnecessarly sweeping way
of avoiding paradox and inconsistency. It may only be necessary to
recognise that some functions including predicates cannot be given
domains quite as big as we at first think they...
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Author: John JonesJohn Jones
Date: May 28, 2008 15:28
A room with a view is a room with a view, whether or not there is a viewer.
Then let's be bold. Objects are made real, ontologically and logically,
by a view. This isn't the quaint idea of a quantum world collapsing into
physical form by a view, nor is it psychologism where an individual's
'beliefs' contribute to a phenomenal world.
Thus, or for the cautious 'for example', a universe of one object cannot
realise that object for there is no view or framework in which the
object can possibly be presented. The only justification we can make for
a solitary object is to claim that it views itself, or else to suppose a
supernatural viewer. This idea is known as transcendental realism and is
an implicit foundation for all logics and sciences.
It is for this reason that I argue that logic and science are either
supernaturalisms or psychologisms, where the viewer, historically
presented as God, has been anthropomorphised and rendered invisible. For
these studies the viewer is ever-present, yet never 'seen', never
questioned. The consequences of questioning 'the view' can be dramatic,
if the explorer of knowledge wishes to travel that far.
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