Last Call for Papers: International Conference on Modeling, Simulation
and Control (ICMSC 2008)
From: International Association of Engineers (IAENG)
San Francisco, USA, 22-24 October, 2008
http://www.iaeng.org/WCECS2008/ICMSC2008.html

Important Dates:
Draft Paper Submission Deadline (extended): 30 July, 2008
Camera-Ready Papers Due & Registration Deadline: 16 August, 2008
WCECS 2008: 22-24 October, 2008

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/25/skype_backdoor_rumours/

For years I have advocated that the purchase of Skype by eBay was incited by the U.S. government who wanted to put in code so they are able to intercept Skype communications. Here's more proof of this, although hard proof is still out.

I call on Open Source developers to create a Skype clone with full encryption which cannot be intercepted.

I'm looking at building a cryptographic hash starting with a weak
bijective function f.

Most attacks rely on differentials. If you can attack a structure
with n rounds of f, that comes down to finding n separate
differentials where you get to choose the input of just one of them.
(Unless you can find differentials that map to themselves, say ff(x+d)
= ff(x)+d, like Fluhrer's attack on Mercy. I'll assume that f has
been screened for differentials like that.)

One question is how big should n be. I'll make a stab in the dark: if
every one-bit differential usually affects every bit forward by at
least 25%% after x rounds and backwards by at least 25%% after y rounds,
then n = 2(x*y) is a good guess. I think I've seen 1.5 rather than 2
used in practice.

Another question is, given that n=30 rounds of f is enough, how do you
combine data blocks with the permutation to build a hash? How do you
associate a key with the permutation?

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/25/skype_backdoor_rumours/

For years I have advocated that the purchase of Skype by eBay was incited by the U.S. government who wanted to put in code so they are able to intercept Skype communications. Here's more proof of this, although hard proof is still out.

I call on Open Source developers to create a Skype clone with full encryption which cannot be intercepted.

6) On the subject of stronger algorithms, the necessity of obscure key
generation is the question. If all keys are tightly searchable,
security options are also limited. But an unsearchable key space with
virtually unlimited means of generating keys all which could be used
with a specific algorithm makes more then good sense. For test
purposes, something trivial is OK but if used for security, such keys
are likely foolish.

The average stupid user, many are, seeks simple security and can get
that or less. The most secret of adequate keys when not closely held
are in fact shared keys; strangers hold no virtue if their values
diverge from yours. The big truth is that sales arguments are for
taking rather than for giving and it is easy to be taken.

The rant against security by obscurity might only be narrowly valid
where generic information is to be openly discussed but otherwise that
noise probably amounts only to mere attempted intimidation for one of
many possible reasons. Uncountable good algorithms are possible and
having more of them is good. If you preach status quo because you
have all the answers, you don't.

A while ago I posted basic code on how to hide a channel amongst three
channels.

A,B,C are three data channels amongst the single channels. A time
division multiplexing appears the common method of many channels on a
single data line.

What happens is a hidden channels appears and the ciphertext binary
set was distributed amongst the whole A,B,C set. A random background
to all three A,B,C channels disallows easy data detection.

All that is necessary appears the actual name for this technique. A
code to exactly distribute the data inside the three channels appears
a class of encipherment. And so I get to ask for the techniques name.

Please what is this techniques real name?

Thanks
Doug

eaglesondouglas123@yahoo.com