First I would like to say: Please... bear with me. I am still getting
my bearings with this crypto stuff.

I have looked at the benchmarks for RSA operations at Wei Dai's site
(http://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html) and GMP
(http://www.swox.com/gmp/gmpbench.html), and I have executed "OpenSSL
speed rsa" (http://www.openssl.org/) on my Pentium Core Duo 2.0GHz and
got some values from that.

The benchmarks are not clear. In particular, there is not enough
information presented in the output of the data to allow the
experimenter to clearly interpret the benchmark without having to
rummage through the code or make (potentially incorrect) assumptions
about the code. For example, it is not stated whether CRT or the
Montgomery mechanism is used to compute the benchmark data.

So I would like to your insight on what I can expect on RSA performance
for specific parameters.

Hi all:

Would somebody take time to explain in simple terms what a "key
collision attack" mean? And, the summary of Biham key collision attack?

Thanks!
AM

What am I supposed to believe now, Joe? The Beale ciphers are
Jefferson "style" ciphers? Jefferson "type" ciphers? And at the same
time, seperate and apart from the Beale treasure scheme, Jefferson
simply made the decision to expend the greater part of his remaining
life and fortune, and also all the money he could borrow, to found a
university? That's starting to sound silly, Joe. See, Jefferson was
what you might call a "gentleman of honor". You might want to research
those terms on a site other than sci.corrupt. I don't think you
appreciate the stigma attached to that kind of behavior in his day. You
may well be sitting on the most important revision of American history
in the history of American history. Doesn't that make you proud? You
might try and amend some of your own history. How 'bout this as a
proclamation from Joe Peschel: "Wagner was right, except when my
friends are involved". Or this: "Wagner was right, except when there's
money at stake". You know, Joe, lately other toadies have been
intimating that you're "gone", no longer "here", that you have "left".
We know better, don't we? Is that you hiding between those you call
your friends and that which you call your charcter? Maybe not. Someone
run outside and check real quick! Maybe Joe's still in the "parking
lot". ...

If you have been on holiday you may have missed recent events.

A rather psychotic, anonymous, multiple personality poster has joined
sci.crypt.

This would not normally be a problem except that this particular
individual's malfunction has led to the extreme harassment of a
sci.crypt regular including forged postings about child pornography with
details of where the regular lived, phone number etc which have not only
defamed and harassed the regular, caused a police investigation but have
also placed the regular in actual physical danger from self-proclaimed
vigilantes.

This alone is not acceptable but is made worse because the perpetrator
is still in the position to continue or repeat the harassment on the
previous regular or any other.

This is an important issue and open to debate(what exactly is the issue
and what results are desired?). Would someone be willing to moderate
such a debate?

F i r s t C a l l F o r P a p e r s

EUROPKI'07
Fourth European PKI Workshop: Theory and Practice
28-30 June 2007
Mallorca, Spain

http://dmi.uib.es/europki07

The 4th European PKI Workshop: Theory and
Practice is focusing on all research aspects of
Public Key Applications, Services and
Infrastructures.Submitted papers may present
theory, applications or practical experiences on
topics including, but not limited to:

A quick remark. In general, if you want to base it on any linear secret
sharing scheme (such as Shamir), we can do secure exponentiation in
constant rounds of communication between the parties:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11681878_15
I'm not sure how efficient the whole thing is in practice.

-Eike

On Dec 18, 8:12 pm, "Robert" gmail.com> wrote:

On 20 Dec 2006 07:25:45 -0800, Sergei gmail.com> wrote:

The encrypted message is still hidden from everyone when
the public key is shared. That's the point of public-key
cryptography.

Is there is any known way to solve the following problem:

There is two (or more) parties (call them "senders") that send
encrypted messages. Each sender has its own encryption key. There is
one "receiver", who gets the messages and then decrypts them (she knows
the keys of the senders). The senders have different keys and no
deterministic id of the sender should be attached to the encrypted
message.

Is there is a way to make the receiver able to decrypt the messages in
a more efficient manner than just trying all the keys and checking
which gives the valid message?

Best regards,
Sergei

Thanks for the tip. I will definitely look at the LibTomCrypt. However, I
was able to add some strategic register shifting and get the Outerbridge
working. Basically, at the top of 'desfunc', shift the input variables, and
at the end shift the output variables.

There is probably a more efficient way of doing it, but this macro worked
just fine, in case anyone finds it useful:

#define swapend(lval) (((lval & 0xFF000000L) >> 24) | ((lval & 0x00FF0000L)

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