yes i know extende euclidean works but i want its implementation in
some software like Maple , because i am having problems in doing that.
thankyou anyways for your reply
Mark Wooding wrote:

Hello guys,

I've got something to decrypt, it's an SMS sent to my friend by
annonymous guy and she wants to know what's going on with it. Can
anyone help, it is in Polish:

KTN DGTGM APTPTJ JGPTEP TPJGMD EJXMJ AJPT MDBHJAD DMJATP DJAPT JA
MTPJAT MJPTJP DJTW DVPGJ NJAPATM JPB AQ ATPU JATQT MDBTP TJADGP JBPJT
TQGJAT MTQAT? JA KMTJ

Cheers,
Marty

rossum coldmail.com> writes:

And heterosexuals are prone to molest young girls. ( People who molest
young girls tend to be heterosexuals. Thus the conclusion follows ;-)

"Tom St Denis" gmail.com> writes:

There was? I do not recall it. And doing a google search on Courtois, I
find only this thread in the last two weeks. Now perhaps you discussed it
over coffee with a friend, but unfortunately those conversations
are not indexed by Google.

Hi,

Recently, Courtois and Bard published a new paper on algebraic
cryptanalysis of DES (see http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/402 .

Citing the abstract:

"In this paper we finally show that practical algebraic attacks are in
fact possible for reduced-round versions of DES. This is the first
known example of a working algebraic attack on up to 10 rounds of a
real-life ``industrial'' block cipher. The attack requires only ONE
SINGLE KNOWN PLAINTEXT (instead of a very large quantity). This is an
unprecedented thing that has no equivalent in any cryptographic attack
ever done.

Though (on a PC) we recover the key for only six rounds, in a weaker
sense we can break 12 full rounds of DES. These results are very
interesting because DES is known to be a very robust cipher, and our
methods are very generic. Thus, if DES is susceptible to this kind of
algebraic cryptanalysis, then probably nearly any other cipher is, and
some may be substantially weaker."

Could anyone please comment on this paper? Is the attack described
really easier than a brute force attack on (10 rounds of) DES?

Rob Warnock wrote:

If the someone you don't trust has root on your server, then there's
no point in worrying about fancy cryptographic attacks they might be
able to perpetrate against you. They have root! That means they can
trivially learn any private keys you have stored on the box. I don't
see what relevance this side-channel attack has in that scenario.

Those contract terms sound weird. What if I'm running ObscurOS?
What good is it to have root if it's some obscure OS that the co-lo folks
won't know how to use? What if I'm running ResearchOS, where there is no
concept of root? The justification for a co-lo site insisting on root
access doesn't make any sense to me. Why do people put up with those
kind of contract terms? Because they feel they have no choice, I presume?

Kristian Gj

Zarathustra gmail.com> wrote:

I think it is time to ask you to describe your problem, not your
solution. Then perhaps you can get better answers.

Have you looked at TinySec?

I know these configuration. The main problem is that you have to
transmit a syncronization value for each communication and that it's
not good for my problem.

Mike Amling ha scritto:

Luc The Perverse wrote: