i want to find inverse of a given polynomial modulo another primitive
polynomial. a very common function i.e to find g(x) s.t f(x).g(x) =1
modulo h(x) here f(x) and h(x) are known polynomials over GF(2).

if any one can help me in finding any algo implemented in magma or
maple for such computation i will be thankful

mehreen- a student
of cryptography

Dear fellow cryptologists,
I turn to the cryptologic public, because I experienced unfair and
incorrect review procedures at IACR sponsored workshops, and the IACR
board of directors seems to be unwilling or unable to react adequately
to my formal complaints.

I submitted two papers to CHES 2006, and these two papers got three
reviews each. There is firm evidence that none of the six reviewers had
bothered to read completely the paper they had to review . It is
obvious that it is impossible to judge the merits of a scientific paper
one has not read.

Hi All,

I'm damn near embarassed to ask, but I have a third party library that
is Failing Key Validation in an EC Operation.

When E is over GF(p), one must supply R (order). Is this a random
Integer based on the BitCount of p? If not, how does one determine an
appropriate value?

Below is an example from NIST P192 (only p and R are shown). I find it
more than coincidence that the first 28 decimal digits are the same.

Jeff

NIST P192:
p = 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279
R = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081

~ * ~
_________________________________________
~ * Morning Wood Enunciates
A Public Annunciation ~ !*
_________________________________________
COALITION
FOR THE

h o m e l e s s

in nyc
_________________________________________
Act UP, Act OUT
Don't always SUBLIMATE ~ !
(especially with your Soul Mate)

~~~ *~
Five things you can do today
To help the homeless ...

1. DONATE

2. JOIN A CAMPAIGN

3. VOLUNTEER

(posted to comp.compression per accident, too)

Hi all,

for an application in a chess program, I am looking to reduce the
required storage for moves.

Naive method: from square (6 bits) + to square (6 bits) = 12 bits

If we also want to store promotion or castling information (somewhat
less vital than the above), we need 3 additional bits making 15 bits in
total.

Now, I need to reduce this, optimally to 8 bits or less, and this can be
at the cost of making the storage lossy. I also only need an equality
operation.

Given this conditions, hashing the 12 (or 15) bits to an 8 bit value
seems like a good approach.

My problem is now:

a) Can we use domain-specific knowledge to optimize the hash function?
It should be fast to compute, but still avoid collisions as much as
possible.

b) If we know that an average chess position will have about 40 possible
moves, what is the expected collision rate for the 8 bit hash?

"Tom St Denis" gmail.com> schreef in bericht
news:1163680664.603011.180560@h54g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...

Cryptlib looks interesting, although it's a littlebit overkill for my
application, I don't need S/MIME/PGP, certificates or key-management.

"Tom St Denis" gmail.com> schreef in bericht
news:1163680664.603011.180560@h54g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...

TC yahoo.com> wrote:

I think Blum-Goldwasser counts as an asymmetric stream cipher.

Here's how it works. Let n = p q, where p and q are primes in 3 + 4Z.
The public key is n, and the private key is p and q.

Some important facts:

* Let Q_n = { x^2 | x in Z/nZ } be the set of quadratic residues in
Z/nZ. The Chinese Remainder Theorem tells us that Z/nZ is
isomorphic to F_p x F_q. Now, choose some y in Q_p; then

(y^2)^(p+1)/4 = y^(p+1)/2 = y . y^(p-1)/2 = y

Therefore y |-> y^2 is a permutation on Q_p. By symmetry, it's a
permutation on Q_q too, and therefore (by the isomorphism) on Q_n.

* Moreover, the map y |-> y^2 is one-way, under the assumption that
factoring is hard. Suppose an adversary can invert this
permutation; then we can choose z in Z/nZ with Jacobi symbol (z/n) =
-1 (so z is not in Q_n), run the adversary on the element z^2 in Q_n
giving a square root y; then either gcd(z - y, n) or gcd(y - z, n)
is a nontrivial factor of n with probability > 1/2 contradicting
hardness of factoring.

rossum wrote:

He won't use ms cryptoapi because he thinks it needs a special licence,
and it can't be used from VB6 (his development environment). Both of
those beliefs are wrong, but he won't acknowledge that.

TC (MVP MSAccess)
http://tc2.atspace.com

Antony Clements wrote:

Stupid FTW....

I guess it never occurred to you that someone else may have made an RNG
before you...

I can't wait until you release your RNG so we can start making random
bits... Crikeys I hate feeding my RSA keygen "tom needs random bits
please help me" as the PRNG seed ....

Tom