>>... However, that was not my point. What we are attempting to
>>discuss here, i.e. not just evade, is exactly how critical to the
>>sciences in general is Popper's concept falsifiability? I state _without
>>reservation_ that any non refutable proposition cannot even be
>>understood. IOW, I cannot make my position any clearer than that.
There's also a useful article at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend/
Unfortunately, all I know about Feyerabend is what I just read in
those two articles, so I can't do justice to his views.
Did Feyerabend believe that a valid scientific theory need not
_in principle_ be falsifiable? Or only that it need not be
falsifiable in fact?
There are scientific theories which we now accept as valid that
could not be falsified by any practical method when they came
out. Some theories about the speed of light, quantum phenomena,
molecular structures, the dark side of the moon, the center of
the earth, and many other things required more advanced
technology than was available when they were first proposed in
order to test them. But I think they were _in principle_
falsifiable, even when they were first proposed.
There are also scientific theories which we now accept as valid
that contradicted generally accepted interpretations of
observations, thus appearing to be inconsistent with facts. As
simple examples, we can consider Aristotelian physics which
says that an object in motion will come to rest (if the donkey
stops pulling the cart, it slows down and stops), the sun goes
around the earth (the earth is too heavy to move but the sun is
made of fire which moves easily). But again, falsifiability _per
se_ is not at issue here. The apparent contradiction between
Newtonian physics and univerally acknowledged "facts" was
resolved by re-interpreting those "facts", not be throwing out
falsifiability.
I don't think I (or John Edser, or Karl Popper) would have any
problem accepting any of that.
John never argued that experiments that would falsify a theory
have to be practical with current technology, or that accepted
"facts" can't turn out to be in need of reinterpretation. He
only argued that if there is, _in principle_, no way to falsify a
theory, it's not a scientific theory.
Isn't that right? If there is _in principle_ no possible
empirical observation that could falsify a theory, is it a theory
about empirical reality at all? It's very hard for me to see
how.
Alan
