> Magnequench: CFIUS and China's Thirst for U.S. Defense Technology.
>
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1913.cfm
>
>
>
>
> One of Senator Hillary Clinton's Asia policy advisers quit her
> presidential campaign several days ago, complaining that the candidate
> was engaging in "gratuitous China bashing."[1] And, in fact, the
> Senator has of late been engaged in a jeremiad on China.[2]
>
> To be sure, a good portion of the sourness nurtured in the Democratic
> Party's base against China is undeserved, and more about big-labor
> politics than genuine security concerns, yet Senator Clinton has
> spotlighted at least two grave vulnerabilities in America's defense
> industrial base: Chinese state-controlled investments in key U.S.
> defense suppliers and the impact on defense supplies caused by
> seemingly unrelated environmental litigation that closed down the
> world's second-largest rare-earths mine and thereby gave China a
> monopoly on oxide ores that are absolutely essential to all defense
> electronics.
>
> The first concern was addressed in 2007 when Congress passed the
> Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA),[3] which seeks
> to balance the exigencies of America's national security with its
> "open investment" policy. FINSA codifies what the Committee on Foreign
> Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has been doing for the past 20
> years, and while it is not perfect, there have been some significant
> changes. The 2007 amendments now require that CFIUS (1) publish
> guidance in the Federal Register on the types of transactions that it
> has reviewed and that have presented national security considerations
> and (2) notify Congress after each review and investigation. FINSA
> also created the concept of "lead agency" and the responsibilities
> thereof, particularly in following up on and enforcing mitigation
> agreements relating to "covered transactions." These were positive
> steps.[4]
>
> The question is whether Senator Clinton or any other presidential
> candidate is up to the challenge of questionable foreign investments
> in U.S. defense industries—and CFIUS may now be the least of the
> problems.
>
> How China Bought Magnequench
>
> Magnequench's story is indeed a story of executive branch disregard
> for the health of the nation's defense industrial base, but the
> Administration of Bill Clinton bears culpability for letting it happen
> in the first place.
>
> Magnequench had a unique expertise in the manufacture of high-powered
> neodymium magnets, which it pioneered in the 1980s for its parent
> company, General Motors, to use in airbags and mechanical sensors.
> When GM restructured in the early 1990s, the company began to divest
> itself of subsidiaries that were not in its "core competence."
> Magnequench, in spite of its high-tech pedigree—and the fact that it
> provided critical component parts to "precision guided munitions" that
> were then in great demand by the U.S. Department of Defense—was put up
> for sale.
>
> Reportedly, Magnequench supplied 85 percent of the neodymium magnets
> used in servo motors for PGMs,[5] but neodymium magnets are far more
> important and ubiquitous than their use in advanced weaponry might
> suggest. They are the sole reason high-speed, high-capacity computer
> data storage devices can work. They are found in literally every
> computer in the world, and in 2004, Magnequench, together with its
> merger partner NEO Material Technologies (and its integrated Chinese
> joint-venture partners), supplied about 80 percent of the world market
> share of neodymium and rare-earth oxide powders used in those magnets.
> [6]
>
> So when GM put Magnequench on the block in 1995, who should come up
> with the $70 million asking price?[7] An investment consortium headed
> by Archibald Cox Jr. (son of the illustrious Watergate prosecutor)
> acting in concert with two Chinese state-owned metals firms, San Huan
> New Material and China National Nonferrous Metals Import and Export
> Company (CNNMIEC), which had been pestering GM to sell Magnequench
> since 1993.[8]
>
> In the deal, the two Chinese firms took at least a 62 percent majority
> of Magnequench shares, with the senior Chinese investor taking over as
> the company's chairman and Cox as chief executive officer (CEO).[9]
> (In 2005, when Magnequench merged with a Canadian firm then known as
> AMR, Cox was listed as owning a significant minority share of AMR and
> was named AMR chairman.[10] )
>
> The chairman of San Huan, a Mr. Zhang Hong, son-in-law of former
> Chinese "paramount leader" Deng Xiaoping (and now director of the
> Research and Development Bureau of the Chinese Academy of
> Sciences[11]), took over as chairman of Magnequench.[12] No doubt, Mr.
> Zhang's desire to acquire Magnequench was informed by the Chinese
> government's—and his father-in-law's—"Super 863 Program" to develop
> and acquire cutting-edge technologies for military applications,
> including "exotic materials."[13] The other Chinese investor in
> Magnequench, CNNMIEC, was at the time run by yet another Deng Xiao-
> ping son-in-law.
>
> CFIUS's Role in Magnequench
>
> But the United States government surely would not permit the Chinese
> simply to walk in and take over a significant U.S. high-tech firm,
> would it? Several sources indicate that CFIUS did reach a "mitigating
> agreement"[14] with Magnequench's new owners that the Chinese
> companies could not remove Magnequench's production equipment or jobs
> from the U.S. for a period of ten years.[15]
>
> It is, however, an old Chinese tradition that "rules are made to be
> broken" (shang you zhengce, xia you duice). Magnequench's Chinese
> owners cleverly reinterpreted the CFIUS conditions. One Magnequench
> employee reported that shortly after the Chinese took over,
> Magnequench's neodymium-iron-boron magnet production line was
> "duplicated in China" and that, after the Chinese "made sure that it
> worked, they shut down" the U.S. production in Indiana. The employee
> added, "I believe the Chinese entity wanted to shut the plant down
> from the beginning. They are rapidly pursuing this technology."[16]
>
> It is quite likely that the Chinese government realized (even if the
> U.S. government did not) that neodymium-iron-boron supermagnets are
> absolutely essential to the assembly of U.S. precision weaponry and
> that there was basically only one U.S. supplier of those magnets to
> the U.S. defense firms that assembled such arms.
>
> In 1997, the Magnequench shares held by the two Chinese firms were
> transferred to Onfem Holdings, a Chinese state-owned holding company
> based in Hong Kong and run at the time by a Mr. Wu Jianchang, yet
> another son-in-law of Deng Xiaoping.[17] Archibald Cox, in the
> meantime, became the titular Magnequench President and CEO, and
> although a Chinese firm held at least 62 percent of Magnequench's
> stock, his firm's PR office began to hold the company out as a "U.S.-
> majority owned company headquartered in Anderson, Indiana."[18]
>
> EPA Shuts Down World's Second-Largest Rare-Earths Mine
>
> A few months later, in March 1998, Magnequench's major U.S. supplier
> of rare-earth oxides, Molycorp (then owned by Unocal), was obliged to
> shut down its rare-earths mine at Mountain Pass, California, and pay a
> $410,000 fine for leaking what the Environmental Protection Agency
> (EPA) termed "low level radioactive waste." Mountain Pass, the "only
> producer of rare earths in the United States," was the second-largest
> rare-earths mine in the world and included a "world class" refinery.
> [19]
>
> Overnight, this removed 20 percent of the world supply of rare-earth
> powders from the market. Magnequench, however, was controlled by China
> National NonFerrous Metals Corp. (CNNMC), the Chinese state-owned
> corporation that had a virtual monopoly on key rare-earth supplies,
> and found it very easy to source its supplies from partners and
> affiliates in China.
>
> By September 2001, citing slack demand, Cox announced that he would
> shut down the Magnequench production lines completely even though the
> company posted revenues of $250 million in the year 2000. Cox
> explained that "almost all of the raw materials for Magnequench's
> powder products come from China, and 90 percent of our customer base
> is in Asia."[20]
>
> In April 1999, Magnequench announced that it would open a 30,000-
> square-foot laboratory facility on a 10-acre site mostly in the
> Research Triangle Park in Raleigh–Durham, North Carolina.[21] But by
> September 2003, Magnequench had abandoned North Carolina and relocated
> its entire research operation to Asia, and the U.S. company's revenues
> dropped to $158 million.[22] One could speculate that Magnequench's
> Chinese owners in the CNNMC (Onfem's parent in Beijing) were more than
> making up for their U.S. losses in the vast expansion of supermagnet
> sales from Chinese companies.
>
> By the first months of the Bush Administration, Magnequench's crown-
> jewel technologies had already seeped off unnoticed to China, and the
> entire production line was already being dismantled in the United
> States. U.S. Senator James Inhofe (R–OK) complained in October 2005
> that "over 12 years, the company has…moved piecemeal to China, leaving
> the U.S. with no domestic supplier of neodymium, a critical component
> of rare earth magnet." The blame, he said, rested with CFIUS because
> "CFIUS approved this transfer" in 1995 and failed to enforce the terms
> of its approval.[23]
>
> Of course, the real reason Magnequench could not source neodymium in
> the United States was that the EPA had closed the world's second-
> largest source of the mineral—the Mountain Pass mine—charging that the
> mine effluent was not "beneficiated" (i.e., "earthen in character") as
> the mine operator claimed, but rather "processed."[24] It does not
> appear from the court record that the mine's effluent endangered
> either human health or animal habitat.
>
> By 2005, Magnequench remained a proprietor of several important rare-
> earths magnet patents and production processes and, presumably with
> financing from its Chinese owners, was sought out by other North
> American firms in the rare-earths business. Magnequench merged with a
> Canadian rare-earths firm, AMR, in 2005, and Archibald Cox was listed
> as the largest shareholder on the board of directors, apparently on
> behalf of an unnamed "initial holder." AMR is now known as NEO
> Materials Technologies (which still retains the
www.magnequench.com
> Web address).
>
> NEO and its Magnequench affiliate report that 85 percent of their
> manufacturing facilities are in China (the other 15 percent is in
> Thailand); that 95 percent of their personnel are located in China;
> and that all of their China manufacturing facilities are in the form
> of "joint ventures" with Chinese state-owned enterprises. It now
> appears that the United States has no rare-earth oxide magnet
> production capacity.[25] This is unsettling when one considers that
> virtually no piece of advanced information technology can be
> fabricated without rare-earth oxides—which, of course, means that no
> weapons system can be assembled without them.[26]
>
> In short, America's defense industry already relies on China for some
> of its most indispensable components—and the problem did not begin
> with President George W. Bush. It goes back to the early part of the
> Clinton Administration.
>
> Senator Inhofe was understated when he noted in 2005 that the United
> States no longer has a domestic supplier of neodymium, a critical
> component of rare-earth magnets. Treasury representatives believe that
> CFIUS's writ runs only to items specifically covered in arms-export
> control legislation, and there is little that it can or should do with
> regard to ensuring supplies of strategic materials not so listed.
>
> Conclusion
>
> No responsible policymaker seeks to restrain foreign investment in the
> United States. Foreign investment introduces new technologies and
> skills to America's economy, helping to promote U.S. competitiveness
> abroad. About 20 percent of all U.S. exports originate from U.S.
> affiliates of foreign-owned companies.[27]
>
> In the Magnequench case, Chinese investors found a number of different
> vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industry base: a poor appreciation
> of the importance of small and medium niche suppliers and the
> Achilles' Heel of environmental litigation, which has handed to the
> Chinese—up to now—a virtual monopoly on supplies of an essential
> resource to modern computing electronics.
>
> It is not clear from the record that either Republicans or the
> Democrats, Bushes or Clintons, have the intestinal fortitude to take
> the steps necessary to monitor problematic foreign investment in
> America's high-technology manufacturing sectors, which supply our
> defenses, or to balance sane environmental concerns with national
> security exigencies. If they did, a reasonable solution to the
> Mountain Pass mine effluent could have been found without closing the
> entire operation, and Magnequench's gradual metamorphosis into a China-
> based company and the consequent loss of its products in the U.S.
> defense supply chain would not have happened.
>
> John J. Tkacik, Jr., is a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies
> Center at The Heritage Foundation.
>
>
>
> [1] Lisa Lerer, "Clinton adviser quits over China rhetoric," Politico,
> April 18, 2008, at
>
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0408/9719.html.
>
> [2] Timothy Aeppel, "Clinton Seeks Edge by Focusing on Voter
> Insecurities: Magnet Industry, Overtaken by China, Gets Play in
> Indiana," The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2008, p. A7, at
>
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120951864538254897.html.
>
> [3] Public Law 110–49, July 26, 2007.
>
> [4] FINSA consists of several amendments to the 1988 "Exon–Florio"
> legislation, which itself amended the Defense Production Act of 1950
> (50 U.S.C. App. 2170). See also U.S. Department of the Treasury,
> Office of International Investment, "31 CFR Part 800 Regulations
> Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers," Federal Register,
> Vol. 72, No. 196 (October 11, 2007), p. 57900.
>
> [5] Jeffrey St. Clair, "Outsourcing US Missile Technology to China:
> The Saga of Magnequench,"
Counterpunch.org, April 7–9, 2006, at
>
http://www.counterpunch.org/stclair04072006.html.
>
> [6] NEO is the new name for AMR. AMR "acquired" Magnequench in a stock
> swap that left Mr. Cox as AMR chairman. See "Rationale for MQI
> Acquisition," Annual Information Form, AMR Technologies Incorporated,
> for the Year Ended December 31, 2005, p. 5, at
>
http://www.magnequench.com/assets/content/ir/
> ir_fil/ir_fil_2004_2006/aif0603/AMR_AIF_31March06.pdf.
>
> [7] $56 million in cash and a $14 million note. See Charles Child, "GM
> to sell magnet unit to Chinese," Automotive News, March 27, 1995, p.
> 46.
>
> [8] Ibid. See also GM press release, "GM to sell Magnequench
> International," PR Newswire, June 28, 1995.
>
> [9] Under the name "Hong (Harry) Zhang," Mr. Zhang Hong was listed as
> Magnequench chairman in all regulatory filings, and Archibald Cox was
> listed as CEO. See
>
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/
> people/person.asp?personId=6258361&capId=677601&previousCapId=23245&
> previousTitle=TCW%%2FCrescent%%20Mezzanine%%20Partners%%2C%%20L.L.C. Hong
> Zhang, Harry, had served as Deputy Director of the Technology Sciences
> of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a central government agency, and
> chairman of San Huan since 1985. Mr. Zhang has more than 25 years of
> professional engineering and management experience. He was Chairman of
> Magnequench International, Inc. (Magnequench Inc. or Magnequench)
> since 1995. Some filings show Harry Zhang as "Chairman of the Board
> and Director" of Neo Material Technologies Inc. "since 1995." However,
> in a phone call to NEO, Mr. Zhang Hong was said to have "retired in
> late 2006" as CEO of "Magnequench Tianjin." The two firms sold 62
> percent of Magnequench to a Chinese state-owned holding company in
> Hong Kong, "Onfem," in 1997. "Onfem" is a wholly owned subsidiary of
> China National Nonferrous Metals Corporation, and CNNMC no doubt
> instructed CNNMIEC to make the transaction. It does not appear that
> either San Huan or CNNMIEC retained any "Magnequench" shares. See Lana
> Wong, "Onfem in US magnetic deal," South China Morning Post, January
> 7, 1997. There are also reports that the Chinese government pressured
> GM into selling Magnequench to Chinese interests as a condition for
> approving GM's bid to open an automotive production line in Shanghai.
> See the testimony of Richard D'Amato, U.S.–China Security and Economic
> Review Commission, in hearing, China National Offshore Oil–Unocal
> Merger, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives,
> July 13, 2005.
>
> [10] Pres release, "GM to sell Magnequench International." In 2005,
> Magnequench merged with a Canadian firm, then known as AMR, and Cox
> was listed as "beneficially owning directly or indirectly" about 11
> percent of AMR shares—apparently the result of the AMR–Magnequench
> stock swap that effected the merger of the two firms. A footnote (no.
> 7 at page 26) to AMR's annual information form for 2005 indicates that
> about half of these shares were held on behalf on an "initial holder"
> to "facilitate short-selling transactions." There was no further
> identification of the "initial holder." See AMR Web site, at
>
http://www.magnequench.com/assets/content/ir/ir_fil/
> ir_fil_2004_2006/aif0603/AMR_AIF_31March06.pdf.
>
> [11] Cheng Li, Chinas Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman
> & Littlefield, 2001), p. 138.
>
> [12] See entry on "Hong (Harry) Zhang, chairman of Magnequench" at
>
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/
> stocks/people/person.asp?
> personId=6258361&capId=677601&previousCapId=23245&
> previousTitle=TCW%%2FCrescent%%20Mezzanine%%20Partners%%2C%%20L.L.C.
>
> [13] For a description of the "Super 863 Program" and the patronage of
> Deng Xiaoping, see U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 105-851,
> Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/
> Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Vol. 1, May
> 25, 1999, p. 13, at
>
http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851-html/ch1bod.html.
>
> [14] "When a covered transaction does present national security
> concerns, [the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007]
> provides statutory authority for CFIUS…to enter into mitigation
> agreements with parties to the transaction or impose conditions on the
> transaction to address such concerns." See proposed "Regulations
> Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers by Foreign Persons,"
> 31 CFR 800, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Investment
> Security, at
>
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
> proposed_regulations42108.pdf.
>
> [15] It seems unlikely that CFIUS would have negotiated "jobs" as a
> mitigation condition unless it could be shown they were directly
> relevant to national security. CFIUS's mitigation terms are not
> published. However, several parties interested in the transaction,
> particularly the labor unions representing Magnequench's employees,
> seem to have been notified of them. An officer of NEO Materials told
> the author that NEO does, in fact, "maintain pensions" for former GM
> employees. One report alleges that, "despite original promises
> approved by CFIUS as part of the transaction that the production
> equipment and jobs were not to be moved out of the U.S., those
> transfers did, in fact, happen." See press release, "USW's Gerard
> Calls for Moratorium on CFIUS Approvals, Comprehensive Review of
> Process; Letter to President Bush Cites Ports Controversy, Transfer of
> Magnequench ‘Smart-Bomb' Technology to China," United Steel Workers,
> February 28, 2006, at
http://www.usw.org/usw/program/content/2790.php.
> See also Scott L. Wheeler, "Missile Technology Sent to China," Insight
> on the News, March 3, 2003, p. 26. A version of this report is
> available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_5_19/ai_97874289.
>
> [16] Wheeler, "Missile Technology Sent to China."
>
> [17] Wong, "Onfem in US magnetic deal."
>
> [18] Magnequench press release written by Jake Ring, "Magnequench
> Acquires Ugimag Rare Earth Magnet Business," Business Wire, November
> 2, 2000.
>
> [19] For a broader discussion of the importance of the Mountain Pass
> facility, see James B. Hedrick, "Rare-Earth Metals," U.S. Geological
> Survey, 1998, at
>
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/
> rare_earths/740497.pdf. See also U.S. Geological Survey, The Mineral
> Industry of California, 1998, at
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/state/980699.pdf,
> and David R. Jessey, field report, "Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine,"
> California State University at Pomona, at
>
http://geology.csupomona.edu/drjessey/fieldtrips/mtp/mtnpass.htm. With
> rare-earths prices at historic highs, Molycorp reportedly intends to
> reopen the Mountain Pass mine in 2008. See Jane Spooner, "RARE
> EARTHS," Minor Metals Trade Association Mining Journal Review, January
> 1, 2006, at
>
http://www.mmta.co.uk/economicsFacts/Articles/
> MiningJournalReview/RareEarths.pdf.
>
> [20] Stuart A. Hirsch, "Magnequench announces plans to close plant;
> Officials don't say when local factory will close; ‘slack demand'
> cited in elimination of 260 jobs," The Indianapolis Star, September
> 29, 2001, p. N1.
>
> [21] Lisa F. Smith, "Magnequench to be park's newest tenant," The
> Herald-Sun (Durham, N.C.), April 30, 1999. p. B8.
>
> [22] Leo John, "Magnet maker shutting local operation; 15 jobs gone,"
> Triangle Business Journal,
>
> Vol. 18, No. 51 (August 22, 2003), p. 3.
>
> [23] See transcript of hearing, Implementation of the Exon–Florio
> Amendment and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
> States, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate,
> October 20, 2005, provided by Federal News Service.
>
> [24] See "Molycorp, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency," No.
> 98-1400, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
> Circuit, December 17, 1999, at
>
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/
> opinions/98opinions/98-1400a.html.
>
> [25] Magnequench and Hitachi NEF were the only two U.S. magnet
> manufacturers, but their magnet production lines are either in China
> or Japan. A Japanese firm, Santoku, owns the only magnet-alloy
> metallurgy plant in the United States and, according to a company
> representative (contacted through
http://www.santoku.com), supplies
> the alloys to magnet makers in Japan and China.
>
> [26] For a very readable discussion of China's thirst for rare-earths
> oxides, see David Lague, "China corners market in a high-tech
> necessity," International Herald Tribune, January 23, 2006, p. 11, at
>
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/22/business/rare.php.
>
> [27] See Daniella Markheim, "The Need for CFIUS Reform to Address
> Homeland Security Concerns,"
>
> Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 944, June 13, 2006, at
>
http://www.Research/NationalSecurity/hl944.cfm
WND
'Smart bomb' technology moving to China
Pentagon brushes aside concerns national security will be threatened
Posted: August 12, 2003
1:00 am Eastern
By Sherrie Gossett
© 2008
WorldNetDaily.com
Citing national-security concerns, two Democratic lawmakers are engaged
in a last-ditch effort to halt plans for the transfer of an Indiana
factory that produces critical technology used in the guidance systems
of U.S. "smart bombs" to the People's Republic of China.
The Department of Defense denies any impropriety, but some observers are
asking: Is it a case of politics as usual, or a cover-up?
The Magnequench factory (originally known as UGIMAG) was sold in August
2000 to a consortium that included Chinese interests. In 2001, it was
announced the plant would be shut down.
The factory is responsible for producing 80 percent of the rare-earth
permanent magnets used in the guidance systems of U.S. "smart bombs,"
according to lawmakers.
Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind.
On Aug. 1, the office of Rep. Pete Visclosky, D-Ind., issued a statement
indicating he and Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind., were mounting a "last-ditch"
effort to halt the factory move to China. Citing the loss of 225
northwest Indiana jobs, Visclosky also expressed concern over the
"transfer of sensitive defense technology to the People's Republic of
China."
"We deserve answers not only about the economic impact of this move, but
also about the potential threat to national security that it creates,"
Bayh said.
Both Bayh and Visclosky previously lobbied President Bush and
administration officials to look into the Magnequench matter, but
received no response.
"We're still trying to get a response," Visclosky press secretary
Clifton Brown told WND.
"The congressman is very concerned about the transfer of this kind of
technology to a foreign power," Brown said, stating that a supply
chokepoint could result "in the event the U.S. becomes involved in a
conflict that the Peoples Republic of China doesn't approve of."
"The congressman is very unhappy the administration has taken no
interest in this issue at all," he added.
Inquiries go unanswered
The two lawmakers reportedly received no response from letters sent to
President Bush on March 6 and May 1.
Two letters sent to Treasury Secretary John Snow (on May 20 and June 5)
received a response turning down a request from the congressman for a
meeting. Several phone calls also have received no response.
Rep. Pete Visclosky, D-Ind.
Visclosky sent a letter July 31 to the U.S. House of Representatives
Armed Services Committee, requesting the committee review the contracts
Magnequench currently holds with the U.S. Department of Defense.
"These contracts must be reviewed in order to verify the legality of the
pending move to China," he said.
Bayh, who is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, backs the
request for a review.
WorldNetDaily contacted the office of Sen. John Warner, R-Va., head of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, and asked whether the committee was
moving on this issue. At the time of the publication of this report, WND
had not received a response.
On Aug. 1, Bayh and Visclosky also sent a letter to the U.S. Department
of the Treasury demanding all the facts of its investigation into its
review of Magnequench's 1995 sale to a consortium that included Chinese
interests and Magnequench's 2000 acquisition of the Valparaiso facility.
To date, they have not received a response. WorldNetDaily contacted
Snow's office and had not received a response by press time.
A controversial sale
In 1995, Beijing San Huan New Material High-Tech Inc. and China National
Non-Ferrous Metals Import & Export Corporation partnered with investment
firm the Sextant Group Inc. to acquire Magnequench and established the
new entity as Magnequench International Inc.
Magnequench, a high-tech company created in 1986 by General Motors,
pioneered the development and production of quenched
neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) – magnets used in the guidance system of
"smart bombs." Beijing San Huan New Materials High-Tech Inc. is a
holding of the Chinese Academy of Science Business Group and was
established in 1985. China National Non-Ferrous Metals – previously
described by the Wall Street Journal as a "high-flying state company" –
operates under the control of the State Council, one of the major organs
of the Chinese government.
The 1995 sale required approval from the Committee on Foreign
Investments in the U.S., or CFIUS. The CFIUS is an inter-agency
committee chaired by the secretary of treasury, tasked with conducting
reviews of foreign acquisitions that might threaten national security.
"Concerns raised by American officials about what they considered a
clear case of the PRC attempting to obtain control of vital U.S. weapons
technology were shot down, and CFIUS permitted the buyout," reported
Insight magazine and WND.
WorldNetDaily has learned that in the same year the CFIUS approved the
sale, the U.S. International Trade Commission had initiated an
investigation into San Huan New Materials and found they were associated
with the Chinese government and were engaged in illegal practices that
harmed domestic industry.
Investigation into San Huan
That finding was part of an investigation into San Huan New Materials
High Tech Inc., Ningbo Konit Industries Inc. and Tridus International
Inc. regarding the importation of certain NdFeB magnets that infringed
upon U.S. patents held by YBM Magnex Inc. (successor in interest to
Crucible Materials Corporation).
The investigation was launched in response to a February 1995 complaint
lodged by YBM.
San Huan, Tridus and Ningbo are related companies. Tridus is San Huan's
exclusive representative for the sale of NdFeB magnets in the United
States; Tridus obtained the imported magnets from San Huan and Ningbo;
and San Huan and Tridus own a controlling interest in Ningbo.
The companies were referred to collectively as the "San Huan
Respondents" in a later enforcement proceeding.
Following the announcement of the investigation, San Huan voluntarily
entered into a consent order that forbade the company from continuing to
import the infringing magnets unless under consent or license from
Crucible. The consent order became effective Oct. 10, 1995.
It was soon found that San Huan continued illegal importation and sales
unabated.
Citing "bad faith" and "harm to domestic industry," the commission
argued San Huan's actions deserved a "significant penalty," and a $1.55
million fine was levied against the company.
Magnequench sale goes through
In 1995, the Magnequench sale was completed, and San Huan told investors
it chose to acquire the General Motors company because "it possessed the
best technology, biggest production capability and sole patent for
rapidly quenched NdFeB powder."
The powders are used in the manufacturing of state-of-the-art sintered
neodymium-iron-boron magnets. The move was said to "set San Huan firmly
on the road toward international expansion."
In 1998, Magnequench moved on to acquire GA Powders to capitalize on its
breakthrough gas atomization process for making NdFeB powder. The
technology was designed to create superior materials at lower costs. At
the time it was created, the Ames National Laboratory estimated the $250
million market for these bonded magnets was expected to grow by more
than 20 percent annually into the next century.
GA Powders was in fact a spin-off innovation company created by the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, which was
managed by Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company.
At the time, Ames said, "The new venture will strengthen the economy,
create jobs and provide a return on taxpayer investment in
government-sponsored research and development."
Ironically, as a sign of the times the Rare-earth Information Center at
the Ames National Laboratory was later forced to shut down, after more
than 36 years of providing scientific and technical information to
industry, government, universities and individuals. The center cited
consolidation in the rare-earth and magnet industries as a factor in the
shutdown. Private corporations had previously provided significant
sponsorship to the RIC, supplementing government funding. The RIC closed
on July 1, 2002.
After acquiring GA Powders, Magnequench opened a new powder plant in
Tianjin, China, in June 2000, moving production closer to the source of
raw materials and driving down the overall cost of the NdFeB magnets.
San Huan's close association with the rare-earth ore mining provinces of
Inner Mongolia and Jiangsi gives it a guaranteed stable source of raw
materials.
As previously reported by WND and Insight, a second effort to halt
technology transfer to China from Magnequench failed in 1999. Company
officials sought U.S.-government approval to export equipment from the
Magnequench plant in Anderson, Ind., that could enhance China's ability
to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.
"Stronger opposition to the transfer within government ranks again was
stymied, and the high-tech computerized machine tools were moved to the
company's new plant in mainland China." Insight writer Scott Wheeler
reported.
The "new" Magnequench then went on to purchase the Valparaiso, Ind.,
factory (then known as UGIMAG) in October 2000, which then became known
as Magnequench UG.
The people behind Magnequench
The successful 1995 Magnequench sale was followed by an interesting
series of management changes that primed the company for successful
expansion.
The chairman of San Huan New Materials, Mr. Hong (Harry) Zhang, then
also became chairman of Magnequench.
Archibald Cox Jr., president and CEO of Magnequench
Archibald Cox Jr., founder of the Sextant Group, was appointed president
and chief executive officer.
And Shannon Song, the former finance director of state-run China
National Non-Ferrous Metals Import & Export Corporation, was appointed
as a member of the board of directors. Song is now senior vice president
strategic planning and is also responsible for China operations.
Zhang is the husband of Deng Nan, second daughter of China's former
premier, Deng Xiaoping.
Deng Nan, wife of Hong Zhang and daughter of Deng Xiaoping
Deng Nan serves on the PRC State Council as vice minister of state for
the Ministry of Science and Technology. Broad technology policy
directives originating in the upper levels of the Communist Party
hierarchy are fine-tuned and implemented by the State Council and its
institutions.
The ministry oversees the "863 Program," an aggressive science and
technology acquisition program first launched by Deng Xiaoping and
funded and controlled by the Chinese government. It is formally known as
the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China.
Its name comes from the month (March) and year (1986) it was implemented.
Hong (Harry) Zhang, chairman of Magnequench
U.S. government reports indicate the "Super 863 Program" (as it was
called after 1996) calls for continued acquisition and development of
technology in a number of areas of military concern, including machine
tools, electronics, petrochemicals, electronic information,
bioengineering, and nuclear research, aviation and space.
The 863 Program continues to be focused on technology research and
acquisition in eight specific fields.
The 863 Program
Rare-earth metals and products, including NdFeB magnets, are one of the
chief target areas of focus of the 863 Program. They fall under the
category of "exotic materials." In addition to rare-earths, materials
sought in this category include optical-electronic information
materials, new energy compound materials and high-capacity engineering
plastics.
Despite the wide range of consumer-market uses for NdFeB magnets, the
possible military applications of "dual-use" sintered NdFeB magnets
concern critics.
About the 863 Program, the 1999 congressional Cox Report noted, "These
projects could advance the PRC's development of materials, such as
composites, for military aircraft and other weapons." Potential dual-use
of exotic materials acquisitions were said to be a key area of military
concern."
San Huan has undertaken various research projects in national government
programs such as the Torch Program (another sci/tech development
program), the Assault Program, and the 863 Program, which the company
says "has greatly enhanced and upgraded San Huan's technology and products."
San Huan Materials is mentioned repeatedly in 863 annual reports, which
also applaud significant advancements in neodymium-iron-boron magnet
engineering.
For the English-speaking public, 863 states it's goals are to aid
military and civilian industry with an emphasis on civilian uses and
subsequent economic growth.
According to Russia/China expert Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets, Chinese
language explanations of 863 emphasize military goals above civilian goals.
As an example, Nemets quotes a translated sentence from Chinese media
stating the 863 Program was necessary for "the development of new
advanced technologies for defensive and offensive warfare."
It is Nemets' opinion that since 1986, through its 863 Program, China
has been developing post-nuclear superweapons using knowledge gained
from the "dragnet" of the eight fields of research.
Nemets, who refers to the West as "geo-strategically lobotomized," has
been highly critical of the Bush administration's war on Iraq, faulting
it for not focusing on what he considers to be the far greater threat of
strategic developments in China.
"Project 863 has at its disposal not only everything necessary for its
development of non-machine post-nuclear superweapons, but also the
scientific manpower of the entire world," said Nemets.
Nemets is a consultant to the American Foreign Policy Council and
co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New
Geopolitics." A former student of the Moscow Institute of Steel and
Alloys, Nemets worked at the Presidium of Academy of Sciences USSR as an
expert on the economic and technological development of China and Japan,
and published several dozen articles and booklets in the Soviet
scientific media.
Power and the 'princelings'
Deng Nan was not the only high-placed figure in Chinese politics that
was connected to the new Magnequench. At the time of the sale, the
president of China Nonferrous Metals Industrial was Wu Jianchang, who is
married to Deng Lin, the eldest daughter of the late Deng Xiaoping.
Jianchang headed what was China's key state monopoly in metals trading
and was also a director of listed companies in Hong Kong such as Silver
Grant.
The two daughters are part of the "Crown Prince Party" – descendants,
usually second-generation, of prominent and influential senior
Communists of the People's Republic of China. By virtue of their
lineage, the descendants wield significant political and business
influence. Members of the Crown Prince Party are commonly referred to in
the West by the colloquial terms "princelings" and "princesses."
In January 1998, Zhang Wule, a senior Communist Party official who had
served as governor of Gansu province and more recently headed the State
Economic and Trade Commission, was named president of China Nonferrous
Metals.
By 1999, San Huan Materials had become the top publicly traded Chinese
manufacturer of sintered magnetics, the biggest company for producing
NdFeB magnets in China and the world's third-largest volume producer.
Pentagon weighs in
WorldNetDaily spoke to several spokespersons and weapons experts with
the Pentagon, the Department of Defense and the Air Force regarding the
concerns raised by Bayh and Visclosky. Upon initial contact, none of
those contacted knew anything about the Magnequench situation.
Although not familiar with the details, Pentagon spokesman Glenn Flood
told WND: "Would we go to China for this? No. If you recall we didn't
buy them [sic] berets."
Gloria Cales, a spokeswoman for the Air Force and a weapons expert, and
Maj. Paul Swiergosz offered to have the issue researched.
A statement was later given to WND by Pentagon spokesperson Cheryl Irwin.
The same statement is slated to be given to members of Congress who
inquire about the issue. It said in part, "The Department of Defense
does not keep records on the percentage of rare-earth magnets which we
have procured from the Indiana facility. However, that plant at one time
did make rare-earth magnets used in motors for tail fins on certain U.S.
precision-guided munitions."
Boeing image of a JDAM from it's Asian Aerospace 2002 conference site.
In a January 2003 interview with Wheeler, Magnequench President Cox
initially denied but later confirmed having a contract for the
production of rare-earth magnets for the JDAM – the U.S. Joint Direct
Attack Munitions project commonly referred to as "smart bombs."
When asked how DoD could not know the percentage, since the magnets were
obtained under contract, Irwin declined further comment, refusing to
answer any of WorldNetDaily's specific questions.
DoD: 'Department of Dodging?'
Visclosky's office labeled the DoD's response to WND an "artful dodge."
"A very large amount of these products are still made there. … It's a
mistake to allow such a large production to go overseas," said Brown.
Regarding the vagueness of the DoD's response and their failure to
answer critical and specific questions, Jake Swinson, a weapons expert
earlier recommended to WND by the Pentagon, said, "[Irwin's] up there
with Rumsfeld's people," adding, "They probably don't know what to do
about it. They're probably in shock. That's a pretty serious thing."
Swinson added that complex situations arise "when these mergers take
place and sales get up to a pretty high level."
"They're probably having trouble deciding what to say and what to do to
investigate it," he added.
Said Brown from Visclosky's office: "It's clear that they are trying to
avoid answering these questions. The public wants to know. There's
something that they don't want to tell people about what's going on."
2 down - 1 to go
The DoD statement also said, "Nor has China cornered the manufacturing
market for such magnets, as numerous alternate suppliers exist (40
percent of world production in Japan, 5.8 percent in the U.S., and 4.8
percent in Europe). Additionally, there are substitute materials for
these components available from other sources. "
The response failed to answer questions regarding contracts already in
place and whether those would be honored, resulting in the U.S.
purchasing 80 percent of the magnets used in JDAMs from China.
According to Walter Benecki, a consultant to the worldwide magnetics
industry, there are only three firms in the U.S. licensed to sell
sintered NdFeB magnets. The second firm – a Kentucky plant belonging to
Germany's Vacuumschmelze GmbH, Hanau – has now announced it is closing
as well.
"Today we're down to one – and that one is owned by Japan," he said.
That firm is the Hitachi Magnetics Corporation in Edmore, Mich., part of
Hitachi Metals America.
In terms of the raw materials used to make the permanent magnets, the
country's foremost supplier (80 percent) of rare-earth materials
(Molycorp) experienced a shut down in 1998, according to Insight
magazine, after spending millions to remake its mining facilities
following Bureau of Land Management complaints that it was endangering
the desert-tortoise environment. Dr. Stanley Trout, a former consultant
to Molycorp, told WND the deteriorating prices on rare earths, mainly
due to Chinese competition were also a key factor in the severe
operational cutbacks. Some separation facilities at the mine, used to
process and purify rare-earth ores remain closed, subject to resolution
of the environmental issues. The Mountain Pass rare-earth deposit is the
highest quality deposit in the world.
A spokesperson for the Pentagon told WND, "Seventy-five percent of the
raw material used to make rare-earth magnets is currently supplied by
China. Although other sources and mines exist around the world –
including the United States – China remains the most cost effective
source at this time."
Until 1998, there were essentially two active mines in the world
producing rare earths for the exotic magnets – the Molycorp mine in
Mountain Pass, Calif., and China's Baotou mine.
The year after the U.S. mine shutdown, China met 88 percent of the world
demand for rare earths.
No risk – no monopoly?
The DoD statement went on to deny the lawmakers' assertion there was
risk involved in the situation: "Thus, implication of a risk to DoD due
to a Chinese monopoly on these magnets is incorrect," adding, "The
Department has no plans to alter our current purchasing practices of
these magnets."
Dr. Peter Leitner, a senior strategic-trade adviser to the DoD, had
previously told Wheeler, "The Chinese are clearly trying to monopolize
the world supply of rare-earth materials such as neodymium that are
essential to the production of the militarily critical magnets that
enable precise guidance and control of our most advanced weapons and
aircraft," adding that "rare-earth magnets lie at the heart of many of
our most advanced weapons systems, particularly rockets, missiles and
precision-guided weapons such as smart bombs and cruise missiles."
"By controlling the access to the magnets and the raw materials they are
composed of, U.S. industry in general and the auto industry in
particular can be held hostage to PRC blackmail and extortion in an
effort to manipulate our foreign and military policy," Leitner said.
"This highly concentrated control – one country, one government – will
be the sole source of something critical to the U.S. military and
industrial base."
Benecki believes within the next five years China will dominate the
world market for sintered NdFeB magnets, but doesn't see it as
problematic or "conspiratorial."
"It's just the natural evolution of technology and manufacturing driven
by raw materials," he told WND, referring to China's low labor costs and
abundance of rare-earth materials.
"I honestly don't know how big a national-security issue this is,"
Bencki said, "but I hate to see the point where there are no producers
of these products in the U.S."
Benecki is sought after for his expertise in creating strategic
alliances with China.
In May, Benecki addressed the Transformer Association on "How to
Efficiently Establish an Operation in China." In October, he will be
presenting a seminar in Detroit on Survival Strategies for Western NdFeB
Producers.
His advice? Companies must establish some sort of China capability to
remain profitable.
"The whole magnet industry is seeing these types of pressures," he said.
"It's a very difficult equation."
On July 17, minerals expert Hugh Hanes testified before the Subcommitee
on Energy and Mineral Resources and warned that the U.S. was in need of
a "well-conceived minerals and metals policy." Calling them "hidden
commodities," he emphasized how integral they were to the
aerospace/defense and critical civilian infrastructure. Among those
areas listed were JDAMs, F-22 stealth systems, reconnaissance
satellites, battlefield surveillance, missile and ground-based laser
systems, telecommunications, electronic transmission and medical
applications.
After faulting "a series of unwise political decisions largely over the
last 10 years, which discounted the importance of a U.S. minerals base,"
Hanes warned, "We have lost or are losing these capabilities as we speak."
'Going nuts' over intel
The diminishing U.S. base for strategic minerals, sensitive
technology-transfer issues and espionage can all combine to form a
particularly complex concern for the intelligence sector.
The bipartisan "Cox Committee Report" found that two of the methods used
by the PRC to acquire advanced U.S. military technology included:
* Relying on "princelings" who exploit their military, commercial
and political connections with high-ranking Chinese Communist Party and
Peoples Liberation Army leaders to buy military technology from abroad .
Two of the currently most notable princelings, Wang Jun and Liu
Chaoying, have been directly involved in illegal activities in the
United States, according to the report.
* Acquiring interests in U.S. technology companies.
The scores of legitimate Chinese mergers, combined with what U.S.
officials say are opaque Chinese intelligence operations buried deep
within other legitimate-appearing mergers, make such technology-transfer
questions murky at best.
According to James Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to the PRC, U.S.
agencies are "going nuts" trying to discern where Chinese intelligence
links to the PRC's military science and technology collection are. Such
links either are typically buried beneath layers of bureaucracy or later
turn out to not exist at all.
Sun sets on Indiana workers
Meanwhile, in Indiana, a crowd of 150 angry Magnequench workers recently
vented their frustrations at a Valparaiso protest, jeering the mention
of Magnequench President Archibald Cox Jr.'s name.
Wearing t-shirts that read "No More Lousy Trade Deals," they cheered
when union organizer Mike O'Brien called Cox "a traitor to this
country," according to Northwest Indiana News.
Magnequench workers protest.
"I would say Archibald Cox and company are committing a criminal act,"
by moving to China the manufacturing of internal workings of U.S.
defense system self-guided bombs, O'Brien said.
Visclosky, standing on a pickup truck bed at the end of the march,
called for the ouster of elected officials who've "made it easier to
move U.S. jobs out of the country, " the newspaper reported.
"We're giving our enemies our defense technology and your 225 jobs,"
Visclosky said.
Magnequench has already begun dismantling some equipment in the plant
and moving it to China, according to Indiana media.
The plant is set to close by Sept. 30, with most workers to be gone by
Aug. 15.
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