> Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism in Turkey highest
> since Islamist PM Erdogan (AKP) took office in Ankara:
>
> http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=304
> "
> Is There a Clash of Civilizations?
> Islam, Democracy, and U.S.-Middle East Policy
>
> Featuring Soner Cagaptay, September 14, 2006
>
> House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee
> on the Middle East and Central Asia
>
> On September 14, 2006, Soner Cagaptay testified before the House
> International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle
> East and Central Asia's hearing on Islam, democracy, and U.S.
> policy toward the Middle East. The following is the prepared
> text of his remarks:
>
> Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the
> opportunity to appear before you today. I am submitting my full
> testimony for the record and will summarize my statement. In
> discussing the question of a clash of civilizations between the
> West and Muslim countries, I would like to elaborate on Turkey's
> recent drift away from the West.
>
> In the post September 11 world, as a secular democracy deeply
> entrenched in Western institutions, Turkey emerged as a pivotal
> country in debunking the argument of a clash of civilizations.
> Yet, my recent observations lead me to believe that Turkey's
> unique position as a country anchored in the Western world is
> being challenged. The rise of the Islamist Justice and
> Development Party (AKP) government in November 2002 is a
> milestone in this process. Hence, I would like to focus my
> discussion today on the gap that has emerged between Turkey and
> the West since the AKP's rise to power.
>
> Turkey's foreign policy orientation before the AKP
>
> Until November 2002, Turkish foreign policy was quite predictable.
> Ankara cooperated enthusiastically with Washington, whether in
> the Middle East or in the Balkans. Turkey aligned itself with
> Israel and kept at arms length from Middle Eastern neighbors
> such as Syria and Iran. On the European front, Ankara pursued an
> aggressive policy of European Union (EU) accession.
>
> Turkey's foreign policy orientation since the AKP's rise
>
> Today, though, the picture looks much different. U.S.-Turkish relations
> are strained on almost all Middle East issues. From their views
> of terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to dealing with
> Iran and Syria, the US and Turkey have developed vastly
> disparate positions since the AKP's rise to power
>
> How did we get here? In the runup to the Iraq War in March 2003,
> the AKP-controlled parliament in Ankara refused to allow the
> creation of a northern front. After that, the AKP took issue
> with the Iraq War, and sharply criticized U.S. policies in Iraq.
> Later on, the AKP castigated other U.S. policies in the Middle
> East. The AKP's anti-American rhetoric has caused a shift in
> Turkish public opinion towards the United States, while the
> party has pursued rapprochement with Muslim states in the Middle
> East. Accordingly, Turkish and American views of the region have
> diverged significantly.
>
> For instance, while the U.S. has aimed to isolate Syria
> internationally, Turkey has pursued a policy of rapprochement
> with Damascus. Relations between Ankara and Damascus have
> improved noticeably since 2002 with the help of high-level
> visits. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul and prime minister
> Recep Tayyip Erdogan have visited Damascus numerous times. In
> return, Syrian foreign minister Farouq al-Shara and prime
> minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro have visited Ankara. The most
> important visit encapsulating the rapprochement between Ankara
> and Damascus was Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's January 2004
> trip to Turkey. Whereas only a few years ago, Turkey viewed
> Syria as an enemy country due to Damascus's support for the
> terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the AKP showered Asad
> with praise. Before leaving Ankara, Asad summarized his
> successful trip to Turkish network CNN-Turk: "We have moved
> together from an atmosphere of distrust to trust."
>
> Relations between Turkey and Iran have also improved noticeably
> since the AKP's rise. During 2003, for instance, four high-level
> visits took place from Turkey to Iran (two by Turkish foreign
> minister Gul), and six from Iran to Turkey, including one by
> Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi. Since 2003, Iran has
> claimed to be cracking down on PKK terrorists within its
> borders, Ankara's most pressing concern. Advances were also seen
> in the cultural sphere. A December 2003 treaty on educational
> cooperation between Turkey and Iran creates mechanisms for
> Turkish students to study in Iran, provides for reciprocal
> scholarships and facilitates the sharing of curricula between
> the two countries (a difficult endeavor, given that Turkey has a
> secular education system whereas Iran does not). Although lately
> there have been signs that Turkey supports the European
> initiative to block Iran's nuclearization, enhanced ties between
> Ankara and Tehran make it very hard to believe that the AKP
> government would ever, for instance, join international
> sanctions against Tehran, let alone take part in aggressive
> action to challenge Iran's nuclearization.
>
> While the AKP has pursued a policy of rapprochement with Syria
> and Iran, Turkish attitudes toward the United States have soured
> significantly. Four years of harsh criticism of American foreign
> policy in the Middle East-U.S. military incursions into Fallujah
> in 2004, for example, were officially called a "genocide" in
> Turkey-have created what could be a permanent dent in public
> opinion. Whereas in the pre-AKP period typically more than half
> of Turks expressed favorable views of the U.S., a June Pew
> Center survey showed that only 12 percent of Turks view America
> positively. In that study, the United States is favored worse in
> Turkey than in Egypt or Jordan.
>
> Some of the blame lies with Washington. America's unwillingness
> to take action against the terrorist PKK in northern Iraq is a
> source of frustration. Lately, Turkish casualties resulting from
> PKK attacks have been mounting at a rate close to that
> experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq. The civilian carnage in Iraq
> itself has added to the Turkish frustration.
>
> Yet, there is something peculiar about anti-Americanism in
> Turkey under the AKP. Whereas in the pre-AKP period the Turks
> were America's best friends in the Muslim world, today they have
> the least favorable opinions of the United States.
>
> The AKP is also alienating Turkey's other traditional ally in
> the region, Israel. A good example came earlier this year when
> Erdogan invited the leader of Hamas's military wing, Khaled
> Mashal, to Ankara, despite criticism from the West and
> pro-Western Turks. The AKP continues to defend the visit, keeps
> contacts with Mashal, and opposes Western efforts to isolate
> Hamas.
>
> Mr. Chairman, the AKP's alternative is the Muslim Middle East.
> The party has demonstrated an intense and bizarre interest in
> all "Muslim causes." Last month, at the onset of the
> Israel-Hizballah war, Erdogan lambasted Israel for trying to
> "wipe out the Palestinians" in Lebanon. On the same day, a PKK
> terror attack killed five Turkish soldiers. But Erdogan failed
> to mention the PKK in his speech. Erdogan's foreign policy gives
> the impression that Muslim causes are more important than
> Turkish ones.
>
> The AKP's change of tone on the Mideast isn't without
> consequences. The Turkish media have run virulently anti-Semitic
> articles-a dreadful development in a country that has prided
> itself on saving Jews who fled the Spanish Inquisition as well
> as the Nazis. A recent anti-Israel demonstration in Istanbul
> attracted around 100,000 people. Before the AKP, anti-Israeli
> protests would have drawn just a few hundred diehard jihadists.
>
> Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, the AKP challenges
> Turkey's Western orientation not only through its foreign policy
> initiatives, but also through its words. The party leadership
> almost always describes regional issues in the Middle East as
> religious and cultural conflicts, shaping Turkish public
> attitudes on such issues through the prism of a clash of
> civilizations.
>
> For instance, AKP leader Erdogan has more than once
> characterized the Israel-Hezbollah war as a religious conflict,
> stating that "mothers and sons are being martyred in Lebanon."
> Such rhetoric suits more the year 1099 and the Crusades than
> Turkey, which is negotiating entry into Europe today.
>
> In another incident, in 2005 Erdogan spoke at the Arab League
> summit in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, saying "The West uses
> terrorism to sell us weapons." Such remarks show where Erdogan
> thinks Turkey belongs-not in the West, but strangely enough, in
> the Arab world. (The Arab countries showed a better sense of
> national identity vis-à-vis Erdogan: they turned down Turkey's
> application to join the Arab League, saying Turkey is not an
> Arab country).
>
> Why does the AKP pursue such policies? If Islamist ideology
> constitutes one part of the party's foreign policy calculus,
> domestic aspirations are another. The AKP's conundrum is that it
> is not supported by a majority of Turks, and the party has
> therefore used a populist foreign policy that bashes the West to
> boost its domestic standing.
>
> This is working: Not only are Turkish attitudes toward the
> United States spoiling, but the AKP now draws broad domestic
> support from its foreign policy. If Turks think of themselves as
> Muslims first in the foreign policy arena, then one day they'll
> think of themselves as Muslims first in the domestic one. A
> telltale sign of the growth of Islamist sentiments is the surge
> in Islamist media. In the last four years, Islamist newspapers
> have boomed in Turkey. Combined circulation figures for the
> Islamist press have almost tripled to more than 1.1 million
> today from 441,200 in 2001. Another alarming sign is changing
> Turkish attitudes toward the Christian faith. According to the
> June Pew Center report, today only 15 percent of the Turks have
> favorable opinions of Christians.
>
> Mr. Chairman, some policy realists may suggest that Turkey's
> ongoing drift away from the West is an internal matter and that
> it is more important to promote a short-term AKP commitment to
> Washington's policy objectives in the region, such as
> encountering Iran's nuclearization. This does not seem viable.
> Here is why.
>
> Recently, Turkey approved a motion to send peacekeepers to
> Lebanon. In demonstrating how far Turkey has drifted away from
> the West and toward the Muslim world, Erdogan countered public
> objections to sending peacekeepers to Lebanon, saying that
> "Turkey would neither disarm nor harm Hezbollah." With that
> promise, the Turkish parliament approved sending peacekeepers to
> Lebanon. If the AKP's Turkey needs to be convinced to take part
> in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon only on the condition that
> Hezbollah will not be confronted, how will the same government
> ever join any action against Iran? And let's not ignore the fact
> that according to a recent German Marshall Fund survey, under
> the AKP, Turks have come to like Iran more than they like the
> United States: Today 43 percent of Turks have a favorable
> opinion of Iran. This means that for every Turk who likes the
> United States, there are three Turks who like Iran.
>
> The AKP experience in Turkey shows that, once in government,
> Islamist parties bring about change in unexpected ways. The
> AKP's foreign policy is scratching away the Turks' sense of
> national identity, while infusing Turkish society with a strong
> sense of Muslim nationalism. In the rift between the West and
> the Muslim world, Turkey is fast approaching the tipping point
> at which "the cat will not walk back." Whether this
> transformation continues depends on if the United States takes
> the right steps to address Turkey's most serious concern in
> bilateral ties: the PKK in northern Iraq. There is some promise
> in this regard: Washington has recently prioritized the PKK
> issue with the appointment of a special envoy, Gen. Joseph
> Ralston, to discuss cooperation against the PKK. A second factor
> that will determine Turkey's future is the Turkish elections of
> 2007. Will secular, Western-minded Turks, long unable to provide
> a captivating political message, successfully challenge the AKP,
> and will the United States support such an initiative? If not, a
> second AKP government might well turn Turkey into an
> unrecognizable country-somehow democratic, superficially
> secular, and definitely not Western.
>
> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
>
> Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute
> and chair of the Turkey Program at the State Department's
> Foreign Service Institute.
> "
>
>
> --
> ATTENTION !
> One never can trust an Islamist like Erdogan & Co !
> Because they mostly practice taqiyya ! (ie. lying !).
> You might wonder why pious religious people would do such a shameful act.
> Ha ha! You don't know Islam and its "holy" book Koran! Look:
> Islam has a built-in "lying for the case of Islam is permitted" in its 'bible' (ie. the Koran).
> It's called "al-Taqiyya". If you still don't believe then just read this paper:
> http://groups.google.com/group/alt.religion.islam/msg/87bd60bd8f05243c
> So, be careful when dealing with any Islamist... :-)
> America must change its Turkey policy; you cannot trust the Islamist AKP party.
> The Islamists have built a gigantic propaganda media (see above text)
> to practice, guess what, AL-TAQIYYE of course!
> So don't use their islamic news sources (Zaman, TodaysZaman, Vakit,
> YeniSafak, Star, Taraf, ...) as it is mostly propaganda full with lies.
> Ask the secular Turkish opposition parties (CHP, DSP, SHP, IP, DTP etc...) and
> news sources (Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Vatan, Tercüman, Yenicag, Hürriyet, Ulusal Kanal, ...)
> You cannot trust the ruling Islamic AKP party and its leader PM Erdogan!
>