> Liam O'Shea wrote:
>

>> On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 13:45:32 +1100, Sylvia Else
>> wrote:
>>

> This document
>
> http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch6.htm
>
> mentions the point I made:
>
> "Morton Thiokol, Inc., the contractor, did not accept the implication of
> tests early in the program that the design had a serious and unanticipated
> flaw.1 NASA did not accept the judgment of its engineers that the design
> was unacceptable, and as the joint problems grew in number and severity
> NASA minimized them in management briefings and reports. 2 Thiokol's
> stated position was that "the condition is not desirable but is
> acceptable." 3
>
> Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rubber O-rings sealing the joints to
> be touched by hot gases of motor ignition, much less to be partially
> burned. However, as tests and then flights confirmed damage to the sealing
> rings, the reaction by both NASA and Thiokol was to increase the amount of
> damage considered "acceptable." At no time did management either recommend
> a redesign of the joint or call for the Shuttle's grounding until the
> problem was solved."
>
> As regards the temperature at launch
>
> http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch3.htm
>
> "The ambient air temperature at launch was 36 degrees Fahrenheit measured
> at ground level approximately 1,000 feet from the 51-L mission launch pad
> 39B. This temperature was 15 degrees colder than that of any previous
> launch."
>
> And in
>
> http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
>
> "The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that
> decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the
> O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
> recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at
> temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of
> the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position."
>
> So they'd been told, though the managers may not have been aware of it,
> that they were about to launch when the temperature was 17 degrees
> Fahrenheit below what the manufacture said was the minimum.
>

>> Perhaps management complacency is too light a term - maybe criminal
>> negligence causing death would be more appropriate.

>
> Gross managerial incompetence, for sure. The problem with calling it
> negligence is that you'd have to show that these people knew what they
> should be doing, but didn't do it. I doubt that that's the case.
>
> I don't think many managers understand the nature of risk. If an engineer
> says something's not safe, but the manager does it anyway and get away
> with it 50 times, the manager is inclined to think that the engineer is
> just being an old woman.
>
> I myself have raised issues about a practice being unsafe, only to be told
> that they'd done it hundreds of times without accident, as if that proves
> something.
>
> Sylvia.