Norway's foreign policy and opportunities for cooperation with the
EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

The following excerpts on Sri Lanka Peace is from Minister of Foreign
Affairs - Jonas Gahr Støre who gave a speech at Annual Europe
Conference which held in Oslo on May 21st, 2007.

....Let me now continue on a related area where Norwegian foreign
policy has taken a distinctive course in recent years, yet in concert
with the EU - our involvement in a number of peace processes in
various parts of the world. Much of our engagement is well known, from
the Middle East to Sri Lanka and Guatemala. Some of it is, however,
not publicly known at all for obvious reasons of discretion.

It has been claimed that Norway can only assume such roles since we
are not a member of the EU and thus not bound by its common policies.
In some cases this is probably correct.

There are examples of common EU positions making it difficult or
impossible for EU member states to contribute to peace processes. One
such example is what happened in Sri Lanka when the EU chose to put
the LTTE on its list of terrorist organisations. As a consequence the
LTTE withdrew their security guarantee for the EU nationals in the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission, and consequently, Sweden, Denmark and
Finland had to pull out their monitors. If we had done the same, there
would be nobody left.

In general, one could argue that Norway, being outside the process of
shaping and deciding on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
is able to engage with the degree of flexible diplomacy that peace
processes often demand.

However, we should remember that the EU and individual member states
have played important roles in a number of processes around the world.
This fact is often neglected in the Norwegian public debate. The
Norwegian efforts in the peace process in Sudan were made as a part of
a troika with the United Kingdom and the United States. We work
alongside Spain in Columbia, and we cooperate with Finland in Aceh in
Indonesia.

It is the rule rather than the exception that our efforts are made in
cooperation with the EU and its member states. For example, the EU,
represented by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, is a member of the co-
chairs group, and thus our partner in Sri Lanka.

However, in some settings we may pursue a division of labour. I think
this is an important point to make. In some situations we can present
views and promote initiatives that would be more of a risk for the EU
to spearhead, but which it nonetheless might choose to support....

Full Sppech

Ladies and gentlemen, friends,

It may sound like a repetition - but no matter how we try to approach
our changing world, we observe how pressing issues, challenges and
opportunities are interconnected. It is a striking phenomenon. And -
we are compelled to add - how pressing our need is to strengthen our
capacity to deal with these interconnections. Policies - or politics -
are lagging behind.

Migration, health issues, trafficking, crime, climate change, energy
security, nuclear proliferation and so on - all these features of
globalisation link people and communities together. They enhance our
experience of being interdependent.

A few days after this year's "Schuman Day" - the 50th anniversary of
the Treaties of Rome - there are still multiple approaches to
understanding the phenomenon that is the European Union. If I were to
select one approach today, it would be its remarkable accumulative
capacity of uniting European states. - This is what stands out 50
years after its inception.

There is the internal market, which is, of course, important as it is
for jobs and welfare. But even more remarkable is the attempt - a long
line - to build and secure a political response to the forces of
globalisation and interdependence.

- The ability and courage to reach out to new member states, when
Europe was facing the dramatic and welcome change of reunification.

- The determination to become a global actor, not so much driven by
hard power and military might, but more by the soft power of economic
integration and by all those values that give us Europeans a common
identity: the rule of law, human rights and democracy.

- And the ability to change and correct the process of globalisation,
to address climate change and to fight global poverty.

This is not the time - as the Commissioner said - for another debate
on Norwegian accession to the European Union. But let me add - just on
a personal note - that it is precisely these political dimensions that
underpin my own conviction that Norway should have become a full
member of the EU - and of this political process.

A majority of Norwegians ruled differently in 1994 - and this I do, of
course, respect. But for Europe's peace and security - and thus
Norway's - I am extremely pleased that the rest of Europe chose the
way of cooperation and integration.

*******

Today, the EU is involved in foreign policy on a broad basis with its
own security and defence policy based on the European Security
Strategy adopted in 2003.

The Commissioner has presented to us the scope of the EU's foreign
policy today. From my perspective, these developments are welcome.

The EU and its member states are our closest partners and our
neighbouring countries. In broad terms they represent the same values
and goals that our own foreign policy is based on - the rule of law
and respect for human rights, the importance of international law, and
the belief in conflict prevention through democracy and dialogue - our
faith in cooperation, engagement, involvement.

Professor Timothy Garton Ash at Oxford University has written
extensively on the need for a new - and true - "European story" woven
"from six strands, each of which represents a shared European goal".
The six strands, which he names, -are freedom, peace, law, prosperity,
diversity and solidarity.

I agree with him: we need an updated narrative, one that offers our
citizens a broader vision than the predominant one based on unilateral
force.

For decades, we here in Norway have viewed the EC and then the EU
mainly as a single market. The internal market is now a reality and we
have sought to manage our relations with this market through the EEA
Agreement.

But perhaps the structured format of the EEA, with its focus on
directives and acquis, has somewhat narrowed our perception of the
emerging role of the EU, the true nature of the political dimension of
the EU's role in the field of international relations.

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Norwegian Parliament
got the point, I believe, when it explicitly - and in unison - made
its recommendation on how to pursue our relations with the EU:

"The Committee is of the opinion that the EU has played an important
stabilising role in Europe through the last half century ... [and] has
influenced and promoted democracy in many former dictatorships, and
continues through its expansion to exert a positive influence on the
democratic development of many states."

Let me reiterate: for reasons of history, values and interest,
Norway's foreign policy goals are close to those of the EU and its
member states. It is indicative, I think, that we choose to align
ourselves with most of the political statements issued by the EU, as
they so clearly are in line with our own views.

We are, however, not a part of the institutional framework or informal
processes that often promote the convergence of views and a strong,
efficient network.

EU foreign ministers - and other cabinet members - meet several times
a month, informally and formally, and this contributes to a continuous
dialogue on current challenges -including in the foreign and security
policy arena.

who are also party colleagues for dinner the day before a meeting of
EU foreign ministers. It is a valuable setting for listening and
adding Norwegian views. But is also an instructive illustration of how
policies are hammered out in today's Europe, quite different from in
the past.

Thus - as a non-member - how should we relate to the role and the
activities of the EU in foreign and security policy?

How can we add value, how can we work together, and when can our
interests - and perhaps also broader interests - be better served by
pursuing more independent policies?

Let me also question the very notion of an "independent foreign
policy". Of course, we all value independence - as opposed to being
dependent on others. But how much sense does independent foreign
policy make in a world of so much interdependence?

In certain settings independence would almost equal irrelevance. A
nation's foreign policy interests today must be married with the need
for international cooperation, it must maximise interest precisely by
seeking a broader web of mutual interest.

So it is perhaps more useful to speak of a certain autonomy rather
than independence. And as we are outside the EU and its decision-
shaping and formal decision-making, we should wisely utilise - where
appropriate - this state of autonomy.

*******

Although Norway and the EU may agree on most goals, there are
crossroads where the choice of strategies may lead to different
policies.

One example is the Middle East. Here too, in the broader setting, our
strategic goals are shared: we wish to see peace in the Middle East
based on the relevant UN resolutions, the Road Map, a two states
solution between Israel and the Palestinians, and freedom from
violence and terror for all.

We agree on the strategy, but we may not apply the same tactics at
every crossroads. Again, our decisions are autonomous - we closely
follow the 27 members of the EU, but we have to decide for ourselves,
and it may happen that we make decisions that are distinctive.

We see this right now in our relations with the Palestinian National
Unity Government. Norway decided on 17 March to normalise relations.

This means, in short, to be ready to talk to them, talk with them,
with all the members of the National Unity Government - just as
President Abbas has urged the international community to do.

Talking and engaging mean holding them to their joint platform. It
means starting to normalise the way we channel our financial support,
from temporary mechanisms - as the Commissioner mentioned - to more
normal procedures under the control of the Palestinian Finance
Minister.

We are not pursuing this policy in a vacuum. We find it important -
even essential - to keep in close contact and consult, more or less on
a daily basis, with the parties, the members of the Quartet, including
the EU, and countries in the region, to clarify our choice and the
reasoning behind it. And we find that the positions of the EU and
Norway are close rather than far apart.

What has changed since 17 March?

On the political side, I believe, quite a lot. The EU and the EU
member states are now dealing with Palestinian government ministers,
although not all of them. The point here is that there now is
engagement. Last week the Palestinian Foreign Minister met with the
European Council of Foreign Ministers, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner
and Javier Solana. The Palestinian Finance Minister has been widely
received, including by the US Secretary of State.

On the financial side, things are also changing. Finance Minister
Fayyad has now structured a financial account through which we can
channel our support in a more normal fashion. Norway is preparing to
do so very soon with a transfer of USD 10 million. I urge others to
follow.

So I believe there is progress. But it is too slow. The dramatic
events in Gaza tell us all about that. Norway has condemned the
violence and the unacceptable launching of rockets from Gaza towards
Israel. It has to stop, and we keep on stressing this to the
Palestinian leaders.

But at the same time, if we are to see security prevail and violence
stop, then we need to engage and work with the National Unity
Government, supported as it is by President Abbas. How can Israel
expect the Unity Government to successfully intervene when Israel has
combated it from the very first day, withholding Palestinian funds and
urging the world to boycott all members of the cabinet?

Perhaps Palestinian leaders will be able, once again, to calm down
their own people. But I believe we must be frank: if this Palestinian
Unity Government fails, then politics will fail. And the alternative
to politics is violence.

We need to demonstrate that we are ready to engage, politically and
financially.

We need to enable the moderate forces to stand out and tell their
people: "Look, by seeking unity and working politically, we can
improve the situation, we can gradually start paying teachers, nurses
and policemen, we can fix the sewage and the water, and not the least,
we can tell the young generation of Palestinians that this is how we
can move forward towards peace with Israel, towards peace in the
region and to have our own state".

If we do not engage explicitly and swiftly, then I fear that
Palestinian leaders from all ranks will have to conclude: "Look, no
matter what we do, it does not work, they are not ready to see and
reward change, they - the world outside - are not ready to engage".

And then violence and extremism will prevail. Then President Abbas and
key ministers we now trust and work with will loose.

And then we will be faced with the alternative: civil war, chaos, more
suffering and ever mounting insecurity - not only for the
Palestinians, but indeed also for Israel - and this will be a serious
blow to the efforts to make progress between Palestinians and
Israelis.

During the last two months I have sensed a shared evaluation of the
realities among EU colleagues. However, now time is an essential
factor, and I urge the EU to keep moving forward as it has been doing
during the last weeks. We are working closely with the EU, with the
Commission and the member states. I really hope we will be able to
continue complementing each other's efforts.

*******

Let me now continue on a related area where Norwegian foreign policy
has taken a distinctive course in recent years, yet in concert with
the EU - our involvement in a number of peace processes in various
parts of the world. Much of our engagement is well known, from the
Middle East to Sri Lanka and Guatemala. Some of it is, however, not
publicly known at all for obvious reasons of discretion.

It has been claimed that Norway can only assume such roles since we
are not a member of the EU and thus not bound by its common policies.
In some cases this is probably correct.

There are examples of common EU positions making it difficult or
impossible for EU member states to contribute to peace processes. One
such example is what happened in Sri Lanka when the EU chose to put
the LTTE on its list of terrorist organisations. As a consequence the
LTTE withdrew their security guarantee for the EU nationals in the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission, and consequently, Sweden, Denmark and
Finland had to pull out their monitors. If we had done the same, there
would be nobody left.

In general, one could argue that Norway, being outside the process of
shaping and deciding on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
is able to engage with the degree of flexible diplomacy that peace
processes often demand.

However, we should remember that the EU and individual member states
have played important roles in a number of processes around the world.
This fact is often neglected in the Norwegian public debate. The
Norwegian efforts in the peace process in Sudan were made as a part of
a troika with the United Kingdom and the United States. We work
alongside Spain in Columbia, and we cooperate with Finland in Aceh in
Indonesia.

It is the rule rather than the exception that our efforts are made in
cooperation with the EU and its member states. For example, the EU,
represented by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, is a member of the co-
chairs group, and thus our partner in Sri Lanka.

However, in some settings we may pursue a division of labour. I think
this is an important point to make. In some situations we can present
views and promote initiatives that would be more of a risk for the EU
to spearhead, but which it nonetheless might choose to support.

*******

Friends,

Then there are many, many areas where the interests of Norway and of
the EU meet and often converge, and where we seek to maximise our
common efforts.

Let me mention just a few examples: the High North and our relations
with Russia, our cooperation on crisis operations in conflict areas,
our cooperation on development policy issues and - not the least - the
long-standing cooperation regarding developments in the Balkans, where
we work hand-in-hand.

Finally, we cooperate in areas that are highly relevant to today's
broader security concept: the fight against organised crime, including
illegal immigration, trafficking and terrorism. - A lot of the
cooperation in these areas is a result of our participation in the
Schengen cooperation.

The High North, including the development of our relations with
Russia, is a top priority for the Government, and therefore also in
our cooperation with the EU. We need the EU in the High North, and we
need the EU in our relations with Russia.

In this picture, the EU's Northern Dimension has increased the
relevance of the High North in Brussels. The new platform that was
finalised last November includes Norway, Iceland and Russia as equal
partners. We attach great importance to this cooperation scheme. I
think that the EU's Northern Dimension also illustrates how smaller
member states have taken on important roles in the foreign policy
arena while holding the EU Presidency.

My message to EU colleagues and to various EU institutions is that the
High North - the north of mainland Europe and the Barents Sea - is
emerging with distinct strategic importance for the EU. Because of its
energy resources. Because of its fish. Because of its environment, and
because of the challenges of climate change.

The immediate result is a gradual deepening of relations with our EU
neighbours Sweden and Finland. These two countries have a land-based
perspective on the High North. Norway for its part has a predominantly
ocean-based perspective.

Now, we wish to see more complementarity between these perspectives.
In two weeks time, I will meet with my Swedish and Finnish colleagues
in Stockholm to take stock of the challenges and opportunities in the
High North. Then, from 10 to 12 June, Carl Bildt and I will be joined
by a high-level Swedish-Norwegian business delegation to visit Tromsø
and Hammerfest to highlight the perspectives and the potential for
more cooperation.

I believe developments in the High North will bring important
political perspectives in these three countries closer together, and I
believe this can add new relevance to the way we shape our foreign and
security policies. And, by definition, this means that Norway will
work more closely with the EU through Sweden and Finland, and they
will work more closely with NATO through Norway.

The sum of all of this - I believe - is enhanced security. This is an
integral part of our High North policy. And it goes without saying
that it is also an integral part of our European policy.

Beyond the Nordic family, I welcome the intensified dialogue we have
with the Commission and the EU institutions and a number of EU states
on issues related to the High North, from energy, maritime security
and fish to the new opportunities of genomics.

The shared and increased focus on the High North may serve as an
additional perspective as the EU deepens its neighbourhood policies.
Norway fully supports the new European Neighbourhood Policy initiated
by the EU, which aims to promote stability in areas to the east and
south. Our ambition is to support the ENP through projects in the same
areas, first of all in the CIS area.

Then there is cooperation in the field of security and defence policy
- the ESDP. This is of course key. The ESDP contributes to our own
security. As a NATO member anchored in a solid transatlantic
tradition, we support a strengthened EU role in security matters and
crisis management.

Our commitment can be seen through contributions of Norwegian
personnel to EU operations, be it in the Balkans or Indonesia, and to
the future civil operation in Afghanistan, where our cooperation will
be even more active and involve an even greater number of personnel.
We are participating in one of the new EU battle groups together with
Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Ireland. And in March 2006 we entered
into an agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) - as the
first and so far only non-EU member.

Take but one example here: last week, my colleague, the Norwegian
Minister of Defence signed an agreement on a joint investment
programme on force protection under the EDA agreement, which involves
Norwegian financial support of EUR 1.5 million.

We also have a close dialogue with the EU on matters of security and
crisis management in Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan - and not least in
the Middle East, as I mentioned. And let me also mention that we work
closely with the EU on issues related to the Balkans, not least Kosovo
where Norway plans to contribute to the EU mission. This will be the
largest civilian ESDP mission so far.

Dear friends,

Then there is the common objective of the fight against poverty and
the twin issue of climate change and energy policy, which is now
quickly climbing to the top of most agendas, including in Norway's
foreign policy consultations with the EU.

This is in fact the first speaking point for my own talks with
European colleagues, parliamentarians, European think-tanks and NGOs.
We are keenly following the implementation of the new ambitious Energy
Policy for Europe and the EU's ambitions of reducing CO2 emissions.

In the whole perspective of energy security and climate change Norway
is a partner. And in all modesty, I believe that on both fields Norway
and its resources and technological potential will always be part of
the solutions.

*******

The historian Olav Riste has pointed to a typical dichotomy in
Norwegian foreign relations that has existed more or less since our
independence in 1905 - a dichotomy of political exclusiveness combined
with economic internationalism.

Perhaps this is part of our personality as a state. I believe,
however, that we need to be alert to grasp the needs and challenges
that follow with the growing interdependence in our contemporary
world.

This leaves us with the potential of seeking close cooperation with
the EU, opting for common action and common positions where possible,
and autonomous decisions where we see fit - but always keeping our EU
partners informed. Perhaps our relations can be summed up in three
points:

First, closeness: Norway has every interest in maintaining close
relations with the EU, consulting it on issues, sharing views,
identifying common objectives.

Second, complementarity: we have assets that allow Norway to do a
number of things that may not always be as easy for the EU as a group
to do. We can - in other words - complement EU efforts. Rarely would
we be on an opposing course.

And third, utility: our respective foreign policy assets and our
complementarity make us useful to each other - the EU certainly is to
us, and Norway - we like to think - can be useful to the EU.