From www.alexanderpruss.blogspot.com: (I thought this was interesting,
and highly relevant to this group.)

Thesis: It is wrong to intentionally attempt to sexually excite
another person without the other's consent.

I will argue for the Thesis in a moment. But at the moment, I want to
clarify a few things and give some consequences. I take it to be a
consequence of the Thesis that the following three actions are wrong:

Including sexually suggestive imagery in advertising in non-
pornographic media in order that the viewer might be sexually excited
and thus inclined to favor the product.
Dressing in a provocative way in public in order to sexually excite
others.
Seducing another by trying to cause another to become sexually
excited, when the other does not consent to being caused to become
sexually excited, whether the means be a romantic dinner, ethanol,
unfermented grape juice, a movie, a touch, a word, etc.
Both to clarify the Thesis and to explain why these follow from it,
note first that consent is not the same as enjoyment or wishing. Thus,
that a reader of a magazine might enjoy being sexually excited at a
model in an ad does not entail that the reader consents to that
excitement. One way to see this is to consider the following case.
Yakov is a Jewish man who smells some delicious sweet and sour pork
while walking by a Chinese restaurant. He wishes God had permitted him
to eat sweet and sour pork. He then remembers that in Talmudic law, it
is permissible to violate kashrut to save your life (except in times
of religious persecution). The food smells so good that he desires
that the cook should come out, point a gun at his head, and tell him
to eat some sweet and sour pork. He would enjoy this, moreover. (Let's
suppose he's a very brave man much given to pleasures of the palate,
so the sight of a gun pointed at his head would not spoil the
delicious taste.) However, the fact that he wishes the cook to do
this, and that he would enjoy it, does not contradict the fact that he
has not consented to having a gun placed to his head. One can desire
something and know that one would enjoy it when it would come, but
nonetheless not consent to it.[note 1]

Thus, even if it were true that the readers of a magazine would enjoy
the sexual excitement, it would not follow that they consent to it. I
do restrict claim (1) to the case of non-pornographic magazines,
because the reader of a pornographic magazine can be presumed to give
consent to being sexually excited by the contents. (This might be
partly definitional of a pornographic magazine. I am not saying that
there is nothing wrong with pornography, just that its wrongness does
not follow from the Thesis.) Likewise, that someone comes to enjoy
being seduced, and even comes to consent to its continuation, does not
entail that the initial attempt to sexually excite was consented to.
At the same time, consent can be implicit in a context, so this is not
going to cover all cases of seduction (e.g., it will not cover
seduction in the context of a relationship where such seduction is
implicitly consented to and where the implicit consent is not withdrawn
--again, I do not want to say that all consensual seduction is
acceptable, but only that it does not violate the Thesis).

Observe, also, that expectation is not the same as consent. A person
might expect that a popular non-pornographic magazine contains some
provocative imagery, or that a date will try to seduce one, but
expectation is not the same as consent. It should be no defense in a
theft case that a man knew that a neighborhood was rife with muggers
when he went out for a walk and hence he consensually handed over his
wallet, so it wasn't theft.[note 2]

In any case, even if most readers of some non-pornographic magazine or
most bystanders consented to being sexually excited, there would
surely be some who did not, and if the intention was to excite all
readers or all bystanders of the appropriate sex and sexual
orientation, then some would be excited non-consensually, and a
violation of the Thesis would occur.

What is kind of interesting about this argument is that many arguments
against the sexual objectification of women have involved the harm to
women from such objectification (see, e.g., Dworkin). While I think
such arguments are basically sound, they miss out on a dimension of
the question, which is that in many not overtly pornographic contexts
the male viewers are not consenting to sexual excitation, and hence
are being wronged.

I am assuming here that sexual excitement is a state of the person
that includes some emotional and some physiological components, and
that these physiological components involve, at least in part, the
physiological state of the person's sexual systems.

Why should we believe the Thesis? I think it follows from the same
considerations as make sexual assault be wrong. Sexual assault can
range from full-scale violent rape to a sexual pat on the behind. What
is common in all of these cases is that the contact is sexual in
nature and not consented to. (Whether the contact is desired, wished
for or enjoyed ought to be irrelevant to the question whether a sexual
assault occurred, though obviously the more undesired the contact, the
worse the crime.) It seems plausible to suppose that any sexual
manipulation of parts of the physiological sexual systems of a person
is wrong.[note 3] Nor should it matter much whether the manipulation
is done directly by means of the assailant's body, or by the
intermediate use of some tool. Even if the manipulation is done by
means of the victim's own self without the victim's consent, this is
surely sexual assault (think of the case of hypnotizing an
unconsenting subject[note 4]).

Cases of intentionally sexually exciting someone are cases of
intentionally manipulating the physiological sexual systems of the
other. Hence if they are non-consensual, they are wrong for the same
reasons that sexual assaults not involving physical contact are wrong.
Hence the Thesis is true.

Interestingly, then, sexual assaults against men are not as rare as
people think--I suspect a lot of ordinary magazines contain them.