Re: Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World's Oil
  Home FAQ Contact Sign in
alt.politics only
 
Advanced search
POPULAR GROUPS

more...

 Up
Re: Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World's Oil         

Group: alt.politics · Group Profile
Author: Filthy Democrat
Date: Apr 2, 2008 14:13

> it was to increase the flow of petroleum from suppliers abroad to U.S. markets

Dude... are you saying that's a bad thing?
Do you walk to work, or do you work?

Are we at war with Canada?
What the hell have I missed here!!

As always,
I B your
Filthy Racist Bigoted Democrat
It's All For The Chillren

Raymond wrote:
> This Article
> Published in the January 2004 edition of Foreign Policy In Focus
>
> Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World's Oil
> by Michael Klare
>
> When first assuming office in early 2001, President George W. Bush's
> top foreign policy priority was not to prevent terrorism or to curb
> the spread of weapons of mass destruction--or any of the other goals he
> espoused later that year following the September 11, 2001 attacks on
> the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Rather, it was to increase
> the flow of petroleum from suppliers abroad to U.S. markets. In the
> months before he became president, the United States had experienced
> severe oil and natural gas shortages in many parts of the country,
> along with periodic electrical power blackouts in California. In
> addition, oil imports rose to more than 50%% of total consumption for
> the first time in history, provoking great anxiety about the security
> of the country's long-term energy supply. Bush asserted that
> addressing the nation's "energy crisis" was his most important task as
> president.
>
> He and his advisers considered the oil supply essential to the health
> and profitability of leading U.S. industries. They reasoned that any
> energy shortages could have severe and pervasive economic
> repercussions on businesses in automobiles, airlines, construction,
> petrochemicals, trucking, and agriculture. They deemed petroleum
> especially critical to the economy because it is the source of two-
> fifths' of the total U.S. energy supply--more than any other source,--
> and because it provides most of the nation's transportation fuel. They
> also were cognizant of petroleum's crucial national security role as
> the power for the vast array of tanks, planes, helicopters, and ships
> that constitute the backbone of the U.S. war machine.
>
> "America faces a major energy supply crisis over the next two
> decades," Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham told a National Energy
> Summit on March 19, 2001. "The failure to meet this challenge will
> threaten our nation's economic prosperity, compromise our national
> security, and literally alter the way we lead our lives."
>
> The energy turmoil of 2000-2001 prompted Bush to establish the
> National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), a task force of
> senior government representatives charged with developing a long-range
> plan to meet U.S. energy requirements. To head this group, Bush picked
> his closest political adviser, Vice President Dick Cheney. A
> Republican Party stalwart and a former secretary of Defense, Cheney
> had served as chairman and chief executive officer of the Halliburton
> Co., an oilfield services firm, before joining the Bush campaign in
> 2000. As such, Cheney availed himself of top executives of energy
> firms, such as Enron Corp., for advice on major issues.
>
> As the NEPDG began its review of U.S. energy policy, its members saw
> the United States was faced with a grave choice between two widely
> diverging paths. It could continue down the road it had long been
> traveling, consuming increasing amounts of petroleum and--given the
> irreversible decline in domestic oil production--becoming ever more
> dependent on imported supplies. Or, it could choose an alternate route
> of reliance on renewable sources of energy and gradually reducing
> petroleum use.
>
> Clearly, the outcome of this decision would have profound consequences
> for society, the economy, and the nation's security. Following the
> same path would bind the United States ever more tightly to Persian
> Gulf suppliers and to other oil-producing countries, with a
> corresponding impact on U.S. security policy. Pursuing an alternative
> strategy would require a huge investment in new energy-generation and
> transportation technologies, resulting in the rise or fall of entire
> industries. Either way, the public would experience the impact of this
> choice in everyday life and in the dynamics of the economy as a whole.
> No one, in the United States or elsewhere, would be left entirely
> untouched.
>
> The National Energy Policy Development Group wrestled with this
> dilemma and completed its report during the early months of 2001.
> After a careful review, Bush anointed the report as the National
> Energy Policy (NEP) and released it on May 17. At first glance, the
> NEP, or the Cheney report as it is often called, appeared to reject
> the path of increased reliance on imported oil in favor of renewable
> energy. The NEP "reduces demand by promoting innovation and technology
> to make us the world leader in efficiency and conservation," the
> president declared as he released it. However, for all its rhetoric
> about conservation, the NEP does not propose a reduction in oil
> consumption. Instead, it proposes to slow the growth in U.S.
> dependence on imported petroleum by boosting production at home
> through the exploitation of untapped reserves in protected wilderness
> areas.
>
> The single most important step proposed in the NRP was increasing
> domestic oil production by drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife
> Refuge (ANWR), an immense, untouched wilderness area in northeastern
> Alaska. While this proposal has generated enormous controversy in the
> United States because of its deleterious impact on the environment, it
> also has allowed the White House to argue that the administration is
> committed to a policy of energy independence. However, careful
> examination of the Cheney report leads to an entirely different
> conclusion. Aside from the ANWR proposal, nothing in the NEP would
> contribute to a significant decline in U.S. dependence on imported
> petroleum. In fact, the very opposite is true: The basic goal of the
> Cheney plan is to find additional external sources of oil for the
> United States.
>
> In the end, Bush made a clear decision regarding future U.S. energy
> behavior. Knowing that nothing can reverse the long-term decline in
> domestic oil production, and unwilling to curb the country's ever-
> growing thirst for petroleum products, he elected to continue down the
> existing path of ever-increasing dependence on foreign oil.
>
> Conservation Initiative: Fact or Fiction?
>
> The fact that the Bush energy plan envisions increased rather than
> diminished reliance on imported petroleum is not immediately apparent
> from the president's public comments on the NEP, or from the first
> seven chapters of the Cheney report itself. It is only in the eighth
> and final chapter, "Strengthening Global Alliances," that the true
> intent of the administration's policy becomes fully apparent. Here,
> the tone of the report changes markedly from a professed concern with
> conservation and energy efficiency to an explicit emphasis on securing
> more oil from foreign sources. The chapter begins, "U.S. national
> energy security depends on sufficient energy supplies to support U.S.
> and global economic growth." The report further states, "We can
> strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the
> global economy," by working with other countries to increase the
> global production of energy. It is a mandate to "make energy security
> a priority of our trade and foreign policy."
>
> The Cheney report is very guarded about the amount of foreign oil that
> will be required. The only clue provided by the report is a chart of
> net U.S. oil consumption and production over time. According to this
> illustration, domestic oil field production will decline from about
> 8.5 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2002 to 7.0 mbd in 2020, while
> consumption will jump from 19.5 mbd to 25.5 mbd. That suggests imports
> or other sources of petroleum, such as natural gas liquids, will have
> to rise from 11 mbd to 18.5 mbd. Most of the recommendations in
> Chapter 8 of the NEP are aimed at procuring this 7.5 mbd increment,
> equivalent to the total oil consumed by China and India.
>
> One-third of all the recommendations in the report are for ways to
> obtain access to petroleum sources abroad. Many of the 35 proposals
> are region- or country-specific, with emphasis on removing political,
> economic, legal, and logistical obstacles. For example, the NEP calls
> on the secretaries of Energy, Commerce, and State "to deepen their
> commercial dialogue with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and other Caspian
> states to provide a strong, transparent, and stable business climate
> for energy and related infrastructure projects."
>
> The Cheney report will have a profound impact on future U.S. foreign
> and military policy. Officials will have to negotiate for these
> overseas supplies and arrange for investments that will increase
> production and exports. They must also take steps to ensure that wars,
> revolutions or civil disorder do not impede foreign deliveries to the
> United States. These imperatives will be especially significant for
> policy toward the Persian Gulf area, the Caspian Sea basin, Africa,
> and Latin America.
>
> Applying the Cheney energy plan will have major implications for U.S.
> security and military policy. Countries expected to supply petroleum
> in the years ahead are torn by internal conflicts, harbor strong anti-
> American sentiments, or both. Efforts to procure additional oil from
> foreign sources are almost certain to lead to violent disorder and
> resistance in many key producing areas. While U.S. officials might
> prefer to avoid the use of force in such situations, they may conclude
> that the only way to guarantee the continued flow of energy is to
> guard the oil fields and pipelines with soldiers.
>
> To add to Washington's dilemma, troop deployments in the oil-producing
> areas are likely to cause resentment from inhabitants who fear the
> revival of colonialism or who object to particular U.S. political
> positions, such as U.S. support for Israel. Efforts to safeguard the
> flow of oil could be counter-productive, intensifying rather than
> diminishing local disorder and violence.
>
> Persian Gulf
> CONT'D
> http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0113-01.htm
>
> Today's bible reading
>
> DT 20:16 "In the cities of the nations the Lord is giving you as an
> inheritance, do not leave alive anything that breathes."
>
> JS 11:8-15 "And the lord gave them into the hand of Israel, ...utterly
> destroying them; there was none left that breathed ...."
>
> L'Shalom
no comments
diggit! del.icio.us! reddit!