"andy-k" wrote in
news:8FPAk.19775$uP.12613@newsfe09.ams2:
>> What I was saying there was that neither the postulates of phlogiston
>> nor atoms are "metaphysical" postulates, and do not presume that the
>> entities postulated have "metaphysical existence" (insofar as I
>> understand the meaning of "metaphysical existence"). I've also been
>> arguing that "metaphysical existence" is a noncognitive concept, and
>> hence cannot be significantly asserted of any entities.
>> IOW, "conventional existence" is the only *cognitively meaningful*
>> "manner" in which something can be said to exist.
> So you were *agreeing* with me?
Didn't realize you had accepted that only "conventional existence" is
cognitively meaningful. If so, then we agree on that point. I disagree with
the choice of terminology, since theoretical existents are no more matters
of linguistic convention than any other entities whose existence is
postulated via language. Thus the "conventional" draws a distinction
lacking a difference. A postulated external is a postulated external. They
do not differ in their being postulated, and thereby being linguistic
constructs; they differ in the experiential consequences they are
postulated to have.
>> It would give us some clues about how to go about modeling the
>> experience of nonlinguistic creatures biologically similar to
>> ourselves, e.g., humans who somehow develop to maturity in a
>> non-social situation and never learn a language.
> If that's of interest to you then go right ahead.
> Meanwhile, I stick with my original comments:
>> We may certainly propose an explanation of the behavior of cats,
>> dogs, pigeons, etc. in those terms, but there can be no explanation
>> in the absence of language. Consequently I don't believe I can know
>> whether or not we would we still divide processes up the same way
>> (or even at all) if our species didn't have language.
Is this the *certainty* again?
We can never be *certain* concerning counterfactual states of affairs,
i.e., situations we may imagine but have not experienced. It is the same
issue as that involved in postulated external entities. We can do no more
than rank them probabilistically, based on the experiential consequences
they entail.
>> Everyone takes existence to be more than a "linguistic convention."
>> No one who postulates an external entity believes he is merely
>> reinforcing or heeding a linguistic convention. Instead, he believes
>> he is *using* the language to assert the existence of something which
>> exists *independently* of the language. He is, however, compelled to
>> observe the conventions of the language to make that assertion, at
>> least if he wishes to be understood by anyone else.
>>
>> Anyone who wishes to assert that an entity exists "metaphysically"
>> must rely on those same conventions, else risk making an utterance
>> which others cannot understand, or which conveys no information to
>> them.
>> You are trying to draw a distinction between cognitive and
>> noncognitive uses of "exists" and then disparaging the cognitive uses
>> as "linguistic conventions," presumably because the cognitive uses
>> observe the conventions for constructing meaningful synthetic
>> propositions, i.e., the "convention" that they have determinate truth
>> conditions.
>> But you don't thereby distinguish between two "manners of existence."
>> You only distinguish between two classes of propositions which assert
>> existence, one of which is meaningful, and the other not.
> You misunderstand me -- I'm not using the term "linguistic
> conventions" in a *disparaging* manner. What I'm doing is disparaging
> the metaphysical notion of "things in themselves", and also any notion
> that the only contrasting position to this is nihilism. There is a
> "middle way", so to speak, and that is the view of 'things' as matters
> of linguistic convention.
Well, we certainly agree on the utility (or lack of it) of the notion of
"things in themselves." But styling some externals as "matters of
linguistic convention" still fails to mark the discernible differences
between classes of externals, and implies that the difference instead lies
in that one class is a linguistic construct while others are not. All
postulated externals are "linguistic constructs," and all are postulated to
exist independently of the observer and beyond the ER.
>>> No. I'm using 'actuality' in the conventional manner in which
>>> it is used in common speech.
>> But there are truth conditions governing that use. A defined entity
>> will be deemed "actual" only if it satisfies one of those sets of
>> truth conditions.
> But in respect of a theoretical model those truth conditions pertain
> to a whole "possibility subspace", not just to a particular point
> within it. This is why it is possible to subsequently discover that a
> model was wrong and to replace it with another.
We do not discover that a model was "wrong," in the "metaphysical" sense I
think you mean. We merely find another model which is more probable, and
replace the former model with the new one. "Wrong" is reserved for models
whose predictions fail utterly, or whose probability, based on available
evidence, is greatly inferior to that of another model.
We do try to evaulate then entire possibility space, insofar as we can
conceive it (and being able to conceive a point introduces it into the
possibility space). But we can only assign probabilities to those points
for which we have some information. Probabilities for all others are
undefined.
>> And at that point he may begin to imagine what might exist beyond the
>> ER, and what he might be able to fruitfully postulate as existing
>> beyond it. He can postulate anything he can imagine, but he will not
>> be able to significantly assert that any of those imagined entities
>> "exist" (or are "real" or "actual") unless he can cite some truth
>> conditions for those claims.
>
> If truth conditions can be cited for those claims then a *scientific*
> investigation may be pursued, and we move away from metaphysics.
Yes. Metaphysics will have "run its course" when the solipsist postulates
an external world. There is no need for any further metaphysical
postulates, and they can serve no explanatory purpose.
>> Yes. The implication there is that what exists is a question for
>> science, not metaphysics. There is no separate realm of "metaphysical
>> existence," or distinctly metaphysical "manner" of existence, or a
>> distinct "metaphysical sense" of the word "exists," or a metaphysical
>> methodology, distinct from the methodology of science, for
>> determining what exists. It is not the role of metaphysics to say
>> what exists; it is the role of metaphysics to set forth the logical
>> and methodological prerequisites for investigating what exists.
> Philosophers debate amongst themselves about the relative merits of
> their different views, but rarely can the different views be tested as
> if to find which is the "correct" view in the manner of a scientific
> investigation. There are 'fashions' in such views, and your particular
> view of metaphysics is at variance with the "metaphysical
> speculations" of many philosophers, but it doesn't thereby invalidate
> their views (except in your view).
There are certainly many views. None can be deemed "correct" or
"incorrect" in that "metaphysical" sense mentioned above, i.e., that one
view or another corresponds to or describes some imagined "reality" for
whose existence we have no evidence. So we can only evaluate them for their
consistency, elegance, simplicity, and their ability to explain
--- meaning
anticipate and control --- the phenomena of experience. If proponents of
other views have different criteria for evaluating theories (metaphysical
or scientific), then I'd appreciate seeing those criteria articulated.
