"andy-k" wrote in message
news:3IsAk.7557$a01.5044@newsfe15.ams2...
>> Need some elaboration there on what is meant by "independent of any
>> experience of it." Do you take that to mean, (1) "X exists whether or
>> not it is experienced," or, (2) "X exists, but neither X nor any
>> effects of X can ever be experienced."
>> Theoretical entities, by hypothesis, satisfy (1).
> I mean (1), and I'm disputing the claim that theoretical
> entities 'exist' whether or not they are experienced
> *except as a matter of linguistic convention*.
Get to this below.
>>>> We have no means of determining whether a conceived entity is or is
>>>> not "metaphysically correct" or incorrect. (The question is
>>>> cognitively meaningless).
>>> It would be absurd to claim that when the idea of phlogiston
>>> was taken seriously, phlogiston "left tracks in the world", but it
>>> no longer does so because the idea is no longer taken seriously.
>> The existence of phlogiston was never a "metaphysical" postulate. It
>> was a theoretical entity postulated to account for certain tracks
>> observable in the world; but it didn't account for those tracks very
>> well. So a different set of entities was postulated instead. No
>> metaphysical claims are implied, either by phlogiston theory or
>> atomic theory, and if any were asserted, we'd have no means of
>> deciding whether they were correct or incorrect.
> We began discussing the manner in which theoretical entities can
> be said to 'exist'. Your introduction of "metaphysical correctness"
> seems something of a digression in this part of the conversation.
Weren't the two alternatives for "manner in which theoretical entities
can be said to 'exist'" "metaphysical existence" and "conventional
existence"?
What I was saying there was that neither the postulates of phlogiston
nor atoms are "metaphysical" postulates, and do not presume that the
entities postulated have "metaphysical existence" (insofar as I
understand the meaning of "metaphysical existence"). I've also been
arguing that "metaphysical existence" is a noncognitive concept, and
hence cannot be significantly asserted of any entities.
IOW, "conventional existence" is the only *cognitively meaningful*
"manner" in which something can be said to exist.
>>>> Again, your model of animal modeling (the one you construct in
>>>> language) could be correct even if you had not conceived it, or
>>>> lacked the language which allowed you to conceive it. It is not
>>>> self-contradictory; hence it is possible. If it is possible, it is
>>>> conceivable.
>>> To the question "what would my experience of the world be like
>>> in the absence of language?", I have no answer whatsoever.
>> I thought the question was only whether we could conceive what it
>> *might* be like.
> Where would that get us?
It would give us some clues about how to go about modeling the
experience of nonlinguistic creatures biologically similar to ourselves,
e.g., humans who somehow develop to maturity in a non-social situation
and never learn a language.
>>>> Since anything we might say exists would be a matter of "linguistic
>>>> convention," the qualifer seems superfluous.
>>> All qualifiers are a matter of linguistic convention.
>> As are all propositions. Which would make pointing out that fact with
>> respect to particular proposition superfluous. Right?
> Wrong. Some take existence to be more than just a linguistic
> convention.
Everyone takes existence to be more than a "linguistic convention." No
one who postulates an external entity believes he is merely reinforcing
or heeding a linguistic convention. Instead, he believes he is *using*
the language to assert the existence of something which exists
*independently* of the language. He is, however, compelled to observe
the conventions of the language to make that assertion, at least if he
wishes to be understood by anyone else.
Anyone who wishes to assert that an entity exists "metaphysically" must
rely on those same conventions, else risk making an utterance which
others cannot understand, or which conveys no information to them.
You are trying to draw a distinction between cognitive and noncognitive
uses of "exists" and then disparaging the cognitive uses as "linguistic
conventions," presumably because the cognitive uses observe the
conventions for constructing meaningful synthetic propositions, i.e.,
the "convention" that they have determinate truth conditions.
But you don't thereby distinguish between two "manners of existence."
You only distinguish between two classes of propositions which assert
existence, one of which is meaningful, and the other not.
There are, however, two distinguishable sets of truth conditions for
claims of existence. An entity (e.g., a patch of color) may be said to
exist when it is the object of immediate experience. All other entities
are postulated; they may be said to exist IFF they logically imply
certain experiential phenomena, and those phenomena are experienced.
There is no other "manner" of existence (meaning that none such is
defined). Entities may certainly exist which have no experiential
consequences, but they exist in the same "manner" as those which do.
They differ, not in the "manner of their existence," but in the fact
that we have no information about them --- if any such exist --- and so
cannot speak sensibly of them.
>> I suppose you are using "actuality" there as a synonym for
>> "metaphysically real."
> No. I'm using 'actuality' in the conventional manner in which
> it is used in common speech.
But there are truth conditions governing that use. A defined entity will
be deemed "actual" only if it satisfies one of those sets of truth
conditions.
>> We make no metaphysical claims about this postulated external world,
>> because they would all be noncognitive. But any such metaphysical
>> claims will be logically possible, provided the external world
>> postulated is not self-contradictory.
> For the "all there is" to encompass the concept of the "all there is"
> is also for it to encompass its complement -- i.e. is for it to
> encompass the postulate that it isn't really "all there is" but that
> there is a domain 'beyond' itself. This is a "bigger picture" in which
> the ER is placed, but it is a picture that does not admit of
> predictions and is not testable. Thus "The (epistemological) solipsist
> is quite correct".
Ah, you're still conflating a postulate with the entity postulated. If
the solipsist asserts that the ER is "all there is," then that is what
he is asserting. His assertion is not refuted, or even rendered
doubtful, by the mere fact that he may conceive the denial of his
postulate. He is not postulating the denial, whether or not he can
conceive it. If he asserts that the ER is "all there is," then there is,
per his postulate, no bigger picture.
He may, of course, postulate the denial, i.e., that something exists
beyond the ER. But then he is no longer a solipsist.
And at that point he may begin to imagine what might exist beyond the
ER, and what he might be able to fruitfully postulate as existing beyond
it. He can postulate anything he can imagine, but he will not be able to
significantly assert that any of those imagined entities "exist" (or are
"real" or "actual") unless he can cite some truth conditions for those
claims.
>> What problems do you see with a realm of theoretical externals which
>> have testable ER consequences, apart from the fact that we can never
>> be certain of their existence?
> Investigation into the realm of theoretical existence which have
> testable ER consequences is *science*, not metaphysics.
Yes. The implication there is that what exists is a question for
science, not metaphysics. There is no separate realm of "metaphysical
existence," or distinctly metaphysical "manner" of existence, or a
distinct "metaphysical sense" of the word "exists," or a metaphysical
methodology, distinct from the methodology of science, for determining
what exists. It is not the role of metaphysics to say what exists; it is
the role of metaphysics to set forth the logical and methodological
prerequisites for investigating what exists.
