| Re: Wittgenstein on the Metaphysical Self |
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Group: alt.philosophy · Group Profile
Author: PubliusPublius Date: Sep 18, 2008 21:07
> In an eternalism model, change could be a type of relation, a
> comparative state. *Situation A* is different from *Situation B*, ergo
> the illusion of one situation having altered into the other --the
> belief that a physical or even hyperphysical action must have
> transpired. But there is no physical modification, change doesn't
> transcend its cognitive nature.
One would then need to argue for the superiority of the eternalism model.
What explanatory advantages does it offer?
Saying that a changing external world is an "illusion" presumes one has
adopted, or at least is leaning toward, a static model rather than a
dynamic one. Given that experience changes
--- and there can be no doubt
about that --- then it would seem that a static model would have a
difficult time accounting for those manifest phenomenal changes. And
accounting for phenomena is the motivation for constructing models in the
first place.
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