"andy-k" wrote in
news:BC1Ak.124347$uW7.114542@newsfe13.ams2:
>> What I was asking there is, What is the difference between a
>> "metaphysical" object alleged to be correlated with a concept, and a
>> theoretical object alleged to be correlated with it?
>>
>> The only difference I can see is that the theoretical object proposes
>> a mechanism by which it gives rise to appearances, which is testable,
>> and the metaphysical object does not (which means we would have no
>> grounds for a claim that it "gives rise" to any appearances).
> The difference is that one either has or has not adopted the idea of
> a world that is independent of any experience of it.
Need some elaboration there on what is meant by "independent of any
experience of it." Do you take that to mean, (1) "X exists whether or
not it is experienced," or, (2) "X exists, but neither X nor any effects
of X can ever be experienced."
Theoretical entities, by hypothesis, satisfy (1). What would be the
purpose of postulating an entity satisfying (2)?
(2), BTW, would contradict any claim that an entity satisfying it would
"give rise" to appearances, since appearances are experienced.
>>>> That is also true of theoretical existents. They are not "in the
>>>> world" (meaning the ER) either. But unlike "things in themselves
>>>> (as you have been describing them), they do "leave tracks" in the
>>>> world.
>>
>>> They are *inferred* in an attempt to account for certain phenomena.
>>
>> Not inferred. One cannot (deductively) infer atoms from observable
>> chemical phenomena. We can only postulate them, assign them some
>> properties, and then see if the entities with their postulated
>> properties allow us to predict additional (so far unobserved)
>> phenomena.
>
> I won't quibble over semantics on this point.
That is not a semantic quibble. It is an important logical one. The
properties of theoretical entities are not derivable from descriptive
propositions about (say) chemical phenomena. The descriptive
propositions can be derived from the definition of a postulated
theoretical entity, however.
>> We have no means of determining whether a conceived entity is or is
>> not "metaphysically correct" or incorrect. (The question is
>> cognitively meaningless).
>
> It would be absurd to claim that when the idea of phlogiston
> was taken seriously, phlogiston "left tracks in the world", but it
> no longer does so because the idea is no longer taken seriously.
The existence of phlogiston was never a "metaphysical" postulate. It was
a theoretical entity postulated to account for certain tracks observable
in the world; but it didn't account for those tracks very well. So a
different set of entities was postulated instead. No metaphysical claims
are implied, either by phlogiston theory or atomic theory, and if any
were asserted, we'd have no means of deciding whether they were correct
or incorrect.
>> You would use "process" to denote a randomly changing set of
>> phenomena?
>
> I have no qualms about calling radioactive decay a 'process'.
The decay of each atom might be fairly described as a process, but
unless there is a chain reaction going on, it seems loose terminology to
describe the decay of a lump of radium as a process (since the decay of
one atom seems to have nothing to do with the decay of others). But if
you wish to so describe it, I think you'll have to distinguish between
"coupled" and "uncoupled" processes (there is already a distinction
between "tightly coupled" and "loosely coupled" processes).
>> Again, your model of animal modeling (the one you construct in
>> language) could be correct even if you had not conceived it, or
>> lacked the language which allowed you to conceive it. It is not
>> self-contradictory; hence it is possible. If it is possible, it is
>> conceivable.
> To the question "what would my experience of the world be like
> in the absence of language?", I have no answer whatsoever.
I thought the question was only whether we could conceive what it
*might* be like.
>> Since anything we might say exists would be a matter of "linguistic
>> convention," the qualifer seems superfluous.
> All qualifiers are a matter of linguistic convention.
As are all propositions. Which would make pointing out that fact with
respect to particular proposition superfluous. Right?
>>> Given the distinction between possibility and actuality, my comment
>>> should be read as "evidence in its favor does not establish it as a
>>> certainty".
>> Agree. No theory, nor any theoretical entity or process it
>> postulates, is ever "proved." They are never certainties. We can't
>> get certainties about externals, and don't need them.
> I realized later that my comment should have read
> "evidence in its favor does not establish it as a an actuality".
I suppose you are using "actuality" there as a synonym for
"metaphysically real." If so, then it suffers the same drawbacks as
"metaphysically real" itself, i.e., the postulate of the entity would be
a noncognitive claim. No evidence could bear upon its truth or falsity.
Your use of "certainty" originally is revealing, however. The quest for
"metaphysical truth" is driven by the longing for the kind of certainty
with respect to externals which attaches to ER phenomena; that
postulated externals must (somehow, somewhere, in some way), "exist" (or
not) in same tangible, indubitable way as the scent of a rose I
experience "exists" (or does not). But, by our premise, nothing exists
--- *in that sense* --- except the ER and its contents. It is therefore
irrational to expect the degree of certainty with respect to the
existence of theoreticals that attach to our paradigm existents, ER
phenomena, the self-evidence of which supplies the criterion of truth
for claims of their existence. Postulated externals cannot be self-
evident --- that is why we must postulate them --- and hence we can
never be as certain of their existence as we can of our own experience.
The notion of "metaphysical existence" is a misguided attempt to posit
unexperienced entities which cause our experience, yet of whose
existence we can be as certain as we are of the existence of experience
itself. It is a confusion.
>>> Empirical evidence carves out a subspace from the space of all
>>> logical possibilities. It is not necessary to claim that some point
>>> in that subspace is "the real B" whilst all the other points in that
>>> subspace are not.
>> Then we would have no cognitive meaning for "real." If that term is
>> to have a cognitive meaning, then there must be some criteria for
>> deciding to what to apply it (4.024).
> The word 'real' has valid uses in most of the various
> language games in which it is employed.
Perhaps. But some of those uses --- the noncognitive ones --- have no
role to play in science or philosophy (as far as I can see). They may
have roles to play in poetry, religion and other varieties of mysticism,
fantasy, et al.
>>> Upon subsequently recognizing that the question has no
>>> 'sense', we may choose to return to that default condition and think
>>> of it no more. Or we may find that we remain perplexed, not about
>>> how things are in the world, but about the very existence of the
>>> world (Tractatus 6.44, 6.45). But, of course, this can't be put into
>>> words, so we shouldn't try (Tractatus 7). But we do try (except for
>>> those that have chosen to return to the default condition).
>>
>> I'm curious why you think the existence of the world (the ER) is any
>> more mysterious than the existence of any of its contents. If we can
>> explain all of its contents, won't we have then explained "the
>> world," *ipso facto*?
>
> Explaining all the parts of a natural system and the way they interact
> permits the parts to be understood in terms of a bigger picture (the
> system itself). To explain the system itself entails understanding the
> system in terms of a bigger picture (the relationship between the
> system and its environment). This process successfully serves to
> reduce perplexity about the contents of the world, but not about the
> world (the ER) itself -- that would entail understanding the world
> (the ER) in terms of a bigger picture.
Yes.
> We can only think about such a
> bigger picture by conceiving the world as part of its own contents (by
> "bringing it into itself" as it were), and any such investigation
> would admit of no predictions and would not be testable.
Nope. That is not how we conceive the world (the ER). We postulate a
realm of existents *external* to the ER, and we do not confuse our
concepts of those existents with the external existents postulated. You
mistake this process as "bringing the (external) world into itself"
because you do not distinguish between the concept of an external world
and the external world thus conceived. Rather than "bringing it into
itself," we project it beyond ourselves. The external world thus
projected will have postulated consequences within the ER, for which we
can test.
We make no metaphysical claims about this postulated external world,
because they would all be noncognitive. But any such metaphysical claims
will be logically possible, provided the external world postulated is
not self-contradictory.
> Attempts to
> understand the world in this manner are accompanied by their own
> problems, and one may investigate such models in terms of a comparison
> of their respective problems.
What problems do you see with a realm of theoretical externals which
have testable ER consequences, apart from the fact that we can never be
certain of their existence?
