"andy-k" wrote in
news:7zqzk.54902$KJ2.11424@newsfe15.ams2:
>> That is exactly what theoretical things (atoms, et al) are postulated
>> to be. So where does the "metaphysical" aspect of "things in
>> themselves" enter into the picture?
> The idea of the "thing in itself" hinges on the distinction between
> 'appearance' (the objects of experience) and 'reality' (the unknowable
> observer-independent objects that putatively give rise to
> 'appearances'). Concepts are "objects of experience", and if one
> subscribes to the appearance/reality distinction then conceptual
> objects would also be considered to have 'real' counterparts. But
> there is no need to postulate metaphysical objects that correlate with
> conceptual objects -- conceptual objects serve their purpose well
> enough on their own.
What I was asking there is, What is the difference between a
"metaphysical" object alleged to be correlated with a concept, and a
theoretical object alleged to be correlated with it?
The only difference I can see is that the theoretical object proposes a
mechanism by which it gives rise to appearances, which is testable, and
the metaphysical object does not (which means we would have no grounds
for a claim that it "gives rise" to any appearances).
>>> They are making a reference to something that has no 'sense' (i.e.
>>> there is nothing *in* the world that it represents -- Tractatus
>>> 2.221, 2.222).
>> That is also true of theoretical existents. They are not "in the
>> world" (meaning the ER) either. But unlike "things in themselves (as
>> you have been describing them), they do "leave tracks" in the world.
> They are *inferred* in an attempt to account for certain phenomena.
Not inferred. One cannot (deductively) infer atoms from observable
chemical phenomena. We can only postulate them, assign them some
properties, and then see if the entities with their postulated
properties allow us to predict additional (so far unobserved) phenomena.
> If a theoretical model and its conceptual objects are subsequently
> found to be in error, then any claim that these (now discarded)
> objects "left tracks in the world" would also have been in error.
True, except that "in error" cannot be taken to mean "metaphysically
incorrect." There is no claim that a theoretical entity corresponds with
any "metaphysical" entity, or is one. It is only "in error" in the sense
that it fails to correctly predict subsequent observations.
We have no means of determining whether a conceived entity is or is not
"metaphysically correct" or incorrect. (The question is cognitively
meaningless).
>> That would be a broad interpretation of "process." Change *per se*
>> does not entail a process, as usually understood. The changes could
>> be occurring randomly. Some sequences could be occurring in an
>> orderly way, but then those would just be processes which happen to
>> be randomly embedded in a larger set of phenomena, whose overall
>> order remains random.
>
> You're using a narrower definition than I am.
You would use "process" to denote a randomly changing set of phenomena?
> I can indeed conceive of how animals might model the world.
> What I cannot do is conceive how *I* might model the world
> in the absence of language because I am steeped in language.
Can you not conceive that you may model the world in the same way as you
now model how animals do so, if you (like them) lacked language? I find
no difficulty conceiving that. All that I cannot conceive is how I might
model the world *as I presently do* without language.
Again, your model of animal modeling (the one you construct in language)
could be correct even if you had not conceived it, or lacked the
language which allowed you to conceive it. It is not self-contradictory;
hence it is possible. If it is possible, it is conceivable.
>> No, no. It doesn't have to "available to be conceived." Concepts of
>> entities can appear *ex nihilo*, for practical purposes (we can
>> imagine there might be some complex psychological/neurophysiological
>> explanation for their appearance, but those would all be ultimately
>> circular). A concept of an entity simply does not exist, in any
>> sense, until it is conceived by someone (and we can make that claim
>> with confidence, because that concept, as all concepts, are elements
>> of the ER, and thus self-evident). Having conceived an entity, we may
>> then postulate its external existence. It will necessarily be
>> external to the ER, if it exists, since it plainly does not exist
>> within the ER, and not even its concept existed until we conceived
>> it.
> We create a theoretical model in an attempt to account for certain
> empirical phenomena, and with increasing confidence in the model we
> may even say (as a matter of linguistic convention) that its
> conceptual objects 'exist'.
Since anything we might say exists would be a matter of "linguistic
convention," the qualifer seems superfluous.
> We need say nothing more than this, and
> there is no need to postulate metaphysical objects that correlate with
> such conceptual objects (conceptual objects serve their purpose well
> enough on their own).
Agree.
>> We *create* a world, comprised of entities and processes synthesized
>> from ER phenomena, and other entities and processes conjured up *ex
>> nihilo*. Then we try to fit them all altogether in a coherent whole
> This would be what we have been calling the CR.
Yes.
>> and project it --- postulate it --- to exist outside ourselves. That
>> is the project we take upon ouselves when we reject solipsism.
>
> The CR encompasses the idea of a subject that is *in* the world,
> but the CR is *in* the ER, and the metaphysical solipsist takes the ER
> to be "all there is" (i.e. the metaphysical solipsist does not take
> the subject *in* the world (as he might conceive it) to be "all there
> is" -- that would be inconsistent).
Yes. The CR postulates a subject "in the world" (the ER) and also in a
world external to the ER. But the solipsist need not assert that first
postulate; that is a question about how to divide up what is "in the
world." He would remain a solipsist as long as denies the existence of
anything beyond the ER, regardless of how he divides up the ER.
>>> Postulating an entity does not make that entity an actuality -- were
>>> it so then no scientists would ever have been wrong. Evidence in its
>>> favor does not establish it as anything more than a possibility,
>>> though it does increase confidence in our theoretical models.
>>
>> The evidence establishes it as more than a possibility. It is a
>> possibility the moment it is conceived, unless it it is self-
>> contradictory. The evidence gives it a *probability*. It makes it
>> more probable than known possible alternatives. And that's all we
>> need. Our "confidence in our theoretical models" rests on that
>> probability; in fact, the probability is a measure of that
>> confidence.
>
> Given the distinction between possibility and actuality, my comment
> should be read as "evidence in its favor does not establish it as a
> certainty".
Agree. No theory, nor any theoretical entity or process it postulates,
is ever "proved." They are never certainties. We can't get certainties
about externals, and don't need them.
>> If the latter, how could that invalid methodology increase our
>> confidence in our model? And what does "confidence in our model"
>> mean, if not that the probability that the world it models exists has
>> been raised by the evidence?
> Empirical evidence carves out a subspace from the space of all logical
> possibilities. It is not necessary to claim that some point in that
> subspace is "the real B" whilst all the other points in that subspace
> are not.
Then we would have no cognitive meaning for "real." If that term is to
have a cognitive meaning, then there must be some criteria for deciding
to what to apply it (4.024).
>> There is no sense to the claim that metaphysical solipsism is either
>> "correct" or "incorrect." That is Witt's point.
> The postulate has no 'sense' -- i.e. there is no explanatory mileage
> as regards states of affairs *in* the world.
Yes.
> The question of metaphysical solipsism is without a 'sense' (i.e. it
> doesn't pertain to states of affairs *in* the world, which is
> blatantly obvious). That doesn't make it meaningless or pointless.
It is only cognitively meaningless. It may be semantically meaningful.
> The
> arising of the question terminates a default condition of unthinkingly
> taking metaphysical solipsism to be false (without even knowing what
> it is).
We have no grounds for declaring it either true or false. That is why it
represents a "transcendental choice point." We are free to opt for
either alternative, and we will necessarily do so on some grounds other
than the truth or falsity of the proposition.
> Upon subsequently recognizing that the question has no
> 'sense', we may choose to return to that default condition and think
> of it no more. Or we may find that we remain perplexed, not about how
> things are in the world, but about the very existence of the world
> (Tractatus 6.44, 6.45). But, of course, this can't be put into words,
> so we shouldn't try (Tractatus 7). But we do try (except for those
> that have chosen to return to the default condition).
I'm curious why you think the existence of the world (the ER) is any
more mysterious than the existence of any of its contents. If we can
explain all of its contents, won't we have then explained "the world,"
*ipso facto*?
