| Re: Wittgenstein on the Metaphysical Self |
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Group: alt.philosophy · Group Profile
Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 16, 2008 08:41
andy-k wrote:
>Ecce wrote: As far as I can tell, an unbroken motion
> slash "existence" of a particle would lead to it
> literally existing as a worldline that eventually
> intersects with other worldlines, thus resulting in
> a block-universe or some other eternalism model. So
> continuity seems a *bad thing* if one advocates
> presentism or that the flow of time is objective
> (not a construction of subjective relations /
> judgements; i.e., only consciousness engages in
> change and individuations).
>==========================
>andy-k wrote: I'll go back to Witt to respond to the
> above: "We cannot compare a process with 'the
> passage of time' -- there is no such thing -- but
> only with another process (such as the working of a
> chronometer.) Hence we can describe the lapse of
> time only by relying on some other process."
> (Tractatus 6.3611)
There's no passage of time in eternalism, apart from the subjective
illusion of it arising from the judgemental / comparative relations
embedded along the worldline (or so forth) of a cognitive organism or
its brain. The latter would subsume what he continues to talk about in
the relation contrasts between different "processes" (really, a
combination of measurements, practices, observations, devices, and
language games). Metaphysically, "no passage of time" would kill process
cosmology as Whitehead seemed to conceive it:
"Without this element of novelty and self-determination [in Whitehead's
philosophy], the world would be a machine, what William James called a
block universe. In such a universe, evolution could not have occurred."
~~~~John B. Cobb, Jr.
But Witt is probably doing what he usually did: Being restricted to what
can be said in an empirical and lingusitic context, forbidding
metaphysical extrapolation or rendering it meaningfully impotent. So an
input of Witt to those types of discussion is somewhat pointless, since
all it contributes is: "We shouldn't engage in these discussions". If
one is taking place to begin with it indicates that the participates
don't much hallow that advice.
Even Hume, the ancestor of such approaches, admitted he couldn't
consistently remain in his suspension of beliefs; that he eventually had
to return to asserting something positive-sounding about metaphysics in
order to battle beliefs he considered counterproductive to society
(essentially, some opinions might be less equal than others after all):
"After listing these contradictions, Hume despairs over the failure of
his metaphysical reasoning:
'The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in
human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am
ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion
even as more probable or likely than another.'
"He then subdues his despair by recognizing that nature forces him to
set aside his philosophical speculations and return to the normal
activities of common life. [Emphasis on the following] He recognizes,
though, that in time he will be drawn back into philosophical
speculation in order to attack superstition and educate the world."
~~~~~James Fiesar, IEP
Whitehead apparently entered the metaphysics fray to combat what he
considered a bugbear: the determinism of a block-universe. Actually,
though, a "machine" that embodies the predetermined appearance of
novelty is probably indistinguishable from the novelty that an
incomplete reality supposedly indulges in (if there's no perspective
obtainable outside either one).
posted by Ecce
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