"andy-k" wrote in
news:LPwyk.10008$eJ.8865@newsfe17.ams2:
>> Well, maybe I misread. In your first quote above, you said, "I don't
>> class theoretical entities postulated to account for phenomena in the
>> ER as 'beyond the ER'. In the second quote above, you said, "What is
>> 'beyond the ER' is anything postulated to explain the existence of
>> the ER itself, including 'things in themselves' postulated to
>> correlate with entities within the ER (and the ER includes the CR)."
>> I read that as saying, "Entities postulated to account for phenomena
>> within the ER cannot be beyond the ER; only entities postulated to
>> explain the 'existence of the ER itself,' and 'things in themselves'
>> postulated to 'correlate with entities in the ER' can be beyond the
>> ER."
>>
>> That sounds like a limitation to me. I.e., only "things in
>> themselves" can be beyond the ER.
>
> My comment wasn't "*only* things in themselves" but "*including*
> things in themselves" -- i.e. I gave an example of what *might* be
> entertained as constituting some metaphysically external domain.
The "only" is based on your dismissal (above) of theoretical entities as
possible existents beyond the ER. You rejected one class of possible
externals, and then gave an example of aacceptable externals. But your
comments below seem to suggest you now allow theoreticals as possible
externals.
>> And (as I asked before), How could we possibly establish that these
>> "things in themselves" are correlated with entities within the ER?
>
> They might be *postulated* (by some people) to be correlated
> with entities within the ER, but being *metaphysical* entities the
> claim cannot be tested -- it is metaphysical speculation.
Ok.
>> Let me just ask, Do you consider it impossible for an entity
>> answering to the definition of (say) the atom to exist beyond the ER?
>> Or any entities which have consequences within the ER? If so, what
>> kind of impossibility is this? Logical?
>
> No logical possibility may be ruled out in the absence of empirical
> evidence to the contrary.
Ok. The next question would be, Does discovery of the predicted
consequences qualify as evidence in favor of the existence of the
popstulated external? (We can put that aside here, since it arises again
below).
> The postulate of "things in themselves" is not mine, but in the
> absence of empirical evidence to the contrary I cannot rule it out.
"Things in themselves" is a muddled concept. It *seems* to imply either
a thing without properties, or a thing "considered separately from its
properties." But the notion of a thing without properties is incoherent.
Things are defined by their properties. The properties need not be
experiential, e.g., qualia, but they must be specifiable in some way.
And one may not consider a thing separately from its properties unless
one posits substance, which is an unwarranted and unnecessary posit. A
minimal "thing" is just the union of its properties, so cannot be
considered separately from its properties.
Or one might merely mean by "thing in itself" just a thing whose
properties are unspecified, perhaps because they are unknown or even
unknowable. We can postulate the existence of a thing without specifying
its properties, which still allows that it has some properties, though
we do not specify them. But then "thing" suffices to denote that entity.
Adding "in itself" tells us nothing further about it; it is a vacuous
qualifier. On this interpretation, "Something exists external to the
ER" is logically and extensionally equivalent to, "Things in themselves
exist external to the ER."
>> Well, we could, but I would have no idea what the distinction is
>> supposed to mark. Saying that an entity is "external to the ER" seems
>> fairly straightforward --- an entity is external to the ER if it
>> exists and is not discernible within the ER (the contents of the ER
>> being self- evident). Whether it exists is the question, of course.
>> That question is answered based on relevant evidence obtainable
>> within the ER (for any external entities which leave tracks within
>> the ER).
> So we agree to designate a theoretical entity "existent" on grounds of
> evidence rather than direct perception (i.e. as a matter of linguistic
> convention), and by virtue of the absence of direct perception we
> designate that entity to be "external" (i.e. conventionally external).
> But when people talk about "things in themselves" they are talking
> about metaphysical scenarios for which there can be no evidence (i.e.
> metaphysically external).
Yes. They are trying to talk about things about which "nothing
(sensible) can be said." (Witt).
>> And I'm not sure why you wish to characterize the relationship
>> between a postulated entity and the evidence for it as "linguistic
>> convention." Linguistic conventions have to do with such things as
>> word order in sentences, gendering of terms, whether the dative case
>> is used, etc. The relationship between an hypothesis and the evidence
>> for it is not usually thought to be a matter of "linguistic
>> convention." Indeed, it is usually thought to be
>> language-independent, in the sense that it can be described in any
>> natural language, whatever its conventions.
>
> It's because the language games in which the word 'exist' plays a role
> are matters of convention.
Well, if you are using "convention" that broadly, then you are of course
right. But by the very same reasoning your "things in themselves" and
"metaphysical existents" are every bit as "conventional." They are no
less artifacts of language games than theoretical existents.
You are not succeeding in making a distinction between "real" things and
"conventional" things via that strategy, as I think you imagine you are.
You are only drawing a distinction between two language games. So the
question is, "Which game has the greatest payoff?" That answer, in turn,
depends upon what we hope to accomplish by playing the game.
>> I was speaking there of relationships among things "in the world."
>> They may all be related (and I accept that as a working hypothesis),
>> but they may not be.
> If an artificial neural network is capable of identifying clouds and
> of identifying cars then clouds and cars are related in their being
> objects identifiable by the artificial neural network. If there is
> knowledge of distinct things "in the world" then they are related by
> virtue of that knowledge of them -- i.e. the ER is the over-arching
> process within which all things "in the world" arise (including
> theoretical entities). Anything substantially distinct (i.e. of a
> different substance) from the things of the world would not be evident
> in the world.
That is the sort of otiose relationship to which I referred in my
previous post, i.e., "Everything in the world is related by virtue of
the fact that everything is in the world." It is tautologous and thus
trivial. And it is premature to describe the world (the ER) as a
process. Until we can identify specific relationships between specific
elements, then it is merely a set, whose elements' only known
relationship is membership in the set (which is trivial).
>> You put "exist" above in quotes ("said to 'exist'"), as though
>> "existence" so understood is a nonstandard, disparaged, metaphorical,
>> or otherwise problematic use of a term which has some more literal,
>> accurate, or fundamental meaning. Presumably this would be
>> "metaphysical existence." But it is "metaphysical existence" which is
>> the problematic use. It is problematic because there are no truth
>> conditions for claims of "metaphysical" existence, which renders that
>> use cognitively meaningless.
> Language games in which the word 'exist' plays a role are matters of
> linguistic convention.
Already covered.
>> A cat once chased by a dog will thereafter be wary of dogs. A pigeon
>> who learns that pressing a lever delivers food will thereafter press
>> the lever when it wants food. Indeed, we must already understand
>> causal relations in order to learn language (we have to grasp the
>> relationship between our making an utterance and the response it
>> brings).
> We may certainly propose an explanation of the behavior of cats,
> dogs, pigeons, etc. in those terms, but there can be no explanation
> in the absence of language. Consequently I don't believe I can know
> whether or not we would we still divide processes up the same way
> (or even at all) if our species didn't have language.
The examples are not explanations of behavior, but merely descriptions
of it. Nonlinguistic animals (including human infants) behave as though
they make connections between events of the kind we would call
"causal." It doesn't matter how they make those connections (which would
be an explanation of them), what we call that relationship, or whether
we call it anything at all. The behavior speaks for itself. The only
clues we have about how we might model the world in the absence of
language is the behavior of other nonlinguistic creatures.
>>> Postulating an entity does not make that entity an actuality --
>>> were it so then no scientists would ever have been wrong.
>>> What is your underlying point regarding this part of the discussion?
>>
>> It certainly doesn't. What makes it an actuality is evidence in its
>> favor. And that evidence only establishes a probability of it being
>> actual. There is no other meaningful sense of "actual," or "real."
>
> So it's a matter of linguistic convention that we refer to certain
> theoretical entities as 'real'.
It is a matter of "linguistic convention" (as you are using that term)
that we refer to *any* entities as "real."
>> The point was to articulate the differences between a postulate, the
>> definition of an entity, and the entity defined and postulated.
> Yes but what is the relevance to this discussion?
Well, you have been balking at the idea that theoretical entities are
distinct from the concepts of them. Have I been misinterpreting you on
that?
>> Then consider EM fields. Does the existence of working radios (and
>> many other phenomena) not furnish evidence for the existence of those
>> entities? Will the mere idea of an EM field enable radios to work?
> EM fields are postulated in order to account for phenomena in the
> world -- it's a mistake to then use those phenomena as evidence for
> the existence of the postulated EM fields. We gain confidence in our
> models when predictions are confirmed, and we might even say,
> as a matter of linguistic convention, that such theoretical entities
> 'exist' (for as long as the idea is found useful).
That is a surprising and quite radical claim. But we need to eliminate a
possible source of confusion. We don't, say, postulate B as a cause of
A, then cite A as evidence for B. That would be patently question-
begging. We postulate B as a cause of A, but we define B in such a way
that C --- which we have not hitherto observed, or observed in the
circumstances B predicts --- also follows. It is finding C, or finding
it in the predicted circumstances, that is evidence for B. Once the
probable existence of B has been thus established, then A may serve as
evidence for B on later presentations.
Are you suggesting that C is not evidence for B? That would seem to
dismiss much if not all of probability theory.
>> Well, I said, "something (external) causes lightning." I didn't add
>> the "metaphysical" because it adds nothing to the claim (as far as I
>> can see).
>
> I presumed you were talking about metaphysical solipsism,
> but if you were talking about epistemological solipsism then
> I still don't see your lightning example as grounds for its rejection.
That is not the grounds for rejecting solipsism (either variety). We
reject solipsism for methodological reasons (because it fruitless). When
neither deductive nor compelling inductive evidence for a proposition or
its denial exists, then we have a "transcendental choice point" (a
Kantian idea). We are free to postulate either option. So we choose the
one which appears will gain us the most explanatory mileage.
> I use the term "substantially distinct" in the sense of "being of a
> different substance", and only in order to call the whole idea of
> substance-based metaphysics into question.
Ok. No disagreement on that.
>>>> Agree on that one! But once we've rejected solipsism by postulating
>>>> something external ("Something exists beyond me and my percepts"),
>>>> do we need any *more* metaphysical speculation?
>>>
>>> We don't even *need* that one.
>>
>> We do if we wish to reject solipsism. Don't we?
>
> The rejection of metaphysical solipsism is a matter of faith not a
> matter of evidence (there can be no evidence for or against the
> postulate of a domain metaphysically external to the ER). The
> rejection of epistemological solipsism is inconsistent (since there
> can be no evidence for or against the postulate of a domain
> metaphysically external to the ER).
Rejection of solipsism is not a "matter of faith." Nor is it a matter of
evidence, or a conclusion deductively drawn from *a priori* premises. It
is a methodological choice, deliberately made. See just above.
>>> But we are also inclined to regard the experienced
>>> world as an item of interest and therefore something in need of a
>>> bigger framework in which to place it, and the mere postulation of a
>>> domain external to the experienced world provides no such framework
>>> and explains nothing.
>> It doesn't explain, say, lightning? Why the sun shines?
>
> Nothing postulated to be metaphysically external to the
> experienced world explains lightning, why the sun shines,
> or any other phenomenon in the experienced world.
I agree. That is why there is no point in postulating "metaphysically
external" things, and why electrons, et al, are not postulated to be
"metaphysically external" things, or "things in themselves."
>> Really would like an answer to this question:
>>
>> "Let me just ask, Do you consider it impossible for an entity
>> answering to the definition of (say) the atom to exist beyond the ER?
>> Or any entities which have consequences within the ER? If so, what
>> kind of impossibility is this? Logical?"
> No logical possibility may be ruled out in the absence of empirical
> evidence to the contrary.
Ok. Does the presence of empirical evidence allow some logical
possibilities to be ruled *in*? At least as probable external existents?
>> 2. Why can't atoms be "metaphysically external"?
>
> I didn't say they can't.
I thought they could only be "conventionally external."
Or is it just that any empirical evidence can only bear on
"conventionally external" atoms. Seems we would then have a possibility
of *both* a "metaphysically external" atom and a "conventionally
external" atom existing simultaneously. What explanatory role does the
former play that the latter doesn't?
