"andy-k" wrote in
news:Agnyk.27761$T82.17404@newsfe16.ams2:
>>> Theoretical entities postulated to account for phenomena within the
>>> ER do not themselves appear directly in the ER, but they do appear
>>> in the CR and the CR appears in the ER. It is in this sense that I
>>> say that I don't class theoretical entities postulated to account
>>> for phenomena in the ER as "beyond the ER".
>>
>> That is the same mistake. The CR is a construct within the ER; it is
>> a system of postulates. What is postulated, however, is a realm of
>> entities and processes existing beyond the ER. Those entities and
>> processes are postulated to have consequences within the ER. We can
>> thus test for those consequences, and if found, they provide
>> inductive support for the existence of the postulated entities.
>>
>> The postulates exist within the ER; the entities postulated don't
>> (if they did, we wouldn't have to postulate them).
>>
>>> What is "beyond the ER" is anything postulated to explain the
>>> existence of the ER itself, including "things in themselves"
>>> postulated to correlate with entities within the ER (and the ER
>>> includes the CR).
>>
>> That is an arbitrary limitation. Anything may exist beyond the ER;
>> thus we may postulate whatever we like as existing beyond it. There
>> is no *a priori* restriction on what external things can be
>> postulated. There is an *a posteriori* one, however; it behooves us
>> not to postulate entities which "leave no tracks" in the ER, since
>> such propositions will have no truth value (they'd be noncognitive).
>> We'd have no means of deciding whether a "thing in itself" postulated
>> to be correlated with the ER was correlated or not.
>
> I haven't imposed a limitation but given an example.
Well, maybe I misread. In your first quote above, you said, "I don't
class theoretical entities postulated to account for phenomena in the ER
as 'beyond the ER'. In the second quote above, you said, "What is
'beyond the ER' is anything postulated to explain the existence of the
ER itself, including 'things in themselves' postulated to correlate with
entities within the ER (and the ER includes the CR)." I read that as
saying, "Entities postulated to account for phenomena within the ER
cannot be beyond the ER; only entities postulated to explain the
'existence of the ER itself,' and 'things in themselves' postulated to
'correlate with entities in the ER' can be beyond the ER."
That sounds like a limitation to me. I.e., only "things in themselves"
can be beyond the ER. You seem to be ruling out one logically possible
class of externals without any apparent reason. But maybe I'm misreading
or misunderstanding what you said.
Is that not what you're claiming? If it is, what is the basis of that
claim?
And (as I asked before), How could we possibly establish that these
"things in themselves" are correlated with entities within the ER?
Let me just ask, Do you consider it impossible for an entity answering
to the definition of (say) the atom to exist beyond the ER? Or any
entities which have consequences within the ER? If so, what kind of
impossibility is this? Logical?
>> "Things in themselves" are *undefined entities*. How can undefined
>> entities explain anything?
>
> I'm not postulating "things in themselves".
Then I'm still not understanding. Above, you said that externals include
"'things in themselves' postulated to correlate with entities within the
ER." If you are not postulating such externals, and also, apparently,
not theoretical externals such as atoms, then do you postulate any
externals at all?
>> Nor does postulating externals evidence or entail metaphysical
>> realism, because there is no claim that the entities postulated are
>> "things in themselves." We do not pretend to be speaking of "things
>> in themselves."
>
> I think we'll just have to agree to disagree on the use of the term
> "external to the ER", and focus on the points of agreement here --
> 1. the idea of "things in themselves" is metaphysical speculation.
> 2. we are entitled to claim that a theoretical entity 'exists' for as
> long as the idea proves useful (as a matter of linguistic convention,
> not of metaphysics).
>
> Or perhaps better would be to agree on different terms for our
> different uses? I propose "metaphysically external" for my use,
> and perhaps "conventionally external" for your use?
Well, we could, but I would have no idea what the distinction is
supposed to mark. Saying that an entity is "external to the ER" seems
fairly straightforward --- an entity is external to the ER if it exists
and is not discernible within the ER (the contents of the ER being self-
evident). Whether it exists is the question, of course. That question is
answered based on relevant evidence obtainable within the ER (for any
external entities which leave tracks within the ER).
And I'm not sure why you wish to characterize the relationship between a
postulated entity and the evidence for it as "linguistic convention."
Linguistic conventions have to do with such things as word order in
sentences, gendering of terms, whether the dative case is used, etc. The
relationship between an hypothesis and the evidence for it is not
usually thought to be a matter of "linguistic convention." Indeed, it is
usually thought to be language-independent, in the sense that it can be
described in any natural language, whatever its conventions.
>> Not necessarily. Whether Y "belongs" to a process P is often a matter
>> of conjecture, or hypothesis. To which other things Y is related, and
>> the nature of those relationships, is all part of the CR, which is
>> constantly evolving. I accept the hypothesis that "everything is
>> related," but only as a working hypothesis. And many --- perhaps most
>> --- of those relationships are so remote or tenuous as to be of
>> little interest.
>
> If there were anything completely unrelated to the world (i.e.
> substantially distinct from it) then nothing *in* the world could be
> influenced by it (the interaction problem). The ER is the over-arching
> process within which all things *in* the world arise (including
> theoretical entities).
I was speaking there of relationships among things "in the world." They
may all be related (and I accept that as a working hypothesis), but they
may not be.
And, again, theoretical entities, if they exist, do not arise "within
the world" (meaning the ER). Only the postulates asserting them arise
with in the ER. The postulates assert the existence of something outside
the ER, which may or may not exist.
>> I should say, "I don't *think* being external to the ER entails being
>> "metaphysically real." But I'm not sure just what is meant by being
>> "metaphysically real." We do assume that theoretical existents
>> continue in existence even when none of their postulated consequences
>> are apparent. I suppose I should say that what is real and not real
>> --- or rather, what can be sensibly *said* to be real or not real, is
>> not a matter of metaphysics.
>
> Agreed. Theoretical entities conceived in order to account for
> perceived phenomena in the world may be said to 'exist' for as long as
> the concept proves useful, but this is a matter of linguistic
> convention. In the extreme case there is the question of the
> existential status of quantum systems whilst between interactions.
I still don't understand in what sense a claim that an entity exists,
based on empirical evidence logically derivable from its definition, is
a "linguistic convention." Are you just saying that logic (either or
both deductive and inductive) is a "linguistic convention"? Wouldn't
that render all of science and philosophy mere linguistic convention?
You put "exist" above in quotes ("said to 'exist'"), as though
"existence" so understood is a nonstandard, disparaged, metaphorical, or
otherwise problematic use of a term which has some more literal,
accurate, or fundamental meaning. Presumably this would be "metaphysical
existence." But it is "metaphysical existence" which is the problematic
use. It is problematic because there are no truth conditions for claims
of "metaphysical" existence, which renders that use cognitively
meaningless.
> That processes unfold is not in question. The words 'cause' and
> 'effect' are often assigned to certain stages into which we divide an
> unfolding process. How can I know whether or not we would we still
> divide processes up the same way (or even at all) if our species
> didn't have language?
A cat once chased by a dog will thereafter be wary of dogs. A pigeon who
learns that pressing a lever delivers food will thereafter press the
lever when it wants food. Indeed, we must already understand causal
relations in order to learn language (we have to grasp the relationship
between our making an utterance and the response it brings).
> Any process postulated to be unrelated-to and independent-of
> processes *in* the world would have no consequences *in* the
> world, so all processes *in* the world are (directly or indirectly)
> inter-related and mutually dependent.
That doesn't follow. A process unrelated to processes in the world has
no implications for those in-the-world processes. They may or may not
all be related.
That's the trouble with the "everything is related" thesis.
Relationships can be defined at will between any plurality of things.
But they are all otiose unless they are informative (knowing A is
related B allows us to draw some conclusions about B from knowledge of
A).
>> Not so. A postulate is a proposition asserted in some language. The
>> idea of the monster is a concept, relating a number of properties (ER
>> elements --- qualia, and possibly also some abstract properties) into
>> a coherent whole. The concept is expressed in language via a
>> definition. The postulate, the proposition, asserts the existence of
>> an entity satisfying that definition. The postulate is distinct from
>> the concept, and both are distinct from the entity whose existence is
>> asserted. The postulate does not assert the existence of the concept;
>> the existence of the concept is self-evident the moment the postulate
>> is asserted. You need the concept *in order* to assert the existence
>> of the entity. It is the existence of the entity, not the concept,
>> which is in question; which is contingent.
> Postulating an entity does not make that entity an actuality --
> were it so then no scientists would ever have been wrong.
> What is your underlying point regarding this part of the discussion?
It certainly doesn't. What makes it an actuality is evidence in its
favor. And that evidence only establishes a probability of it being
actual. There is no other meaningful sense of "actual," or "real."
The point was to articulate the differences between a postulate, the
definition of an entity, and the entity defined and postulated.
>> Are you suggesting that the definitions of "moose" and "idea of a
>> moose" are identical? Or that if I come across tracks and droppings
>> of the kind predicted for moose (part of the definition of "moose"),
>> but the moose itself never appears within the ER, that I may infer
>> nothing from them except that I have an idea of moose (which I
>> already knew)? Or that my idea of a moose caused the tracks and the
>> droppings?
>
> I don't consider moose to be a theoretical entity.
Then consider EM fields. Does the existence of working radios (and many
other phenomena) not furnish evidence for the existence of those
entities? Will the mere idea of an EM field enable radios to work? Many
people entertain ideas about ESP, and believe it is "real." Yet they've
been spectacularly unsuccessful in demonstrating any communication via
that supposed "real" phenomenon. Do the differences between EM fields
and ESP justify denoting the former as "real" and the latter "unreal"?
>> That's right. Electrons, not the concept of them, cause lightning.
>> That is of course a theoretical (CR) claim. All that we can say
>> metaphysically is that "something (external) causes lightning." That
>> something is necessarily external because no phenomena within the ER
>> seems satisfactory to account for lightning. And "something causes
>> lightning" is itself a postulate, the fundamental postulate we
>> advance when we reject solipsism.
>
> "Something causes lightning" is not sufficient for a rejection of
> solipsism. "Something metaphysically external causes lightning" is a
> rejection of solipsism.
Well, I said, "something (external) causes lightning." I didn't add the
"metaphysical" because it adds nothing to the claim (as far as I can
see).
>>>> If it is not substantially distinct from the ER, what is the value
>>>> of postulating it?
>>>
>>> We postulate it in our attempts to fit the ER into a "bigger
>>> picture".
>>
>> If it is a bigger picture than the ER, it would have to be
>> substantially distinct from the ER. Wouldn't it?
>
> Why invoke the notion of substance at all?
I didn't invoke it! You did!
But I assumed you were using "substantially" in the sense of
"significantly."
>> Agree on that one! But once we've rejected solipsism by postulating
>> something external ("Something exists beyond me and my percepts"),
>> do we need any *more* metaphysical speculation?
>
> We don't even *need* that one.
We do if we wish to reject solipsism. Don't we?
> But we are also inclined to regard the experienced
> world as an item of interest and therefore something in need of a
> bigger framework in which to place it, and the mere postulation of a
> domain external to the experienced world provides no such framework
> and explains nothing.
It doesn't explain, say, lightning? Why the sun shines?
