"andy-k" wrote in
news:hUSxk.134180$Ff2.28050@newsfe13.ams2:
>> Language may have evolved to speak of things in the world, but it is
>> often used to speak of things not in the world, and is entirely
>> capable of being so used. Theoretical entitities are indeed
>> postulated to account for things in the world (usually), but those
>> entities are not themselves in the world (that's what makes them
>> theoretical). If they exist, they exist "beyond the world" (meaning
>> the ER).
>>
>> ("The world" is often used to denote "everything that exists,
>> whatever and wherever it may be," so we need to clarify our use
>> here).
>
> Theoretical entities postulated to account for phenomena within the ER
> do not themselves appear directly in the ER, but they do appear in the
> CR and the CR appears in the ER. It is in this sense that I say that I
> don't class theoretical entities postulated to account for phenomena
> in the ER as "beyond the ER".
That is the same mistake. The CR is a construct within the ER; it is a
system of postulates. What is postulated, however, is a realm of entities
and processes existing beyond the ER. Those entities and processes are
postulated to have consequences within the ER. We can thus test for those
consequences, and if found, they provide inductive support for the
existence of the postulated entities.
The postulates exist within the ER; the entities postulated don't (if they
did, we wouldn't have to postulate them).
> What is "beyond the ER" is anything
> postulated to explain the existence of the ER itself, including
> "things in themselves" postulated to correlate with entities within
> the ER (and the ER includes the CR).
That is an arbitrary limitation. Anything may exist beyond the ER; thus we
may postulate whatever we like as existing beyond it. There is no *a
priori* restriction on what external things can be postulated. There is an
*a posteriori* one, however; it behooves us not to postulate entities which
"leave no tracks" in the ER, since such propositions will have no truth
value (they'd be noncognitive). We'd have no means of deciding whether a
"thing in itself" postulated to be correlated with the ER was correlated or
not.
And how can a "thing in itself" possibly explain the existence of the ER,
when we have no idea what are the properties of this "thing in itself," and
no means of finding out?
"Things in themselves" are *undefined entities*. How can undefined entities
explain anything?
> Any conjecture that entities
> appearing directly in the ER (or indirectly via the CR) are correlated
> with "things in themselves" in some putative domain "beyond the ER" is
> metaphysics.
There is no claim that theoretical entities (the external entities
postulated via the CR) are correlated with any "things in themselves." Nor
are they to be identified with "things in themselves." They are what they
are postulated to be, nothing more. They are necessarily external, since
nothing answering to their definitions exists within the ER. Those
definitions may entail consequences within the ER. Whether we are entitled
to claim any of those entities exists depends upon whether the predicted
consequences can be found.
> So if an entity does not appear *directly* in the ER but
> only *theoretically* in the CR, we are still not at liberty to claim
> that it exists "beyond the ER" unless by doing so we are subscribing
> to metaphysical realism.
We are entitled to claim it exists if we can find empirical evidence
(evidence within the ER) for its existence. And since it is not itself
evident within the ER, it is necessarily external to it. Just to try to be
a little clearer: the entity does not necessarily exist; whether it exists
is a contingent matter. The strength of the empirical evidence decides that
question. But if it does exist, according to that evidence, then it will
necessarily exist external to the ER.
And, of course, the concept of the thing is not the thing postulated. The
concept does not have the empirical consequences predicted for the thing.
Nor does postulating externals evidence or entail metaphysical realism,
because there is no claim that the entities postulated are "things in
themselves." We do not pretend to be speaking of "things in themselves."
>> Most Y's will be related to many other ER phenomena; they will be
>> elements of several distinct processes.
>
> And by virtue of appearing in several distinct processes they bind
> those distinct processes together into a single over-arching process.
Not necessarily. Whether Y "belongs" to a process P is often a matter of
conjecture, or hypothesis. To which other things Y is related, and the
nature of those relationships, is all part of the CR, which is constantly
evolving. I accept the hypothesis that "everything is related," but only as
a working hypothesis. And many --- perhaps most --- of those relationships
are so remote or tenuous as to be of little interest.
>> We postulate externals when the ER phenomena with which they are
>> known to be related do not allow us to anticipate or manipulate that
>> particular Y as readily or reliably as we'd like. That Y may fit into
>> several "bigger pictures" which relate it to other things, but we
>> want an even bigger picture, one which gives us better predictability
>> and control. So we postulate a bigger picture with some imaginary
>> elements, then see what *that* picture predicts. If it gives us more
>> predictability and control, those imaginary externals become "real."
>>
>> Not "metaphysically real" --- that is a vacuous concept.
>
> Then not "external to the ER".
Non-sequitur. Being external to the ER does not imply "metaphysically
real."
That may be the problem. You are assuming "External to the ER" IFF
"metaphysically real." We can postulate anything we like as being external
to the ER, including things that "leave tracks" in the ER. No more
metaphysics is involved than in inferring the existence of a moose from
tracks in the snow. The tracks give us reason to believe a moose exists, or
at least has recently existed, in the neighborhood, even if we never see
the moose.
I should say, "I don't *think* being external to the ER entails being
"metaphysically real." But I'm not sure just what is meant by being
"metaphysically real." We do assume that theoretical existents continue in
existence even when none of their postulated consequences are apparent. I
suppose I should say that what is real and not real --- or rather, what can
be sensibly *said* to be real or not real, is not a matter of metaphysics.
>> Neither is it a "metaphysical judgment." Metaphysical judgments are
>> arbitrary judgments, expressed with noncognitive propositions.
>
> The use we make of the words 'cause' and 'effect' is indeed a matter
> of convention -- Aristotle gives us four different ways of using these
> words, and we are culturally conditioned to interpret them nearest to
> what he calls "efficient causation". Deductive and empirical evidence,
> no matter how compelling, merely identify different stages in a
> repeatable process, and we conventionally refer to the earlier stage
> as the cause and to the later stage as the effect.
That's true. The terms we use to refer to those stages of that process ---
"cause" and "effect" --- are conventional. The relationship between the
stages is not. The relationship between being bitten by a snake and the
pain that follows will be apparent, and noted, by all observers, whether
they speak English, German, or Navaho.
>> And processes are always delimited in some way, and must be for
>> purposes of analysis and discussion. E.g., the hurricane "began" with
>> the appearance of a tropical depression in the Atlantic, and "ended"
>> with the dissipation of the storm over N. Louisiana and Arkansas.
>> That process was, of course, embedded in the much larger and more
>> complex process of terrestrial meteorology, which has been continuous
>> since the Earth acquired an atmosphere, which is in turn embedded
>> within an even more complex process of stellar and planetary
>> formation, etc. But we can only analyze such vast processes one chunk
>> at a time.
> So all seemingly distinct processes exist in a state of mutual
> dependence and inter-relatedness -- i.e. as sub-processes in a single
> over-arching process.
I accept that as a working hypothesis, as a "focus for research." But it
doesn't tell us much in itself. Knowing that one process is related to
another is substantive only when knowing something about one tells us
something useful about the other.
>> Then you are misunderstanding what is conceived and postulated. If I
>> postulate the existence of monster in Loch Ness, then I mean what I
>> say --- that there is living, breathing, tangible, scaly, and
>> voracious monster living in Loch Ness. I am not postulating the
>> concept or idea of a monster. I do not need to postulate the *idea*
>> of the monster; I'm having that idea at this moment; like all
>> elements of the ER, it is manifest. I have to postulate the "real,"
>> scaly one, which is *not* now present in the ER.
>
> The postulate of the monster *is* the idea of the monster.
Not so. A postulate is a proposition asserted in some language. The idea of
the monster is a concept, relating a number of properties (ER elements ---
qualia, and possibly also some abstract properties) into a coherent whole.
The concept is expressed in language via a definition. The postulate, the
proposition, asserts the existence of an entity satisfying that definition.
The postulate is distinct from the concept, and both are distinct from the
entity whose existence is asserted. The postulate does not assert the
existence of the concept; the existence of the concept is self-evident the
moment the postulate is asserted. You need the concept *in order* to assert
the existence of the entity. It is the existence of the entity, not the
concept, which is in question; which is contingent.
> The thing and the idea of it are different for things that appear
> directly in the ER by virtue of their direct appearance in the ER.
> That cannot be said of things that don't appear directly in the ER.
Are you suggesting that the definitions of "moose" and "idea of a moose"
are identical? Or that if I come across tracks and droppings of the kind
predicted for moose (part of the definition of "moose"), but the moose
itself never appears within the ER, that I may infer nothing from them
except that I have an idea of moose (which I already knew)? Or that my idea
of a moose caused the tracks and the droppings?
> With regard to a postulated entity we can say no more than that
> the *concept* exists -- no claim can be made for the existence or
> non-existence of the entity itself.
We make the claim for its existence the moment we postulate it. And, as I
said, we can postulate the existence of anything we like. What we then need
to do is substantiate that claim, by seeking evidence supporting it. Are
you suggesting that no evidence ("tracks within the ER") is possible for
any external entity? What would be the basis of that claim? How do you rule
out external entities which leave ER tracks?
>> They sure don't. That's why we need an external entity if we are to
>> account for them. The concept of electrons cannot account for
>> lightning.
> The concept of electrons plays a significant role in our account of
> lightning, but the concept of electrons doesn't *cause* lightning.
That's right. Electrons, not the concept of them, cause lightning. That is
of course a theoretical (CR) claim. All that we can say metaphysically is
that "something (external) causes lightning." That something is necessarily
external because no phenomena within the ER seems satisfactory to account
for lightning. And "something causes lightning" is itself a postulate, the
fundamental postulate we advance when we reject solipsism.
>> Didn't answer the question, either. What would, on your view, warrant
>> a conclusion that some external X existed?
>
> There are no truth conditions for any claim for the "existence" of
> "things in themselves" (that inhabit some conjectured domain beyond
> the world).
I agree. That is why any such claims are nonsensical, and therefore we
don't make any more of them than necessary. (We only need one).
> The way the world breaks up into distinct entities and events is not a
> matter of pure perception. Indeed the distinction between perception
> and conception is itself a conceived distinction. Running with that
> conceived distinction, the way we perceive the world is conditioned by
> the way we conceive the world and vice versa. Language plays a strong
> role in that conditioning process -- it is an objectifying activity.
> Could there be any such process as 'explanation' in the absence of
> language?
No. We need language for explanations. We also need it to construct
concepts. But a certain amount of organizing of percepts into things and
processes occurs pre-linguistically. A cougar has what we might call a
proto-concept, a conception, of a deer, and an infant a proto-concept of
its mother. Those proto-concepts are constructed from qualia which tend to
appear together and which have specific relationships in time and space. As
we acquire language, we add various theoretical, historical, and abstract
properties to that complex, which transforms the proto-concept into a
concept.
BTW, Steven Pinker pretty well demolishes the linguistic relativity
hypotheis in *The Stuff if Thought*. Here are links to a talk by Pinker on
the topic, and a review of the book. But I highly recommend the book.
http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/steven_pinker_on_language_and_thought.ht
ml
http://www.slate.com/id/2176113/
>> If it is not substantially distinct from the ER, what is the value of
>> postulating it?
>
> We postulate it in our attempts to fit the ER into a "bigger picture".
If it is a bigger picture than the ER, it would have to be substantially
distinct from the ER. Wouldn't it?
> Going beyond epistemological solipsism means indulging in
> metaphysical speculation.
Agree on that one! But once we've rejected solipsism by postulating
something external ("Something exists beyond me and my percepts"), do we
need any *more* metaphysical speculation?
PS: This post may have an obnoxious spam message at the end. I overran my
quota on my regular server, so am using this alternate.
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