"andy-k" wrote in
news:ESuxk.504258$JM.391178@newsfe16.ams2:
>>> "Metaphysical" is a qualifier that implies that such existents are
>>> conjectured to be more than just "conventional".
>>
>> Well, they are theoretical, which is more than just conventional.
>> There will be some evidence supporting them --- very compelling
>> evidence, in some cases. Does "metaphysical" entail something more
>> than that?
>
> Language has evolved to deal with things *in* the world, and language
> is a matter of convention. This even covers theoretical entities
> conjectured to account for phenomena *in* the world. "Metaphysical",
> in this particular application, entails speculation regarding "things
> in themselves" that inhabit some conjectured domain *beyond* the
> world.
Language may have evolved to speak of things in the world, but it is
often used to speak of things not in the world, and is entirely capable
of being so used. Theoretical entitities are indeed postulated to
account for things in the world (usually), but those entities are not
themselves in the world (that's what makes them theoretical). If they
exist, they exist "beyond the world" (meaning the ER).
("The world" is often used to denote "everything that exists, whatever
and wherever it may be," so we need to clarify our use here).
And of course, as Kant (and Witt) argued, we cannot speak sensibly, or
speculate fruitfully, about "things in themselves." Indeed, the phrase
is incoherent. We cannot define or characterize any "thing" except by
referring to its properties, and we cannot know of its properties except
as they appear in the ER, or, for things which may exist external to the
ER, which we may (inductively) infer from certain consequences they may
have within the ER.
That is not to say that things wholly external to the ER (having no
properties or consequences discernible within the ER) may not exist, of
course. But we cannot ponder them, speculate about them, or speak
snesibly about them. We cannot even define them without assigning them
some properties, and we have no grounds for attributing any properties
to them. We have no means of determining whether such speculations
represent anything beyond our own imaginations. I.e., whatever we may
imagine, we have utterly no reason to suppose it represents a "thing in
itself existing beyond the world." Any such assertion would be baseless,
and idle.
>> More specifically, we need to examine the truth conditions for the
>> various uses of "exists" (the criteria applied to distinguish between
>> true and false propositions of the form, "X exists"). There will
>> likely also be some noncognitive uses (uses having no truth
>> conditions). But those would be of no philosophical interest.
>
> There are no truth conditions for any claim for the "existence" of
> "things in themselves" (that inhabit some conjectured domain *beyond*
> the world).
Yes. That is why all assertions about such things are nonsensical, and
speculations about them idle.
>>> 1. We select a phenomenon Y from the manifestly ordered ER for
>>> investigation
>>> 2. Y is a conceptually isolated aspect of a wider process, and we
>>> wish to determine whatever prior aspects of that process are
>>> consistently correlated with Y
>>
>> That begs the question. We don't *know* that Y is an "aspect of a
>> wider process." But we may *hypothesize* that it is. And then we test
>> that hypothesis.
>
> If Y is related to any other phenomenon in the world then it is an
> aspect of a wider process, but there is a phenomenon that is
> vulnerable to your criticism -- namely the spontaneous decay of
> unstable nuclei. I'm not sure how you could test any claim that this
> is an effect (i.e. that there are prior aspects that consistently
> correlate with it).
Most Y's will be related to many other ER phenomena; they will be
elements of several distinct processes. We postulate externals when the
ER phenomena with which they are known to be related do not allow us to
anticipate or manipulate that particular Y as readily or reliably as
we'd like. That Y may fit into several "bigger pictures" which relate it
to other things, but we want an even bigger picture, one which gives us
better predictability and control. So we postulate a bigger picture with
some imaginary elements, then see what *that* picture predicts. If it
gives us more predictability and control, those imaginary externals
become "real."
Not "metaphysically real" --- that is a vacuous concept.
>> There is nothing occult going on here.
>
> There *is* something occult going on here if we hypostatize cause and
> effect, but that is easily avoided by acknowledging that our use of
> those words is merely a matter of convention and not a metaphysical
> judgement.
Well, as I said, it is not a matter of "convention." Causal
relationships (in science) are based on deductive and empirical
evidence, sometimes very compelling evidence. That we call the white H2O
crystals that fall from the sky in winter "snow" instead of "schnee" is
a matter of convention. That electrical charges on water droplets cause
lightning is not a convention.
Neither is it a "metaphysical judgment." Metaphysical judgments are
arbitrary judgments, expressed with noncognitive propositions.
>> "Cause and effect" is merely an elementary process (the most
>> elementary; it is a process consisting of two elements related in
>> time). It is merely a pair of links we conceptually isolate from some
>> larger chain (process), a binary relationship. It is the equivalent,
>> along the temporal dimension, of a line along a spatial dimension
>> (two connected points). Like lines, causal binaries can be combined
>> to form much larger, more complex structures (objects and processes,
>> respectively).
>> Processes are sets of ER elements related in time; objects are sets
>> of ER elements related in space. Both are "bigger pictures" and may
>> include hypothetical existents (externals) added to "complete the
>> picture."
>
> *Events* are sets of ER elements related in time, and are to time
> as objects are to space. Events are conceptually discontinuous,
> whereas processes need not be conceived as discontinuous.
I think we have a terminological quibble here, but one which we should
be able to clear up. I think of an event as merely a short-term process,
or a portion of a longer process, which we find notable for some reason.
E.g., Hurricane Katrina's flooding of New Orleans was an event, but the
hurricane itself was a process.
And processes are always delimited in some way, and must be for purposes
of analysis and discussion. E.g., the hurricane "began" with the
appearance of a tropical depression in the Atlantic, and "ended" with
the dissipation of the storm over N. Louisiana and Arkansas. That
process was, of course, embedded in the much larger and more complex
process of terrestrial meteorology, which has been continuous since the
Earth acquired an atmosphere, which is in turn embedded within an even
more complex process of stellar and planetary formation, etc. But we can
only analyze such vast processes one chunk at a time.
>> You are equivocating with the term "conceptual entities," which leads
>> to your faulty conclusion, #5. You persist in equating the concept of
>> an entity with the entity conceived, or postulated. The mere
>> conception of an external X cannot cause Y; we cannot relate Y into a
>> useful "bigger picture" merely by relating it to our own concepts. We
>> cannot create lightning by thinking about it, or by conceiving
>> electrons, EM fields, etc.
>
> Conceptual entities invoked to explain phenomena in the world are
> nothing more than conceptual entities.
Then you are misunderstanding what is conceived and postulated. If I
postulate the existence of monster in Loch Ness, then I mean what I say
--- that there is living, breathing, tangible, scaly, and voracious
monster living in Loch Ness. I am not postulating the concept or idea of
a monster. I do not need to postulate the *idea* of the monster; I'm
having that idea at this moment; like all elements of the ER, it is
manifest. I have to postulate the "real," scaly one, which is *not* now
present in the ER.
Having postulated the monster, I can go to the loch and search for it. I
may or may not find an entity which satisfies the description I've
postulated. If I find it, then it exists, and I may fairly conclude that
it existed all along, even before it appeared "in the flesh" in the ER.
And it will definitely be distinct from my idea, my concept of it, which
will exist whether I find anything in the loch or not.
Your claim above, "Conceptual entities invoked to explain phenomena in
the world are nothing more than conceptual entities," entails either:
1. It is impossible to conceive external entities (we are fooling
ourselves by thinking we can conceive such things), or
2. Any external entities are impossible.
Opting for either of those would certainly rule out any "metaphysical"
entities one might try to contemplate (or fool oneself into thinking one
is contemplating).
In short, a conceived external entity is not a "conceptual entity." The
concept of the entity is the "conceptual entity." You are simply
dismissing, or ignoring, without grounds, one of the properties the
conceived entity is defined to have. What are your grounds for declaring
that any entity conceived as external can be "nothing more" than its
concept, that there can be no such external entity?
> Conceptual entities don't
> *cause* effects in the world, but are conceived in order to *account
> for* effects in the world.
They sure don't. That's why we need an external entity if we are to
account for them. The concept of electrons cannot account for lightning.
>> What *would*, in your view, permit us to conclude that an external X
>> exists?
>
> There is nothing to be gained by reifying conceptual entities --
> they serve their purpose well enough without the need to pile
> metaphysical postulates upon them.
There is nothing metaphysical about the claim that electrons exist, or
that they are external to the ER. They are not presumed to be "things in
themselves," but external-things-with-consequences-in-the-world.
Didn't answer the question, either. What would, on your view, warrant a
conclusion that some external X existed?
> To claim that a conceptual entity "exists" as something more than the
> concept is to make an untestable and unnecessary metaphysical claim.
Tests for the existence of theoretical entities are performed all the
time, often successfully. E.g., a doctor may test a patient's blood for
sodium ions, a theoretical entity. He is not testing for a "conceptual
entity" there. (He might do that by asking the patient to explain or
describe sodium ions).
But that statement may reveal the problem. You are assuming that an
assertion of the existence of an entity external to the ER must
necessarily be a "metaphysical claim." But it isn't. Metaphysical claims
are indeed untestable, which is why they are nonsensical. Theoretical
claims (claims involving theoretical entities) are testable. That is
because that class of external entities is presumed to have (defined to
have) internal effects, which can be tested for.
>> Not sure I'm following you there. Common "things" (dogs, trees)
>> consist mainly of sets of qualia, with some hypothetical elements
>> added. Theoretical entities (electrons, photons) are comprised mainly
>> of mathematical or abstract properties, perhaps with a few qualia
>> added. The differences between them is one of degree.
>
> No disagreement there, but we refer to dogs, trees, electrons,
> photons, lightening strikes, etc. as a matter of linguistic
> convention.
They are all constructed entities, but those constructs are not matters
of "linguistic convention." They have explantory power. And they tend to
be largely similar from language to language (linguistic conventions are
idiosyncratic to languages).
> Denoting an entity as 'real' is also a matter of linguistic convention
> -- we are perfectly entitled to denote an entity as 'real' if it
> proves useful in our explanations and predictions of the world, but
> there is no metaphysical judgement entailed by this.
Enuf said, I think, about lingusitic conventions. But I agree that
postulating theoretical externals involves no metaphysical claims or
judgments.
>> There is an interaction problem with any postulated entity or process
>> which, by hypothesis, has no discernible effects within the ER. If
>> our aim is to understand the origins and nature of the ER, then
>> postulating such completely detached entities or processes cannot
>> possibly contribute to that understanding.
>
> There is an interaction problem with any entities or processes that
> are postulated to be substantially distinct. If our aim is to
> understand the relationship of the ER to some postulated domain
> "beyond" the ER, then we can avoid the interaction problem by not
> proposing this postulated domain to be substantially distinct from the
> ER.
If it is not substantially distinct from the ER, what is the value of
postulating it? Is it then just a different terminology for describing
the ER? In what way is it superior to the present terminology?
Does it get us beyond solipsism?
