andy-k wrote:

I think the philosophy of *perspectivism* (especially a broader version
that's less tangled in Nietzsche's specifics and socio-ethical agenda)
is probably a consequence of "things-for-each-other". Although it bars
us from a nonconstructed objective world in its own way (different way
than Kant), perspectivism seems to concern the relational nature of the
empirical world: How a cognitive agent perceives / conceives a
phenomenon depends upon the how, where (distance; scale), when, and so
forth that the former accesses the latter. Not to mention whatever
"theory-ladenness" influences the agent's judgements.

Since "things-for-each-other" is really (IMO) an observation or comment
about the phenomenalistic domain, it doesn't disprove possibilities for
a noumenal domain that might exist independent of human
perceptions/conceptions (one of those possibilities being
"things-in-themselves"). Not only the larger objects of *vulgar
materialism*, but the microentities slash *bundled microproperties* that
physics has entertained over time have variously been described as along
the line of ontic "things-in-themselves" (Berkeley one of the first
accusers that comes to mind). So the idea (things-in-themselves) isn't
non-useful, and the practicing physicist doesn't have to accept it as an
actual metaphysical condition (but scientists probably are realists more
often than not, shrugging away both the metempirical epistemic pessimism
of Kantians and then relativism of generic perspectivists).

posted by Ecce