"andy-k" wrote in
news:N37wk.149589$W71.23260@newsfe12.ams2:
>> Why use "self" to refer to the ER, when that term has another common
>> referent? Why invite that confusion?
>
> Witt wishes to use the term 'self' to refer to it (5.63) and I don't
> have a problem with that. In fact I consider his mode of reference apt
> since "the world" manifests as though from the perspective of a
> 'subject' embedded in a wider world (i.e. in the conceived "objective
> world"), and there is nothing in "the world" with which this 'subject'
> correlates (5.631).
Let's try to schematize this.
1. "The world" manifests as though from the perspective of a
'subject' embedded in a wider world."
2. "There is nothing in "the world" with which this 'subject'
correlates." Ergo,
3. The "subject" and "the world" are identical ("I am my world").
The conclusion is a blatant non-sequitur. It simply doesn't follow that
because the subject is not discernible within "the world," that it must
be identical with the world. In fact, the conclusion contradicts the
first premise, which delineates a cogent distinction between the subject
and the object ("the world"). We don't eradicate the conceptual
distinction merely by asserting them to be identical.
We should "have a problem" with this gratuitous attempt to identify two
distinct concepts. That move doesn't solve any problems; it sweeps them
under the rug.
> He also says that "I am my world" (5.63), implying that the self *is*
> the world. (I don't read German so I can't make an interpretation of
> the original text.)
I do, and the translation is as accurate as any translation can be. The
statement reads and means the same in German.
> Witt says in 5.633 "You will say that this is exactly like the case of
> the eye and the visual field", and some interpret him to be arguing
> for a self that is distinct from the ER (just as the eye is distinct
> from the visual field), but it seems to me that he's criticizing what
> "you will say".
Yes. He is claiming that *inferring* the self is illegitimate (though
inferring an eye may be legitimate). And he's right about that. But it
still does not follow that "the world" and "the self" must therefore be
identical.
>> No doubt. But his difficulty finding a means to describe what he
>> wishes to discuss derives from his realist premise and his adoption
>> of the correspondence theory. Abandon those, and the difficulty
>> vanishes. If the self is understood as a postulated entity then there
>> is no need for convoluted circumlocutions ("at the limits of the
>> world") or elliptical metaphors to refer to it. We simply define it
>> and postulate its existence as an external entity.
>
> You seem to be arguing for realism, and Witt seems to be arguing
> that neither realism nor solipsism may be ruled out.
No. I'm arguing for constructivism. Constructivism is not realism. Witt
is the realist.
Witt (of the Tractatus) does not understand constructivism. He
identifies the self with the world because, since the self is not
discernible within the world, the only alternative seems to him to be
that it is identical with it. But there are other alternatives.
>> One is really not free to stipulate eclectic meanings for common
>> terms. It invariably spawns confusion and fallacious reasoning.
>
> One is entirely free to stipulate eclectic meanings for common terms.
> Once stipulated there is no confusion, so long as one does not
> equivocate.
But Witt does equivocate. Indeed, he identifes "world" and "self"
precisely in order to allow that equivocation.
>> On the other hand, there is utterly no value, nor any point, in
>> postulating entities which do not have consequences within the ER.
>> The existence of such entities is untestable by any means, and hence
>> speculating about them is idle.
>
> There are two distinct issues here. Firstly, postulated entities
> abducted from phenomena in the ER certainly *do* have consequences
> within the ER, since that is their provenance, regardless of any
> further postulate of externality. Secondly, speculation about a
> "bigger picture" encompassing the ER, despite being untestable, is not
> idle if it reduces perplexity.
More on "reducing perplexity" at the end.
>> Do you take Witt (of the Tractatus) to be arguing against any
>> metaphysical stance, or against a particular metaphysical stance?
>> I take him to be pointing out some difficulties with realism, and
>> trying to find a workaround without leaving the realist framework.
>> Those difficulties do not arise for constructivists.
>
> I take him to be arguing that language is an inadequate tool for
> addressing metaphysical issues, since language arises *in* the
> world and addresses situations *in* the world.
If language is an inadequate tool, then how does he propose to
philosophize regarding metaphysical issues? *All so-called "metaphysical
issues" are themselves linguistic constructs*. They are propositions
formulated or questions posed in the very language which is presumed to
be inadequate to address them. If it begins to appear that language is
inadequate to resolve those issues, then the problem is with the way
they have been formulated --- they have been formulated in violation of
various linguistic or logical rules of construction, which renders them
unanalyzable or uninterpretable using accepted linguistic or logical
methods. They are not WFFs.
WFFs in natural languages are propositions which have public truth
conditions. A formula which has no public truth conditions is not a WFF,
and can convey no information. It is a noncognitive verbal string.
>> I did not make that claim. Many events within the ER have effects
>> within the ER, e.g., if I toss a lighted match into a pile of dry
>> leaves, I can predict a fire. No external entities are involved; the
>> entire causal chain resides within the ER. But I can also postulate
>> entities or processes external to the ER which also cause fires,
>> e.g., I can postulate electrical charges on unobservable particles
>> which result in lightning under certain conditions. Electrons and
>> electrical charges on airborne water molecules are not discernible
>> within the ER; they are external to it. (The ideas of them are
>> internal, but the ideas of electrons and charge fields do not produce
>> lightning).
>>
>> And as mentioned above, the external entities (electrons and fields)
>> are indeed testable, because one can test for their hypothesized
>> effects.
>
> Postulated entities abducted from phenomena in the ER have
> consequences within the ER, since that is their provenance, regardless
> of any further postulate of externality. The fact that they don't
> appear directly in the ER is not an argument for a domain external to
> the ER -- that logical possibility (metaphysical realism) cannot be
> eliminated, but neither can other logical possibilities (e.g.
> metaphysical solipsism).
I think we've agreed that solipsism cannot be logically eliminated. We
don't eliminate it on logical grounds; we eliminate it because it is an
explanatory dead end.
And if an entity does not "appear directly" within the ER, then that
certainly is an argument that it must exist externally (if it exists at
all). Anything within the ER is manifest, self-evident, experienced,
"appears directly." There are no hidden, implicit, virtual, immanent, or
other non-experienced entities within the ER.
>> If a conceived entity predicts consequences in the ER, and those
>> consequences are confirmed, then the entity is no longer merely a
>> "conceptual entity." There is something external answering to it. Why
>> do we know that? Because nothing internal --- nothing experienced
>> within the ER --- has those consequences. I can imagine electrons and
>> electrical charges all day long, and never produce a lightning bolt.
>>
>> The logical requirement there is ironclad:
>>
>> 1. Something X exists which causes lightning bolts (metaphysical
>> hypothesis).
>>
>> 2. Nothing exists within the ER which is not discernible
>> (self-evidence of the ER).
>>
>> 3. X is not discernible within the ER.
>>
>> 4. Ergo, X is external to the ER.
>>
>> You may escape that conclusion only by rejecting #1, thereby
>> retreating to solipsism.
>
> You're arguing that "if it isn't internal then it must be external".
> This is a non-sequitur in this particular case, since the ER would
> need to go beyond the ER in order to find out if there was a "beyond
> the ER".
Yes. If it isn't perceived within the ER, then it is necessarily
external to it (if it exists at all). There is no middle ground or third
alternative. (And saying something is "at the limit" is not a solution,
since whatever is "at the limit" must either be perceptible or not. If
it is perceptible, then it is within the ER. If imperceptible, then it
is external.
And we don't need to "go beyond" the ER *in order to have evidence* of
something existing beyond it. We can legitimately infer, inductively,
the existence of unseen and even unseeable entities if those entities
have visible consequences.
What we cannot have is "complete and perfect knowledge" of external
entities. But we can have *useful conceptions* of those alleged entities
--- useful because they allow us to predict ER phenomena, and even lead
us to new ER knowledge. The inductive evidence is more than sufficient
to justify those useful conceptions, and they are all we need.
> It is quite sufficient that entities postulated for the
> purpose of explaining
> phenomena within the ER do so effectively, without piling metaphysical
> postulates upon them.
They are postulated to be external to the ER simply because they are not
perceptible within it. That is indeed a metaphysical postulate, and it
is unavoidable (except by retreating to solipsism).
As I mentioned before, only one metaphysical postulate is necessary,
i.e., "Something exists beyond the ER." What that "something" might be
is constructed --- it is our current "best guess" as to the nature of
the entities and processes existing beyond the ER. As merely a "best
guess," it is always tentative.
>> Didn't answer my question, though. Is there a distinction to be made
>> between "metaphysically real" and "metaphysically unreal" entities?
>> What is the basis for the distinction, if there is one?
>
> There's a distinction to be made between "metaphysically real"
> and "conventionally real" entities.
What is the basis of that distinction, in your view?
Can you further explain what is required, on your view, to reduce
perplexity? I understand the "bigger picture" aspect. What I'm wondering
is how you select among various bigger pictures, since numerous bigger
pictures are always possible.
For myself, I believe I have understood a process or a phenomena when I
am able to predict, produce, or modify that process or phenomena in some
desired way. Fitting the phenomena into a bigger picture does not count
as understanding it, for me, unless that bigger picture allows me to do
something with that phenomena I could not do before. Most of the bigger
pictures we can imagine serve to obscure the phenomena, rather than
illuminate it.
