"andy-k" wrote in
news:bvWtk.45552$f%%6.27330@newsfe09.ams2:
>>>>> I have no quarrel with your argument against Witt's inference of
>>>>> self as a "subject of experience", but that's not to say that I
>>>>> have a quarrel with the use of the word 'self' as a means of
>>>>> alluding to the existence of the ER.
>>>>
>>>> Not sure I'm following that. Is alluding to the existence of the ER
>>>> different from alluding to the ER?
>>>
>>> Either will do.
>>>
>>>> Why do we need to *allude* to either --- why can't we just *refer*
>>>> to it?
>>>
>>> We can refer to it, but at cost of speaking "nonsense" since
>>> there is nothing *in* the ER with which it correlates (5.631).
>>
>> There is the fallacy of 4 terms. The referent of the "it" in your
>> statement just above is the ER. There is no nonsense involved in
>> referring to the ER; it doesn't have to be "in" itself. The nonsense
>> appears when you use the term "self" to refer to the ER, yet continue
>> to think of it as something within the ER.
>
> Since Witt isn't thinking of the self as something within the ER,
> there is no equivocation in the Tractatus.
I was referring to your use (first quote above), not Witt's. Why use
"self" to refer to the ER, when that term has another common referent?
Why invite that confusion?
>> If "self" refers to the ER --- if it is to be just a synonym for it
>> --- then there is no nonsense involved in referring to it with that
>> term (or any term we might choose). It is only nonsensical if it
>> refers to something distinct from the ER, yet which is not
>> discernible within the ER. You're trying to use the term to refer to
>> the ER on one hand, and to something distinct from it on the other.
>> So you have a 4-term fallacy.
>
> Witt speaks of the self as *at the limits* of the world, and section
> 5.633 suggests that the self of the solipsist is an inference (within
> the world) drawn from the existence of the world. I can't find a claim
> for the self being distinct from the world (and indeed this would be
> at odds with his thesis here). However, since the self is not *in* the
> world, then it is not accessible to language (hence we can only speak
> nonsense about it).
If the self is "at the limits of the world," then it is distinct from
the world (the world is not "at the limits of the world"). A fence may
be at the limits of a pasture, but it is still distinct from the
pasture. Saying the self is "at the limits", as opposed to being "in the
world," does not remove the conceptual distinction between the world and
the self.
And as mentioned, the self is not inferred from the world --- not
validly, at least. It is a postulated entity which does not exist in the
world until postulated. It may exist external to the world (the ER), of
course, as may anything else we can imagine (anything which is not self-
contradictory --- round squares, etc.).
>> Witt (of the Tractatus) thinks "I am my world" represents an insight.
>> But it merely represents a confusion. Either "I" and "my world" are
>> synonymous terms, in which case 5.63 states a boring tautology, or
>> the two terms refer to different things, in which case 5.63 is false.
>
> I think he's just using language as best he can to allude to the
> situation he wishes to discuss.
No doubt. But his difficulty finding a means to describe what he wishes
to discuss derives from his realist premise and his adoption of the
correspondence theory. Abandon those, and the difficulty vanishes. If
the self is understood as a postulated entity then there is no need for
convoluted circumlocutions ("at the limits of the world") or elliptical
metaphors to refer to it. We simply define it and postulate its
existence as an external entity.
>> All of this confusion goes away if we simply take the self to be a
>> postulated entity. Postulated entities do not have to be discernible
>> within the ER. Indeed, if they were discernible within the ER, we
>> wouldn't have to postulate them.
>
> There is no confusion -- he has stipulated his use of the word 'self'
> and then proceeded to establish his argument.
Would his argument be at all interesting had he used another term ---
say, "bobbin", to denote what he wishes to denote with "self"? One is
really not free to stipulate eclectic meanings for common terms. It
invariably spawns confusion and fallacious reasoning.
>> Eeek. That is vague. Does "all that is arising" mean everything that
>> exists, or might exist? Should we coin a different term for the realm
>> of experiential phenomena, or are you saying that experiential
>> phenomena is the only realm there is, or can be? (The latter would be
>> the solipsist's claim).
>
> "All that is arising" is the best that language can muster by way of
> allusion (better than simply retorting "this!", anyway). Whether or
> not it is the only realm is a question of metaphysics. Epistemological
> solipsism claims that the self can't know whether or not it is the
> only realm, since it can't go beyond its own limits to find out.
Well, it can, in a way. It can postulate various external entities and
processes which (by hypothesis) affect the ER in various ways. We can
then look for those effects.
>> What needs to be testable are hypotheses regarding the origin and
>> nature of the ER (by "nature" I mean the details of its structure).
>> Are you saying there are no testable hypotheses which bear on those
>> questions, which can shed any light on them?
>
> The structure of the ER exhibits order, making that structure
> predictable to some extent. Those predictions are testable. What
> cannot be tested is the postulate of the existence of a domain
> 'external' to the ER, since the self of Witt's solipsist cannot go
> beyond the ER to make that test.
We may be narrowing our difference here. If we postulate an external
entity which can have effects within the ER, then finding those effects
*is* a test for the existence of that external entity. We don't need to
"go beyond" the ER to make that test. You (and Witt) are assuming,
without grounds, that the only valid "test" for the existence of an X is
an experience of X (an event within the ER). But that is mistaken. If we
postulate
If X then Y (with X being an external entity and Y being an ER event),
then if we find Y, we have evidence for X. The more of the predicted Y's
we find, the stronger that evidence becomes, and the more probable the
existence of X. There is never any need to experience X itself.
On the other hand, there is utterly no value, nor any point, in
postulating entities which do not have consequences within the ER. The
existence of such entities is untestable by any means, and hence
speculating about them is idle.
>> That is another mistake on Witt's part. The world doesn't "manifest"
>> in that way; we *see* it that way. I.e., we see it through a
>> framework we have constructed pre-consciously. But we can see that
>> structure if we focus on it, and can contemplate alternatives to it.
>> It is a "given," but a given we may discard (conceptually) if we can
>> come up with a sturdier structure.
>
> All of that is part of the paraphernalia of the world. To consider it
> otherwise is to adopt a metaphysical stance, and this is precisely
> what Witt is arguing against.
Do you take Witt (of the Tractatus) to be arguing against any
metaphysical stance, or against a particular metaphysical stance? I take
him to be pointing out some difficulties with realism, and trying to
find a workaround without leaving the realist framework. Those
difficulties do not arise for constructivists.
>> And that is where we differ. We certainly cannot eliminate the
>> possibility of a realm of existents which have no effects --- which
>> "leave no tracks," so to speak --- within the ER. But why would we be
>> interested in such a realm? How would positing such a realm help us
>> answer the questions we agreed were the motivations behind the
>> inquiry, e.g., where did the ER come from and what is its nature? How
>> will postulating entities having no discernible connections with the
>> ER help us understand the ER?
>
> I'm not "postulating a realm of existents which have no effect [...]
> within the ER", but rejecting the claim that if anything is to have an
> effect within the ER then it must exist outside the ER. There is no
> requirement for any such domain, and the postulated existence of
> such a domain is not testable.
I did not make that claim. Many events within the ER have effects within
the ER, e.g., if I toss a lighted match into a pile of dry leaves, I can
predict a fire. No external entities are involved; the entire causal
chain resides within the ER. But I can also postulate entities or
processes external to the ER which also cause fires, e.g., I can
postulate electrical charges on unobservable particles which result in
lightning under certain conditions. Electrons and electrical charges on
airborne water molecules are not discernible within the ER; they are
external to it. (The ideas of them are internal, but the ideas of
electrons and charge fields do not produce lightning).
And as mentioned above, the external entities (electrons and fields) are
indeed testable, because one can test for their hypothesized effects.
>> This is a real sticking point. Entities are postulated within the ER,
>> i.e., the act of postulating them occurs within the ER, but the
>> entities postulated are *not* within the ER, *as postulated*.
>> They are postulated to be external to it.
>
> And this further postulate is neither necessary nor testable.
We've agreed (I think) that the ER is self-evident. Are you suggesting
that electrons, EM fields, black holes, cognitive world models, hydrogen
ions, etc., etc., are self-evident constituents of the ER, like colors,
odors, shapes, pains, sleepiness, etc.? Are you claiming to have
experienced any of the former group of entities or processes? If those
entities are not objects of experience, then *they are external to the
ER*, if they exist, by definition of the ER. And the hypotheses which
postulate them are testable, in the manner described.
There is no "further" postulate here. Any entity we might imagine, which
we do not actually experience, is necessarily external to the ER, if it
has any existence beyond the idea of it. And we decide whether it exists
by determining whether the consequences predicted for it occur (not by
somehow "going beyond" the ER to observe it).
> Conceptual entities abducted from phenomena within the ER may
> have predictive power within the ER, but there is no logical
> requirement that those entities should inhabit some domain external to
> the ER.
If a conceived entity predicts consequences in the ER, and those
consequences are confirmed, then the entity is no longer merely a
"conceptual entity." There is something external answering to it. Why do
we know that? Because nothing internal --- nothing experienced within
the ER --- has those consequences. I can imagine electrons and
electrical charges all day long, and never produce a lightning bolt.
The logical requirement there is ironclad:
1. Something X exists which causes lightning bolts (metaphysical
hypothesis).
2. Nothing exists within the ER which is not discernible (self-evidence
of the ER).
3. X is not discernible within the ER.
4. Ergo, X is external to the ER.
You may escape that conclusion only by rejecting #1, thereby retreating
to solipsism.
> The idea of an electron does not necessitate the existence of a 'real'
> electron external to the ER -- it is a shorthand way of referring to a
> certain kind of order manifest within the ER.
The idea of an electron certainly does not *ipso facto* necessitate a
"real" electron. Indeed, it never *necessitates* a real electron. If the
consequences predicted for that entity are confirmed, however, it
renders more probable the existence of a "real" electron. And the
theories of electricity and meteorology are hardly "shorthand" ways to
describe electrical storms. They are quite long-winded ways to describe
them. Furthermore, those theories *predict* orderly patterns *before
they are manifest* (by predicting the behavior of entities imagined to
be external to the ER).
> The realist answers the
> question "why is this order manifest within the ER" by making the
> untestable claim that what is arising in the ER is a perspectival view
> on a domain that exists beyond the ER (the view as 'seen' by a subject
> embedded in that domain). Epistemological solipsism claims that we
> can't know why the ER exhibits order -- it just does.
Correct, except for your claim that the existence of external entities
is "untestable." Observing an entity is not the only valid way to test
for it. But you're right about the solipsist --- solipsism entails
agnosticism. He has no means of explaining why the world behaves as it
does.
> The ER is manifest, including all postulates residing therein.
> The idea that there is an 'experiencer' distinct from the ER is
> neither necessary nor testable.
It is not necessary, but it may be a useful construct. And it is
testable in the manner of all postulated external entities --- by seeing
whether it has explanatory power.
>>>> What would be the criterion for an entity's being "metaphysically
>>>> real"?
>>> Metaphysical realism, as I understand the term, is the untestable
>>> claim for a domain 'external' to the ER, within which 'real'
>>> entities reside (entities providing the template for their
>>> 'appearance' within the ER).
>> How can these entities possibly affect appearances within the ER if
>> they have, by hypothesis, no consequences within the ER? Methinks
>> that is a contradiction.
> The idea that there are entities external to the ER that "affect
> appearances within the ER" is a claim for realism.
No it isn't. It is a claim for constructivism only. Realism requires
some further premises.
Didn't answer my question, though. Is there a distinction to be made
between "metaphysically real" and "metaphysically unreal" entities? What
is the basis for the distinction, if there is one?
>> Nor does it answer the question --- what distinguishes
>> "metaphysically real" entities from "metaphysically unreal" ones?
>
> If metaphysical realism is adopted then the distinction is that of
> reality and appearance, but there is no logical justification for
> adopting metaphysical realism (though the logical possibility cannot
> be eliminated).
But by hypothesis, all we have are appearances. Are appearances then the
only "metaphysically real" entities? How might we establish the
"reality" of any other entities?
