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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 16, 2008 08:41
andy-k wrote:
>Ecce wrote: As far as I can tell, an unbroken motion
> slash "existence" of a particle would lead to it
> literally existing as a worldline that eventually
> intersects with other worldlines, thus resulting...
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Date: Sep 16, 2008 09:56
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> I'll go back to Witt to respond to the above: "We cannot compare a
>> process with 'the passage of time' -- there is no such thing -- but only
>> with another process (such as the working of a chronometer.) Hence we can
>> describe the lapse of time only by relying on some other process."
>> (Tractatus 6.3611)
>
> There's no passage of time in eternalism, apart from the subjective
> illusion of it arising from the judgemental / comparative relations
> embedded along the worldline (or so forth) of a cognitive organism or
> its brain. The latter would subsume what he continues to talk about in
> the relation contrasts between different "processes" (really, a
> combination of measurements, practices, observations, devices, and
> language games). Metaphysically, "no passage of time" would kill
> process cosmology as Whitehead seemed to conceive it:
>
> "Without this element of novelty and self-determination [in
> Whitehead's philosophy], the world would be a machine, what William
> James called a block universe. In such a universe, evolution could ...
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 18, 2008 08:36
andy-k wrote:
>The problem I have with eternalism is that if all
> things and all events are already accounted for in
> some "block universe" then there is no change.
In an eternalism model, change could be a type of relation, a
comparative state. *Situation A* is different from *Situation B*, ergo
the illusion of one situation having altered into the other --the belief
that a physical or even hyperphysical action must have transpired. But
there is no physical modification, change doesn't transcend its
cognitive nature.
And the inference (that a 3D-universe "changed") probably isn't some
eiphenomenal object or substance moving spatially in correlation to
brain actions (since the brain would be a static, continuous
hyperstructure embedded in the larger hyperstructure version of the
universe). But even if the "differences" between situations was reified
as a thing "moving" along outside or inside the brain worldline (or
etc), it wouldn't alter the fixed hyperstructure in its travels (since
by definition it doesn't alter).
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Date: Sep 18, 2008 11:08
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> The problem I have with eternalism is that if all
>> things and all events are already accounted for in
>> some "block universe" then there is no change.
>
> In an eternalism model, change could be a type of relation, a
> comparative state. *Situation A* is different from *Situation B*, ergo
> the illusion of one situation having altered into the other --the
> belief that a physical or even hyperphysical action must have
> transpired. But there is no physical modification, change doesn't
> transcend its cognitive nature.
But isn't 'comparison' a *process*?
> Brian Green ~~~ "I think the relationship between memory and time is a
> very deep and tricky one . . . . I do consider memory that which
> allows us to think that time flows. We all have a sense that...
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Sep 18, 2008 21:07
> In an eternalism model, change could be a type of relation, a
> comparative state. *Situation A* is different from *Situation B*, ergo
> the illusion of one situation having altered into the other --the
> belief that a physical or even hyperphysical action must have
> transpired. But there is no physical modification, change doesn't
> transcend its cognitive nature.
One would then need to argue for the superiority of the eternalism model.
What explanatory advantages does it offer?
Saying that a changing external world is an "illusion" presumes one has
adopted, or at least is leaning toward, a static model rather than a
dynamic one. Given that experience changes
--- and there can be no doubt
about that --- then it would seem that a static model would have a
difficult time accounting for those manifest phenomenal changes. And
accounting for phenomena is the motivation for constructing models in the
first place.
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 20, 2008 00:15
andy-k wrote:
>But isn't 'comparison' a *process*?
But what would this process be comparing Now to? The last Now? What last
Now? If only "Now" exists (3D version), then where is this process or
its operational instructions located? Is it in the universe of this Now,
which it has slated for annihilation?
If a brain has a memory of what it believes are former moments, and that
memory is being compared to the brain's own specious Now to denote a
difference and infer "change", then that would have to be a static
comparative relationship (since the brain is embedded in a single global
Now). If brains are the only regions where there are such relations
between a (specious) present and a past (memory) in that global Now,
then these would only be subjective judgements of change, not an
objective one belonging to the vaster non-brain territory (just as
change also seemed a cognitive property in the eternalism models).
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 20, 2008 00:37
Publius wrote:
>One would then need to argue for the
> superiority of the eternalism model.
> What explanatory advantages does it
> offer? Saying that a changing external
> world is an "illusion" presumes one has
> adopted, or at least is leaning toward, a
> static model rather than a dynamic one.
> Given that experience changes --- and
> there can be no doubt about that --- then
> it would seem that a static model would
> have a difficult time accounting for those
> manifest phenomenal changes. And
> accounting for phenomena is the
> motivation for constructing models in
> the first place.
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Sep 20, 2008 10:41
>>One would then need to argue for the
>> superiority of the eternalism model.
>> What explanatory advantages does it
>> offer? Saying that a changing external
>> world is an "illusion" presumes one has
>> adopted, or at least is leaning toward, a
>> static model rather than a dynamic one.
>> Given that experience changes --- and
>> there can be no doubt about that --- then
>> it would seem that a static model would
>> have a difficult time accounting for those
>> manifest phenomenal changes. And
>> accounting for phenomena is the
>> motivation for constructing models in
>> the first place.
> How does this changing "external world" change?
That is one of the things a theory of an external world will specify.
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Date: Sep 20, 2008 11:19
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> But isn't 'comparison' a *process*?
>
> But what would this process be comparing Now to? The last Now?
A present memory.
> What last Now? If only "Now" exists (3D version), then where is
> this process or its operational instructions located? Is it in the
> universe of this Now, which it has slated for annihilation?
I'd like to return to Witt's comment (5.63) that "I am my world
(the microcosm)" in order to distinguish this from *the idea* of an
"objective world" that arises within this microcosm. It is manifest
that the microcosm is changing and so I call it a 'process', and
the question "where is this process?" makes little sense to me.
Regarding the process of comparison, it is simply a sub-process
of the microcosm.
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 20, 2008 12:34
Publius:
>How does this changing "external world" change?
>===============
>That is one of the things a theory of an external
> world will specify.
I can't quite see the overwhelming merits of a changing external world
theory that hasn't developed to the point of offering how it changes, or
(probably preceding that) what *change* is supposed to be in it. I'm not
so much denying the possibility as just curious about how it absolutely
paddles the arse of every other idea.
>What, if anything, maintains any order or
> nomological-like habits it may have that persist
> over these changes?
>=========
>There is no *a priori* requirement for any agency or
> force to maintain a postulated order. The order may
> be postulated to be fundamental. A primordial
> persisting order is as conceivable and permissible,
> metaphysically speaking, as primordial disorder.
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