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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Aug 30, 2008 09:10
andy-k wrote:
>Witt's refusal to reject epistemological solipsism
> is, of course, nonsensical, as he admits himself
> (6.54), but that doesn't make the proposition
> meaningless (6.522).
It's as a very argument or group of arguments that ES runs into trouble.
It becomes inconsistent when expressed in some/all of language games and
"state of affairs" background. I'm pressed for time, so I'm going to
quote Maarten Maartensz for some of the official knocks against
epistemological solipsism, the 3rd of which rings of the PLA:
1. To reason at all one must make assumptions, and indeed make
assumptions of things that go beyond one's own present experiences. For
if one does not do so, one cannot even test one's guesses.
2. No human being has been raised as a solipsist: Everybody has been
raised by other persons who believe that there are other persons with
experiences like themselves, whatever else they believe.
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Date: Aug 30, 2008 11:38
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> Witt's refusal to reject epistemological solipsism
>> is, of course, nonsensical, as he admits himself
>> (6.54), but that doesn't make the proposition
>> meaningless (6.522).
>
> It's as a very argument or group of arguments that ES runs into
> trouble. It becomes inconsistent when expressed in some/all of
> language games and "state of affairs" background.
This seems consistent with Witt's claims.
> I'm pressed for time, so I'm going to quote Maarten Maartensz
> for some of the official knocks against epistemological solipsism,
> the 3rd of which rings of the PLA:
>
> 1. To reason at all one must...
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Aug 31, 2008 10:28
andy-k wrote:
Ecce wrote:
>>You're presented with an *outside the box* by the
>> very nature of cognition and to confirm knowledge
>> by public consensus or overt tests. It's not the
>> ultimate *OTB* (if there is one), but it's the
>> only *OTB* (and theories concerning it) that
>> science and even philosophy can apprehend.
####
>But wouldn't this be from the perspective of the
> "conventional subject"?
Language supports that convention, and the background *state of affairs*
has a human body, or bodies, surrounded by an external environment, with
the bodies conceived as having thoughts about that world...
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Date: Aug 31, 2008 11:32
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> Ecce wrote:
>>> You're presented with an *outside the box* by the
>>> very nature of cognition and to confirm knowledge
>>> by public consensus or overt tests. It's not the
>>> ultimate *OTB* (if there is one), but it's the
>>> only *OTB* (and theories concerning it) that
>>> science and even philosophy can apprehend.
>
>> But wouldn't this be from the perspective of the
>> "conventional subject"?
>
> Language supports that convention, and the background *state of
> affairs* has a human body, or bodies, surrounded by an external
> environment, with the bodies conceived as having thoughts about that
> world. Trying to doubt or discredit the *conventional subject* and
> *mundane state of affairs* (as part of the baggage that comes with
> language and background conditions) may circularly undermine or
> negate the supposed starting conditions that an inquiry and ...
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 2, 2008 09:43
andy-k wrote:
>Retaining that possibility seems tantamount to
> retaining the possibility of substance-based
> metaphysics, and I don't find substance-based
> metaphysics very helpful in reducing perplexity.
> Process-based metaphysics seems more promising in
> that respect.
Depends, IMO.
If the *process* involves explaining state transitions by a
rearrangement from moment to moment of an enduring fundamental, with
these elemental alterations producing the various properties of things,
then a need for substance persists (IOW, something is always conserved
regardless of what new form it assumes).
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Date: Sep 2, 2008 14:59
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> Retaining that possibility seems tantamount to
>> retaining the possibility of substance-based
>> metaphysics, and I don't find substance-based
>> metaphysics very helpful in reducing perplexity.
>> Process-based metaphysics seems more promising in
>> that respect.
>
> Depends, IMO.
>
> If the *process* involves explaining state transitions by a
> rearrangement from moment to moment of an enduring fundamental, with
> these elemental alterations producing the various properties of
> things, then a need for substance persists (IOW, something is always
> conserved regardless of what new form it assumes).
>
> But if the *process* involves explaining a state transition or the
> circumstance of each moment by having such *change* appear brutely
> (eradicating and replacing the prior situation without being a ...
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Date: Sep 2, 2008 22:22
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> Retaining that possibility seems tantamount to
>> retaining the possibility of substance-based
>> metaphysics, and I don't find substance-based
>> metaphysics very helpful in reducing perplexity.
>> Process-based metaphysics seems more promising in
>> that respect.
>
> Depends, IMO.
>
> If the process involves explaining state transitions by a
> rearrangement from moment to moment of an enduring fundamental, with
> these elemental alterations producing the various properties of
> things, then a need for substance persists (IOW, something is always
> conserved regardless of what new form it assumes).
>
> But if the process involves explaining a state transition or the
> circumstance of each moment by having such change appear brutely
> (eradicating and replacing the prior situation without being a ...
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 4, 2008 08:24
andy-k wrote:
>What I can't seem to dispense with is the
> idea of *change* itself, so I'm inclined to
> regard change as fundamental.
Change (as a noun): "a passing from one form or place to a different
one" (synonym: alteration) ..... "a thing to be used in place of another
thing" (synonym: substitute).
So this seems to jibe with either a substance rearrangement of what
existed before (continuity of "something" that is merely transformed);
or the brute replacement of a prior step with a new one (discontinuity,
no transformation -- no insurance in that scenario that the new world
even has anything in common with the old world other than faith that
memories are *truth* tellers).
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Date: Sep 4, 2008 12:00
Rec Room wrote:
> andy-k wrote:
>> What I can't seem to dispense with is the
>> idea of *change* itself, so I'm inclined to
>> regard change as fundamental.
>
> Change (as a noun): "a passing from one form or place to a different
> one" (synonym: alteration) ..... "a thing to be used in place of
> another thing" (synonym: substitute).
"Becoming", "process".
> So this seems to jibe with either a substance rearrangement of what
> existed before (continuity of "something" that is merely transformed);
Some aspects of an object change quickly (become different) whilst other
aspects change too slowly to notice (remain the same). The object remains
"the same object" by virtue of those aspects that change too slowly to
notice (i.e. it retains the same name -- cf. the "Ship of Theseus" problem,
wherein no part of the ship remains the same as the original ship).
Also cf. Heraclitus: "Panta Rhei".
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Author: Rec RoomRec Room Date: Sep 5, 2008 11:23
andy-k wrote:
Ecce wrote:
>>So this seems to jibe with either a substance
>> rearrangement of what existed before (continuity
>> of "something" that is merely transformed);
===
>Some aspects of an object change quickly (become
> different) whilst other aspects change too slowly
> to notice (remain the same). The object remains
> "the same object" by virtue of those aspects that
> change too slowly to notice (i.e. it retains the
> same name -- cf. the "Ship of Theseus" problem,
> wherein no part of the ship remains the same as the
> original ship). Also cf. Heraclitus: "Panta Rhei".
Yes. There's a conservation of *placeholder* from moment to moment,
whether it's as forms that endure with minor alterations, or forms that
shift suddenly to something radically different (like a ship exploding).
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