> "andy-k" wrote in
> news:ClAsk.40257$AE1.11096@newsfe28.ams2:
>

>> Publius wrote:

>>> "andy-k" wrote:

>>>> -- i.e. the relationship between the self and the experienced world
>>>> is the same as the relationship between the eye and the field of
>>>> vision in that the existence of the latter *presupposes* the
>>>> existence of the former. But this (metaphysical) self cannot be
>>>> spoken of since it is beyond the limits of the world, and therefore
>>>> beyond the limits of language.

>>>
>>> But you have just spoken of it.

>>
>> And Witt speaks of the metaphysical self too, despite saying that it
>> is not a part of the world, and pointing out that language deals only
>> with parts of the world. This is why Witt says "My propositions serve
>> as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me
>> eventually recognizes them as nonsensical" (and he uses the word
>> 'nonsensical' to mean that they do not correspond to anything *in* the
>> world). So since "the limits of my language mean the limits of my
>> world", he locates the metaphysical self *at* the limit of the world
>> (and therefore *at* the limit of language). And so he can say that
>> "there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self
>> in a non-psychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is
>> the fact that 'the world is my world'." So we speak our nonsense
>> anyway.

>
> Wittgenstein's (the Witt of the Tractatus) analysis of the self, and his
> manner of speaking about it, reflect his ontology ("the totality of
> atomic facts") and his theory of language and truth ("correspondence
> with atomic facts"). Since no "self" is apparent within the ER (there is
> no atomic fact corresponding to it), then if it exists, it must be a
> "metaphysical self," or a "philosphical self." These are not "real
> selves," and hence to speak of them is to speak nonsense.
>
> But that is not the way ontology works, or the way truth works (as Witt
> later realized). The self is a construct within the CR, and is just as
> "real" as any other construct within it --- as real as trees, robins,
> mountains, atoms, EM fields, or black holes.
>
> When I refer to "myself," or think about myself --- when I contemplate
> the concept of "self" --- I do not refer to a "metaphysical self" or a
> "philosophical self," i.e., something that stands outside experience or
> forms the limit of my experiences. I refer to a subset of the
> experiences I have, which I integrate into an entity which is
> experiencing the remainder (non-self portion) of that set. The self
> portion includes certain beliefs, preferences, tastes, moods, memories,
> physical sensations, but not others of which I'm also aware. But I
> experience them all, in one way or another, so they are all elements of
> the ER. The ones I classify as part of "self" are those over which I
> have a degree of control which I do not have with the others, and which
> exhibit a unity the others do not have; they are the elements integrated
> into the concept of "self" via what Kant called the "transcendental
> unity of apperception."
>
> This unification of a subset of the ER into the self is a synthetic
> unity, just as is the unification of another subset of percepts into a
> tree or a robin. The former is transcendental, however, because we are
> not aware of the *process* which accomplishes this, as a process. We are
> only aware of the result. But we can certainly theorize about that
> process.
>
> Don't know whether you've read Kant's CPR, but here is a fairly good
> gloss on the transcendental unity of apperception:
>
> http://www.beyondappearances.com/thoughts/apperception.php
>
> There are endless commentaries, criticisms, and exegeses of the CPR
> available, of course.
>
> "Metaphysical selves" and "philosophical selves" are really rather
> useless and redundant concepts. They derive (for Witt) from his implicit
> realism, and thus inject unnecessary mysteries
>

>> I think Witt's point is that the metaphysical self is to the
>> experienced world as the eye is to the visual field -- i.e. it is an
>> inference to the *subject of experience* -- so "there really is a
>> sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a
>> non-psychological way [...] The philosophical self is [...] the
>> metaphysical subject, the limit of the world -- not a part of it."

>
> Yes. If it is not part of it, then it is postulated. If it is
> postulated, then it must have some explanatory purpose. What is its
> purpose (except to buttress an assumption of realism)? What does it
> explain that the ordinary concept of self does not?
>
> The ordinary concept of the self is not co-extensive with the ER. What
> is the explanatory advantage of conflating them?
>

>> The self and the world are the two "opposing poles", as it were,
>> of what we were calling the CR in our previous conversation --
>> so "the self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension,
>> and there remains the reality coordinated with it".

>
> The ordinary concept if the self is not an unextended point. The self,
> as ordinarily understood, has extension, a spatiotemporal location, and
> numerous other distinct, enumerable, and even tangible properties. The
> "point self," or the "metaphysical self," is a hypothetical self.
> Nothing wrong with that, provided that hypothesis can be shown to have
> some explanatory value.
>

>> In the case of the philosophical self (the "subject of experience")
>> we are condemned to speak nonsense, since this subject is not
>> *in* the experienced world: "what the solipsist _means_ is quite
>> correct; only it cannot be _said_, but makes itself manifest".

>
> Again, that is at odds with the "ordinary" self, which *is* in the
> experienced world --- it is a construct assembled from a subset of those
> experiences.
>

>> The very existence of the ER (which is not a postulate) implies
>> an experiencer, and this experiencer is not *in* the ER.

>
> Only if you postulate it to be outside it. The "ordinary" self, the
> construct, is within the ER (as part of the CR), and so are all of the
> percepts which compose it. But that subset of percepts is not co-
> extensive with the ER.
>

>> Relief from perplexity may come either through finding the solution to
>> a problem, or by recognizing the problem itself to be a grammatical
>> error and therefore a pseudo-problem. Witt's thesis is that many of
>> the problems of philosophy are of this latter kind (the problems of
>> science being of the former kind). But my point here concerns Witt's
>> comment that "what the solipsist _means_ is quite correct" -- i.e.
>> that there is an underlying issue here that is neither scientific nor
>> grammatical, and is the "sense in which philosophy can talk about the
>> self in a non-psychological way"

>
> Witt (of the Tractatus) thinks the solipsist cannot say (sensibly) what
> he means because the solipsist cannot "see" the self. But (as I said) it
> isn't necessary to see things (in the sense of experiencing percepts
> within the ER denoted by those terms) in order to talk sensibly about
> them. The CR is populated largely by invisible things. We can talk
> sensibly about them if they entail consequences within the ER which we
> *can* experience.