It's been argued by many social scientists and historians that the
rise of capitalism lays the groundwork for the rise of democracy. We
first saw this in Europe, where economic expansion and modernization
preceded the rise of democracies.
And, we also saw this is in the case of Spain, Chile, Taiwan, and
South Korea.
Under Franco, the Spanish economy had grown considerably and with it a
middle class clamoring for democracy. Same could be said of Chile
under Pinochet. And, South Korea and Taiwan went from military rule to
democracies around the same time; they also followed similar growth
patterns economically and politically.

So, it's been a truism that a healthy robust economy will lead to rise
of democracies. But, China and Russia have undermined this idea. And,
this could also be said of Nazi Germany in the 30s. Why did so many
Germans embrace dictatorship just when their economy was booming? If
economic well being leads to demand for democracy, Nazi Germany
certainly didn't conform to that rule.

Perhaps, we need to take into consideration the chronology of events.
People of both Nazi Germany and Putin's Russia had been through the
trial of democracy, but it didn't bring them much good news. If
anything, things got markedly worse for both countries. To be sure,
the reasons were different. Weimar Germany was willfully punished by
France and UK. The very purpose had been to make things as difficult
for Germany as possible. Also, Germans were treated as losers and were
humiliated. This wasn't the case with Russia. Many nations tried to
help Russia in the 90s. Huge loans were secured for Russia. Experts
from many nations went to Russia to help develop a market economy.
And, Russians were not treated as losers but as fellow citizens of the
world in a new world order where communism was dead. Yet, Russia in
the 90s totally failed. It failed because 70 yrs of communism had
unprepared Russians for freedom, liberty, and free enterprise. Most
Russians had gotten used to taking orders. So, in the new order,
ruthless sharks and gangsters easily preyed on Russian people. Over
time, a narrative developed in Russia that there had been an
international conspiracy to make Russia weak, helpless, and dependent.
Putin has played on this narrative. Though there is a kernal of truth
to the narrative--at least politically--, the failure of Russia was
due to problems intrinsic to Russia. But, in politics, perception is
everything. Also, Russia is a big proud nation, much like Germany in
the first half of the 20th century. It was bound to take its fall with
a greater sense of self-pitying and enraged tragedy.

Anyway, it's probable that most Germans under Nazi rule and most
Russians under today's autocratic rule have not demanded democracy
because they already had a bitter taste of it--under the very worst
light. If Germany after WWI had come under the rule of the military
than under a democracy and if the economic depression had become
associated with authoritarianism, Germans might have looked forward to
democracy as the solution. But, Germans got to associate democracy
with weakness and depression. Similarly, had post-communist Russia not
been democratic but autocratic--and if the economic hell of the 90s
had happened under autocratism--, Russians today may be calling for
democracy. But, Russians experienced democracy in the 90s, a very
difficult time for most Russians--in some ways, worse than what
Germans experienced in the Weimar period.
So, the chronology of events matter. Though it may be true that
economic boom/growth leads to greater demands for democracy, such may
not be the case if the people had already experienced democratic rule
associated with economic depression and social breakdown and chaos--
and then economic and national recovery under autocratism. Like
Pavlov's dog, people irrationally and fallaciously associate certain
things with other things. So, Germans under Nazism and Russians today
think, "Democracy = national weakness and depression; Autocratism =
national pride and economic boom."

This may be one of the crucial reasons why the Spanish, Taiwanese, and
South Koreans were more eager to embrace democracy. They had barely
experienced democracy, and in their memory all the negative things
about their societies were associated with dictatorship and tyranny.
Democracy could only be better. This wasn't the case with Germans in
the 30s and Russians today. Germany has 15 yrs of democracy after WWI
and it mostly left bad memories. And, Russia had democracy for almost
a decade in the 90s, and Russia just imploded. Though it was not the
objective of the West to humiliate or belittle Russia in the 90s, it's
true that America and Western Europe perceived Russia as a hopeless
nation that could treated as a minor power. Somehow, Yeltsin seemed to
symbolize the reality of Russia. Old, alcoholic, undisciplined,
confused, and dependent on others. During these years, Putin worked in
the shadows, but he--and many other serious young men--were burning
with anger and developed an iron will to remake Russia.

Anyway, another factor we should look at as to why certain growing
economies have welcomed democratic transformation while others have
not is the role of commmunism in their history. Consider the fact
that autocratic nations that turned firmly democratic have, for the
most part, not been communist. Spain was not communist. Chile under
Pinochet was not communist. Taiwan and South Korea were not communist.
And, Japan and West Germany--which revived quickly and developed into
healthy socio-politico-economic orders after WWII--had not been
communist.
In contrast, nations like China, Russia, several former Soviet
republics, and Vietnam have been or are still nominally communist.
And, it's these nations that have not shown tendencies to move toward
democratism. To be sure, Russia tried in the 90s, but it had been a
miserable failure. And, there was a call for democracy in China in
1989, but it was easily crushed, and most Chinese today are not
calling for democracy.
Did the fact of communist history have something to do with this lack
of will toward democracy?
Consider the fact that rightwing autocratic orders had never sought
totalitarian rule. Much of civic life and many civic institutions were
left outside the control of the state. Generally, rightwing
dictatorships sought political power and control, not control over all
facets of society. So, it's true that even under rightwing dictatorial
rule, there were many people and much freedoms independent of
government ownership or control. We need only compare pre-democratic
Taiwan with Mao's China, or South Korea under military rule with
communist North Korea. While military rulers could be brutal against
the opposition or against dissidents, they left people alone--and
allowed most freedoms--as long as the people didn't interfere
politically. So, people who lived under rightwing dictatorships had
greater taste of freedom and naturally wanted more.
In contrast, people who'd lived under communism were controlled by the
state from cradle to grave. Everything--schools, workplaces, clubs,
shops, housing complexes, leisure, etc--was controlled, managed and/or
owned by the state. So, people who grew up under communism only knew
communism. Because they had no taste of freedom, they didn't have an
idea of what democracy was or how to make it work. And, when
formerly communist peoples were allowed to be democratic, many people
were simply confused. They had lived in societies where they had
taken orders from cradle to grave. They had done as told and had
depended on the state to take care of them. So, freedom, while
alluring in theory, was often terrifying in reality.
In the case of Vietnam and China, we have people who have no idea
about demanding freedom. As for Russians and other formerly communist
Europeans and Central Asians, they tried democracy but the experiment
came to a bad end.
To be sure, this hasn't been the case with formerly communist nations
such as Poland, Estonia, the Czech republic, etc. But, as these
nations were closer to Western Europe, more developed, more rooted in
liberal ideas, and less under the direct authority of Russians, they
were able to make the transition to democracy much more easily. But,
Hungary is still having big troubles, and former East Germany has
created a great deal of problems for the German nation as a whole.
Indeed, some former East Germans hark back to the good ole communist
days where there had been economic security--though limited in means--
and moral certitude for everyone.

Anyway, it seems that it's harder for a formerly communist nation to
become democratic--even with a burgeoning economy--than it is for a
rightwing dictatorship. The elite in a communist state gained greater
power/control over the populace during its yrs of rule than the elite
in a rightwing dictatorship could ever hope to. When the system
undergoes change, it seems like the ruler of a once rightwing state is
on shakier grounds than the ruler of a once communist state.
A rightwing ruler had secured only political power whereas leftwing
rulers had gained power over all sectors of society. This is why the
Castros will never fall out of power like Fujimori did in Peru. Deng,
even after killing those students in 1989, died peacefully in bed.
Fujimori now sits in jail. Fujimori, the once rightwing autocrat(more
like a demotocrat) had once gained a good amount of political power
but little else. When his time had come to fall, he fell hard.

But, perhaps it's too premature to say what is what or how is how.
After all, despite the great economic rise of China, only 15 to 20%% of
its people can be called middle class. And, though Russian economy had
risen under Putin, Russia is still mostly a backward and poor
country.
When Spain turned democratic, the majority of its people were middle
class. When Chile switched back to democracy, it had by far the best
economy in Latin America. And, when Taiwan and South Korea turned
democratic, 80%% of their citizens identified themselves as democratic.
And, perhaps had Nazi Germany not waged wars and had it survived,
perhaps it would have turned democratic a few decades after Hitler's
death in old age(perhaps in the 1960s).

And, there may be another factor, one of national self-awareness.
Some nations don't feel like world powers. Their leaders want to
cooperate with and even depend on Big Powers. And, most people in such
nations see their lives in terms of individual freedom and happiness
within their own borders. But, some nations have this feeling of
greatness, chauvanism, destiny, and such. The new generations of
leaders and the people of nations like Spain, Chile, South Korea, and
Taiwan didn't feel like world players. (Spain gave up that mantle
centuries ago). Their main interest and hope were to lead better lives
and to have peace. As such, they didn't care about national greatness
in the world stage. Sure, they wanted to be richer and be more
respected, but they knew their limitations. Also, these nations also
understood that they depended on their sponsor or protector nations.
In Western Europe and non-communist Asia, that power was the USA.

This is not the case with China and Russia. Their leaders and their
peoples see themselves as great, important, and deserving of
superpower status. When the consciousness of national greatness,
honor, and pride comes into play, democracy may seem less appealing to
the people. People naturally want to be free, but people also
naturally want to be powerful, proud, and 'great'. Some nations can
never hope to be great, but some nations--China and Russia--know they
can be great and want to be a great world power. So, perceptions vary
among nations. If Korea was the size of China and China the size of
Korea, the national perceptions of both peoples will be very
different. Chinese may want democracy more than Koreans who may be
willing to sacrifice democracy for Greatness. Similarly, Americans
have a different view of the world than people of Denmark or
Switzerland. Americans have found a way to be both democratic and
great, but it's possible that ever since the elite power in the US has
passed from WASPS to Jews, America, though growing in economy, is
losing its soul. When Wasps ruled the US, there was a rough
commonality of identity and unity between the top, middle, and bottom.
But, as US grew more diverse--and non-white--and as Jews came to rule
over a population which is 98%% gentile, there is far less trust and
unity among the American people. Also, Jews have manipulated white/
black relations to their benefit. America used to be united thru
strength, pride, and unity. Today, whites are burdened with 'guilt',
blacks are fueled by 'rage', and other groups have their own narrow
agendas.
If it's perceived by many--from top to bottom--that democracy will
undermine national power, many people may be willing to sacrifice
democratic freedoms for the sake of 'greatness'(which seems to be the
case in China). And, if it's also perceived by many that democracy
stands in the way of economic development, that's another reason to
forsake democracy in the name of national greatness.
Indeed, there is some of this sentiment even in healthy democratic
nations. There are many in Taiwan and South Korea who fondly look back
to simpler times of military rule when things got done must more
easily for the sake of 'national growth'.

But, there is a variation of this in Western nations also. In the
West, many people have come to favor 'social justice' over liberty and
freedom of democracy. This had led to coercively high taxes and
political correctness that will imprison people for 'hate speech'.
(Since 'hate speech' laws were drawn up by the left, it targets those
who vilify other races or ethnicities but gives free pass to those who
vilify 'enemy classes' and religions. The left says we must ban racial
hatred since such led to the Holocaust. But, since class hatred led to
death of 100 million under communism in the 20th century, shouldn't
hostile class rhetoric also be banned?) Anyway, we have this idea
that 'social justice' is so important that we must even give up
democratic liberties for it. How else can we explain the admiration
Castro and Chavez receives from Western liberals? So, whether it's
government taking away our right to free speech or taking our
property, many people support it in the name of 'social justice'.
'National greatness' or 'social justice'--or combination of both in
places like Venezuela--can lead to weakening of democracies.

Anyway, we must be wary of leftwing critics who try to blame
capitalism for the lack of democratization in China and Russia. Their
argument is that rapacious and oppressive capitalism has created
elites who are holding back democratization. But, I would argue that
the real problem in China and Russia goes back to yrs of communist
rule when an elitist order was created whereby the government had
gained tremendous power--which lasted long after the fall or
dissipation of communism as socio-economic practice--and still uses
that authority and those controls to rule over much of society. In
other words, had the Nationalists triumphed in China after WWII,
Chinese economic growth would have likely led to democratization. And,
if communists had not come to power in Russia, economic growth in the
20th century would have turned Russia into a stable democracy. So, the
problem is not that capitalism has failed to produce democracies in
China or Russia. The problem is that capitalism has taken place in a
political framework which is still Leninist and difficult to uproot.
Unlike rightwing rule which ruled from above, Marxism-Leninism ruled
from above, middle, bottom, and below. Communism uprooted all possible
forms of pluralism and planted only the seeds--political, economic,
cultural, etc--that confirmed and conformed to the correct ideology.
Even as the communist core has been cast aside in China and Russia,
the iron shell of Leninist rule and social control still remain--and
is even demanded by the people as the ONLY thing that can maintain
social order and keep the nation together. It's not insignificant
that Putin was a former KGB man. So, the leftists must not weasel out
of this one. The problem is not that capitalism has failed to turn
China, Vietnam, and Russia into democracies but that communism has
planted controls within those societies which make it much harder for
those societies to organically transform into democracie