> someone3 wrote:

>> Sonofagunzel wrote:

>>> someone3 wrote:

>>>> Sonofagunzel wrote:

>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway I'll get to the point, given the consciousness caused by a
>>>>>>>>>>>> 'special structure' perspective:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You have agreed that there is no evolutionary advantage to any
>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious experience in itself, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore evolution would not in anyway have been influenced towards
>>>>>>>>>>>> creating a 'special structure' that caused consciousness (as the
>>>>>>>>>>>> creation of a conscious experience in itself was not an evolutionary
>>>>>>>>>>>> advantage). That the 'special structure', which had evolved to funtion
>>>>>>>>>>>> in such a way that the organism successfully propergated, caused a
>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious experience would have been incidental.

>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Exactly. Incidental. That's what I've been saying all along.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, even if we are correct that conscious experience has no
>>>>>>>>>>> evolutionary advantage in and of itself, it is plausible that conscious
>>>>>>>>>>> experience could have arisen as a by-product of the special structures
>>>>>>>>>>> required for sense, perception, memory, matching, and control of
>>>>>>>>>>> behavior, all of which have significant evolutionary advantages.
>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've added numbering to the paragraphs below for ease of reference:
>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>> 1. If (a) the "special structure" required for those functions (and I presume
>>>>>>>>>>> we are working on the assumption that those functions also require a
>>>>>>>>>>> special structure) also causes consciousness, then (b) that is a clearly
>>>>>>>>>>> plausible way for consciousness to have evolved. 2.(c) Given that, in
>>>>>>>>>>> combination, they are so close to consciousness as to be virtually
>>>>>>>>>>> indistinguishable from it, (a) it is hardly a stretch to surmise that the
>>>>>>>>>>> special structure creating those functions also created conscious
>>>>>>>>>>> experience.
>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In response to this paragraph, you said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Well initially you are simply saying that if the "special structure"
>>>>>>> required for those functions incidentally caused consciousness, then it
>>>>>>> did. This does not confer on it any plausibility in itself, as you have
>>>>>>> no explanation for how it could. It is simply both your assumption and
>>>>>>> your conclusion (based upon your assumptions being true).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "You are then going on to say if your conclusion that the organic
>>>>>>> mechanism does determine behaviour (rather than your consciousness that
>>>>>>> the evidence of our own experience suggests), then its function would
>>>>>>> be indistinguishable from what we consciously experience our
>>>>>>> consciousness being responsible for.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "I think this is called assuming your own conclusion."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Rereading this I now realise I misunderstood your objection.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sentence 1 is in the form, "If (a), then (b)". Sentence 2 is in the
>>>>>>> form "Because of (c), then (a)."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So your first paragraph misses the point: the first sentence says if
>>>>>>> the structures that perform the functions that evolved also cause
>>>>>>> consciousness, then consciousness evolved. The first sentence does not
>>>>>>> attempt to justify why the evolved structured caused consciousness.
>>>>>>> The second sentence explains why I think the structures caused
>>>>>>> consciousness: it is because the functions of the structures that would
>>>>>>> confer an evolutionary advantage, added together, are very much like,
>>>>>>> or even ARE, consciousness. So I was not assuming the conclusion, I
>>>>>>> was proving it.
>>>>>>>

>>>>>>
>>>>>> You are concluding that the "special structure" is so close in function
>>>>>> to our consciousness (c) (i.e. you conclude that it determines our
>>>>>> behaviour), because of your assumption (a), then say that because of
>>>>>> your conclusion, that your assumption was justified.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is this not known "as assuming your own conclusion", I'm not a
>>>>>> philosopher, but it was this type of reasoning that I thought the
>>>>>> expression referred to.
>>>>>>

>>>>> You missed the 2(c) part, and the paragraphs that supported it. C
>>>>> causes A which leads to B.
>>>>>
>>>>> You'll need to do more that label my arguments "assumptions": you need
>>>>> to address them. Until now, you have not addressed my arguments in c
>>>>> and the paragraphs supporting it (see the bullet points and arguments
>>>>> below) at all.
>>>>>

>>>>
>>>> I said in (2c) you state:
>>>> "Given that, in combination, they are so close to consciousness as to
>>>> be virtually indistinguishable from it"
>>>>
>>>> This is conclusion I presume is based on your assumption of that the
>>>> special struture has the same function as consciousness said in two
>>>> forms in (1a) and in (2a)

>>>
>>> Its not an assumption: I backed it up with C and the paragraphs
>>> supporting it. Haven't read the rest of your post yet: I wonder whether
>>> you will actually answer my argument this time?
>>>

>>
>> Ah well you hadn't read it yet, but I think I may have covered your
>> argument below.

>
> Oh you are a tease!
>

>>>>
>>>> (1) "(a) the 'special structure' required for those functions (and I
>>>> presume we are working on the assumption that those functions also
>>>> require a special structure) also causes consciousness"
>>>>
>>>> (2) "(a) it is hardly a stretch to surmise that the special structure
>>>> creating those functions also created conscious experience."
>>>>
>>>> In otherwords if you assume that the 'special structure' has the same
>>>> function as consciousness, then you can conclude that consciousness and
>>>> the structure are so close in their function as to be virtually
>>>> indistinguishable from each other. Therefore given that they are so
>>>> virtually indistinguishable in function, the conclusion is justified.

>>>
>>> How are they distinguishable? Don't just say "one includes
>>> consciousness, the other doesn't": I want to to know why, specifically.
>>>

>>
>> As I said covered below.

>
> OK, scrolling, scrolling...
>

>>>>
>>>> Though I think your labelling had caused me to have overlooked your
>>>> exact perspective. Which was actually in the paragraph above where you
>>>> labelled when you said:
>>>>
>>>> "Therefore, even if we are correct that conscious experience has no
>>>> evolutionary advantage in and of itself, it is plausible that conscious
>>>> experience could have arisen as a by-product of the special structures
>>>> required for sense, perception, memory, matching, and control of
>>>> behavior, all of which have significant evolutionary advantages."
>>>>
>>>> Where you are saying that it is plausible that a special structure that
>>>> would effectively of been a biological robot would have evolved.
>>>> Therefore isn't it possible that we are just a biological robot that
>>>> incidentally has consciousness.

>>>
>>> Not if those functions add up to consciousness.
>>>
>>> And even if I agree that what you suggest is possible, that does not
>>> prove that the opposite is implausible.
>>>

>>
>> What do you mean a function adds up to consciousness? That function =
>> experience ? Aren't they in their nature different, and therefore
>> cannot be equal? If you agree with this then please stop trying to
>> gloss over, if you don't then please explain.

>
> Functions. Plural. I have explained. The functions I cited seem to be
> to be the essence of what consciousness is. Maybe if you tell us
> what's missing (and explain it).
>

>>>> The answer is obviously no, and the
>>>> reason is what I am getting to below,

>>>
>>> OK LET'S HIGHLIGHT THIS BIT:
>>>

>>>> there would be no reason for a
>>>> correlation between what is consciously preferable and what is
>>>> beneficial for the mechanism for example.

>>>
>>> BUT WAIT, THERE'S MORE:
>>>

>>
>> Why the caps btw, you getting a bit flustered?

>
> Hate to disappoint you, but it was so your central arguments (really
> assertions) could be found easily.
>

>>>> When you then consider all of
>>>> the coincidental (in terms of the way the universe would have just
>>>> happened to have been) results, that on each differentiation in
>>>> structure, which would have been for a functional reason not concerned
>>>> with the conscious experience, it just happened to cause a conscious
>>>> experience that You are having a problem because you are looking at it
>>>> upside down, rather than from the perspective of whether the
>>>> explanation is plausible for the conscious experience we have of the
>>>> physical world.

>>>
>>> So you case rests on coincidence. Funny then that you haven't yet
>>> demonstrated why my explanation of why it is not a coincidence is
>>> implausible. Haven't finished reading this post though.
>>>

>>
>> Plausibility comes down to probability. As for whether probability can
>> only be looked at before the event, distribution models give an
>> approximate probability of the likelyhood of a result being in a
>> certain range. While you could say well yes, but supposing it was, is
>> it acceptable to you that the probability of what you are saying being
>> in the range of > 1 billion to 1? Btw, what range criteria are we
>> putting on being plausible rather than possible. I have already agreed
>> that as your story says, that it would be possible that our whole
>> conscious experience were a coincidental deception, but what would be
>> to you an exceptable likelyhood of it being correct, before it is
>> considered plausible?

>
> Why do you think it would be improbable. Wait, maybe you've answered
> this time. Let's see ...
>

>> To give a more concrete example, supposing you were to find 100 coins
>> all placed on heads. That you knew as a fact (analagous to there being
>> a correlation between our conscious experiential preference and what
>> would a preference to the biological mechanism). Would you consider an
>> explanation which said that they were all placed without consideration
>> to whether they were placed as a head or a tail plausible?

>
> I have explained why I think burning and pain are aligned. But the
> scroll bar is only a sixth of the way down: maybe your answer lies
> ahead.
>

>> Is it as
>> likely as the coins being placed on purpose as heads (there was a
>> reason for the correlation between our conscious prefence and what
>> would be preferable to the biological mechanism)? If so, is everything
>> to you equally probable as an explanation?

>
> No answer here. Still going.
>

>>>> In Isaiah 29 there was a prophesy that said this would happen:
>>>>
>>>> 16:You turn things upside down,
>>>> as if the potter were thought to be like the clay!
>>>> Shall what is formed say to him who formed it,
>>>> "He did not make me"?
>>>> Can the pot say of the potter,
>>>> "He knows nothing"?
>>>>
>>>> and from 14:
>>>> "...the intelligence of the intelligent will vanish."
>>>>
>>>> Though you may refuse to even consider that the reason your conscious
>>>> experience makes sense, is because it is presented to you in a way in
>>>> which allows you to make choices with regards to which it is better to
>>>> be loving and selfless, or hateful and selfish.

>>>
>>> Who said I refused to consider it? I may even think that what you say
>>> is true. But I may also think that the alternative view is also
>>> plausible. That's what we are discussing.
>>>

>>
>> I certainly didn't that it why I used the word 'may'.
>>

>>>> This is because you
>>>> have been lead away by a story in which God didn't exist, and had even
>>>> been suggested that it was about the 'selfish gene'.

>>>
>>> In case you hadn't noticed, I'm Christian, but I can walk and chew gum
>>> at the same time. I am not an atheist: I am arguing from the position
>>> of an atheist. I have no more proof of my position than the atheist
>>> does. That's my point.
>>>

>>
>> How was I supposed to notice, what clues did you give?

>
> I said I wasn't an atheist, at the very beginning. No matter. Easily
> missed.
>

>> As for proof, yes you did, you just didn't realise it if that was the
>> case. So out of curiousity why the caps?

>
> Proof! Good, that must mean you've given it somewhere below.
>

>>>> Anyway the plausibility of your story that our conscious experience was
>>>> put together without regard for the resultant experience, and the
>>>> suggestion that our conscious experience have no influence on the way
>>>> the human behaves is addressed below. Hopefully now you understand that
>>>> I did already realise what your perpective was, and was already
>>>> addressing it.

>>>
>>> I'm breathless with anticipation.
>>>

>>
>> So you are not disputing that I was already addressing it?

>
> Absolutely I am disputing that.
>

>> If not why
>> did you say:
>>
>> "You'll need to do more that label my arguments 'assumptions': you need
>> to address them."

>
> Because I am disputing that you addressed it.
>

>>>>>>>>> You said you would not require me to explain in detail how this
>>>>>>>>> occurred - that you would not draw a conclusion of lack of plausibility
>>>>>>>>> merely because of the lack of explanation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here's one anyway.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which of the following is NOT an evolutionary advantage:
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to sense external stimuli
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to sense bodily injury and relevant bodily functions
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to remember sensory inputs (in other words the ability
>>>>>>>>> for the brain to change, in a permanent way, as a result of sensory
>>>>>>>>> inputs)
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to match sensory inputs to previous sensory inputs
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to synthesise from sensory inputs and previous sensory
>>>>>>>>> inputs a model of the world and the animal's place in and influence on
>>>>>>>>> that world
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to react to that input using that model in a way that
>>>>>>>>> will aid the survival of the animal (hunting, getting out of danger,
>>>>>>>>> etc)
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to control body movement to carry out the reaction
>>>>>>>>> * the ability to sense how the body movement affected the outside
>>>>>>>>> world.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Each of these steps can be explained in terms of physics, at least in
>>>>>>>>> simple animals.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> However, there is a clear evolutionary advantage at getting better at
>>>>>>>>> these tasks. The more complex and effective and adaptable the process,
>>>>>>>>> the better for the animal. So there is an evolutionary advantage in
>>>>>>>>> increasing complexity and sophistication in these mechanisms. But as
>>>>>>>>> these mechanisms get more and more complex, as the ability to react is
>>>>>>>>> fine tuned, these factors put together are so close to consciousness
>>>>>>>>> that it should not be surprising that consciousness arises as a
>>>>>>>>> by-product. The brain is now extremely complex.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So the human brain evolved consciousness and is explainable (in
>>>>>>>>> principle) in terms of physics, its just that the physics are very
>>>>>>>>> complex: beyond current understanding.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What have you done to show this evolutionary process is implausible?
>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Above you have described the evolutionary process behind the human we
>>>>>>>> experienced being. Then just jump to that it should not be surprising
>>>>>>>> that consciousness arises. Why would you have expected it to (from your
>>>>>>>> perspective)?

>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> See above.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I pointed out how closely the things that ARE evolutionary advantages
>>>>>>> in and of themselves are related to consciousness.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If a being evolves the ability to do all of the above functions, how is
>>>>>>> that not tantamount to consciousness? More accurately, can you show
>>>>>>> that it is implausible that the above functions, operating at a highly
>>>>>>> complex level, added together do not equal or cause consciousness?
>>>>>>> What element of consciousness is missing from the above list?
>>>>>>>

>>>>>>
>>>>>> You have avoided the question.

>>>>>
>>>>> And you have avoided my questions, which are the key to answering your
>>>>> question. Do me a favour and answer the questions in my last
>>>>> paragraph.
>>>>>

>>>>
>>>> Er, consciousness itself,

>>>
>>> What part of it?
>>>

>>
>> I think I went on to say. Are you back to cutting in in mid sentance?
>> That was rhetorical btw.
>>

>>>> the experiences it has,

>>>
>>> Why isn't this sense plus perception plus memory?
>>>

>>
>> Sorry where was conscious perception, or even perception (I pressume it
>> would be conscious perception and that you aren't being disingenious
>> with words) in the list?

>
> I said:
> "Therefore, even if we are correct that conscious experience has no
> evolutionary advantage in and of itself, it is plausible that conscious
> experience could have arisen as a by-product of the special structures
> required for sense, perception, memory, matching, and control of
> behavior, all of which have significant evolutionary advantages."
>
> I expressed it slightly differently in the bullet points, but I was
> essentially referring to the first five bullet points.
>
> Now can you answer the question?
>
> Perception means organising sensory inputs into a model or picture of
> the world. You see green wavy things, you perceive a field of grass.
>

>> If not then as we have already covered in this
>> debate there is a distinction between a thermostat for example
>> experiencing a difference in temperature, and the conscious experience
>> of something that is hot (I maybe didn't use this example, but I think
>> this point was covered), or don't you see a distinction?

>
> The distinction is memory, reaction, cognition, pattern matching, and
> complexity. A thermostsat doesn't have consciousness as it lacks all
> of these things.
>

>>>> the sensation of will
>>>> being influential in what the human we experience doing does?

>>>
>>> Why would we not feel this due to the complex information processing
>>> and theater of the mind effect of matching current circumstances with
>>> past learning?
>>>

>> Is the mind not consciousness + conscious experiences in the way you
>> use it, is it a mechanism that has no conscious connotations other than
>> incidental? If so what would be doing the matching and for what
>> purpose, or was the matching coincidental?

>
> How can you sense your surroundings, model them into coherent
> perceptions, remember them, understand your effect on the world, and
> perceive the concequences of your actions, without building a mental
> picture of yourself in the world? Isn't that consciousness? The only
> question (irrelevant in my view) is whether that consciousness is a
> part of the decision making process or just a by-product of it.
>
> You need to do the matching so you can apply past learning to current
> circumstances. The matching is not coincidental. The brain can't help
> but match patterns.
>
> Sensing, perception, memory etc happens in the brain. Why would we not
> also sense that which was occurring right where the sensing happens:
> meaning we would sense memories as well as current experiences? How is
> sensing memories (even memories of a split second ago) not
> consciousness?
>
> I ask again, how can you have those functions without consciousness?
>

>>> I think you keep conflating consciousness with a version of free will
>>> operating outside the laws of physics, and assuming that we have such
>>> free will because we think we do.
>>>
>>> How can one have senses, memory, a highly complex decision making
>>> process (not necessarily metaphysical free will), and a sense of place
>>> in the environment without consciousness?
>>>
>>> What element of consciousness is necessarily missing? If it is
>>> metaphysical free will, how do you know we have it?
>>>

>>
>> Sorry when you say conflating consciousness with a version of free
>> will, are you saying that you don't experience being able to
>> consciously move you hand at will?

>
> I experience being able to choose between the options I can think of.
> How does that prove that I can think of anything, or that I can choose
> what I think of, or that I could have made a different choice?
>
> A hypnotised person feels like they have chosen to do what they do.
> But would they have done that if they had not been hypnotised?
>

>> The answer to your questions lies in the implausibility of the
>> correlation between the conscious experiences and the functioning of
>> the mechanism such that the illusion that you suggest were to be
>> considered plausible.

>
> Again, you assert the implausibility but do not explain why it is.
>

>>>> I don't understand how these where key to explaining why one conscious
>>>> experience was more likely than another,

>>>
>>> They aren't: they are the explanation of why it is plausible that some
>>> kind of consciousness arose. The matching of deleterious sense and
>>> unpleasant experience is discussed elsewhere.

>>
>> Ah, I see, it is a story you would like me to accept, while you gloss
>> over the gapping whole in your argument of no reason for a correlation.

>
> I repeat: correlation is discussed elsewhere - in the discussion of
> labelling. This part of the discussion is about how and why
> consciousness of some kind arose, not about how conscious experience
> came to be correlated with reality. Yes they are related: but you are
> continually conflating one argument with another in a shell game of
> avoiding my arguments. I talk about how it arose, you talk about
> correlation. I talk about correlation, you ignore the point, call it a
> coincidence (without giving reasons), or complain that I'm not talking
> about how it evolved.
>

>>>> given that from your
>>>> perpective the guide (what was functionally advantageous) to the build
>>>> was not influenced by the resultant conscious experience or even if
>>>> there was one. Perhaps you could enlighten me?

>>>
>>> I have. Labelling, remember? Let's see what you say below.
>>>

>>>>>> As function being tanatamount to consciousness. Consider a robot, that
>>>>>> mimiced human behaviour, I would have no more reason to think it would
>>>>>> experience consciousness than a mobile phone.

>>>>>
>>>>> No, the point is not about any function, but about those particular
>>>>> combination of functions performed at a high degree of complexity.
>>>>>
>>>>> Robots are far less complex than all but the simplest living things:
>>>>> their senses are far more limited, their reasoning ability much more
>>>>> limited, and the environments in which they can operate extremely
>>>>> limited for any given machine. The number of switches and connections
>>>>> in the human brain is in the billions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Without assuming your conclusion, can you prove that it is not
>>>>> plausible that a robot with a similar level of complexity and sensory
>>>>> abilities to a human would not appear to develop consciousness?
>>>>>

>>>> Well what reason would I have for expecting it to? I certainly couldn't
>>>> suggest a way that it could.

>>>
>>> I've given you reasons, and a way it could. Granted, I have not
>>> explained the physical process, as that is unknown. Are you arguing
>>> that because you and I don't know the process by which it could happen
>>> that it therefore can't happen? Sounds like a classic argument from
>>> ignorance to me.
>>>

>>
>> You have glossed over any reason for a correlation. I am not asking you
>> for the actual process, there isn't one.

>
> Labelling.
>

>>>> Complexity is relative to the observer.
>>>> Supposing I was looking at a very very complex robot but understood
>>>> exactly how it worked, and it's sensors were far more sensitive that
>>>> those of the human. What reason do you think I would have to suggest
>>>> that it was conscious, and had any conscious experiences, any more than
>>>> I would a cup, or a mobile phone?

>>>
>>> That's what I asked you.
>>>
>>> Would you simply assume that it didn't have consciousness? By the way
>>> its a lot more than the sensors.
>>>
>>> Remember, you have not asked me to show that it would happen, just that
>>> it is plausible. Is it not plausible that a robot which had human
>>> sensory and neural capabilities would become self-aware?
>>>
>>> What about other primates? Dolphins? Whales? Dogs? Cats? Rats? Birds?
>>> Crocs? Do they have any form of consciousness? How do you

>>> they have souls too?
>>>
>>> What about newborn babies? Do they have consciousness from the start,
>>> or does it develop later? How do you know?
>>>
>>> What do you see as the defining characteristics of consciousness?
>>>
>>> Why couldn't they arise from a combination of the above functions
>>> operating at a high degree of complexity.
>>>

>>
>> I don't seperate a consciousness from a soul, other than the soul being
>> you in no form of communication, i.e. just you, no presentation.

>
> Exactly: so according to you animals shouldn't have consciousness.
>

>> Are
>> you not going to consciously experience Heaven, is it not the same
>> consciousness that you consider to be you, just experiencing something
>> else, or are you suggesting that your consciousness will end, and
>> something else, seperate from it will experience Heaven?

>
> I'm arguing from an atheist perspective, remember?
>

>> As for the rest of your questions, I think we need rules on this
>> debate, otherwise it could resort to a silly game of who can ask the
>> most questions, and therefore look like they are controlling where the
>> debate is going. My suggestion given your questions has multiple
>> purposes. Firstly to avoid questions that are just a distraction, such
>> as those off topic, about my perspective for example, unless you felt
>> that it was really necessary. To prove the neccesity, it would be
>> reasonable if they came at a price, say one question each per post. You
>> ask a question of your choice (or of the mechanisms function :), I
>> answer, and then reply with a question, you answer and reply with a
>> question. How does that sound to you? We could seperate the discussion
>> by a dotted line (your questions, my answers seperated from my
>> questions your answers). This would avoid anyone failing to answer, but
>> just asking a load of questions so as that a reponse was given, but 95%%
>> was a cover for failing to answer the actual question given. How does
>> that sound to you?

>
> Like a waste of time, and a way to avoid difficult questions.
>
> I'm reminded of Grandbank's prescient post earlier in this thread:
>
> "People responding on this thread will continue to respond as and when
> they see fit until you
> eventually get in a snit about something procedural, declare yourself a
> victor by default, and prance away in some variety of autofellatory
> huff."
>

>>>> The only reason I could even think of, was if I was an atheist assuming
>>>> their own conclusion that that is in essence what they were.

>>>
>>> So the alternative is a Christian assuming their own conclusion that it
>>> can't have consciousness. Seems to me we are at stalemate.
>>>

>>
>> You wish!!

>
> Oh touche!
>

>>>>>> As for your list, consider a person who had been given anaesthetic,
>>>>>> they would not meet most of the criteria on your list. Yet if they came
>>>>>> out reporting a conscious experience throughout, you would clearly have
>>>>>> been wrong to judge them on the criteria in your list.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They experience consciousness, if they experience consciousness,
>>>>>> otherwise it is just an object.
>>>>>>

>>>>> Patients under general anaesthetic who remember the experience
>>>>> obviously satisfied all of the above list except the ability to act.
>>>>> So?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>

>>>> So they wouldn't meet the requirements on your list.

>>>
>>> They can't act. That does not mean they would have been unable to
>>> sense their actions if they could have acted: they just didn't have any
>>> actions to sense. So we agree they are conscious. So what does that
>>> have to do with the physical nature of consciousness or the
>>> plausibility of its evolution?

>>
>> So which requirements would they have met?

>
> All of them.
>

>> By the way, going to skip a bit now, as going to look for the answer to
>> the one essential question that I have posted now a few times, but
>> don't seem to see an answer for.

>
> I know the feeling. Except I don't skip bits.
>
> What was the one essential question?
>

>>>> Though you said above:
>>>>
>>>> "No, the point is not about any function, but about those particular
>>>> combination of functions performed at a high degree of complexity."
>>>>
>>>> So I am not sure why you bothered to supply a functional list,

>>>
>>> To show that consciousness may be a by product of a collection of
>>> advantageous functions performed at a high level of complexity.
>>>

>>>> but anyway, as I am writing this I have yet to get to where you will
>>>> presumably have answered my question about why one conscious experience
>>>> would have been more likely than another from your perspective.

>>>
>>> My answer to that point was labelling, that is, the brain as pattern
>>> matcher would realise the sensation was correlated with something to be
>>> avoided, therefore the sensation would be interpreted as negative.
>>> Can't recall an answer of yours as to why that doesn't make sense,
>>> other than labelling it "coincidence". Not much of an argument.

>
> So the one essential question couldn't have been correlation
> coincidence.
>

>>>> Does it have anything to do with the capacity of mind of the observer to
>>>> what it is observing (complexity)?

>>>
>>> What does that mean?
>>>

>>>>>>> Once it is shown that consciousness plausibly is, or is plausibly
>>>>>>> caused by functions that are, advantageous, the question of whether it
>>>>>>> could have been selected for is essentially solved. There are two
>>>>>>> steps left:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> * if it evolved, would it have persisted?
>>>>>>> * is it plausible that it is a purely physical mechanism?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The answer to the first question is twofold:
>>>>>>> * if the above functions amount to consciousness then it would persist
>>>>>>> for as long as those functions were an evolutionary advantage
>>>>>>> * if the above functions are not themselves consciousness, but instead
>>>>>>> cause consciousness, then it would persist for as long as those
>>>>>>> functions caused consciousness and there was no evolutionary pressure
>>>>>>> against consciousness persisting (by way of analogy, there is no
>>>>>>> evolutionary advantage to having five, instead of six, fingers: yet we
>>>>>>> still only have five fingers). Is there any such pressure? No.

>>>
>>> Still no response? Maybe it's below.

>
> So it can't be about the persistence of consciousness.
>

>>>>>>> Now your objection that it would have persisted is based on the view
>>>>>>> that experiencing pleasure as pleasure and pain as pain is a
>>>>>>> concidence. But if it is a physical process, the same set of inputs
>>>>>>> will cause the same sensations. You feel being burnt the same way I
>>>>>>> do, as there are common physical factors in play. Further, if an
>>>>>>> animal found bodily injury pleasurable, and sought it out, evolution
>>>>>>> would quickly eliminate the animal (all other things being equal).
>>>>>>> Even if it could not seek the experience because consciousness does not
>>>>>>> affect experience, the animals would be conditioned by evolution
>>>>>>> conditioned to avoid bodily injury: therefore the sensation of bodily
>>>>>>> injury would be considered unpleasant, whatever that sensation was.
>>>>>>> Same cause, same sensation, same effect. No coincidence.

>>>
>>> No response here either. Except that it's OK and a launch.
>>>

>> LOL!! Why did you bother to put a comment into a piece of old
>> discussion, other than to break it up, which would see it's full effect
>> in 2-3 posts time. Couldn't you find a sentance from my last post that
>> you could break up, or don't I write them long enough for you :D

>
> Because you haven't responded to it in 3 rounds of posts.
>

>>>>>>> The answer to the second question essentially rests on:
>>>>>>> * the observation that the brain is extremely complex, with synapses in
>>>>>>> the billions, so that physical proceeses would operate in such a
>>>>>>> complex way that they would be extremely difficult to explain (in other
>>>>>>> words, complexity is not just an assertion, but an observed phenomenon)
>>>>>>> * correlations between measurable physical changes in the brain and
>>>>>>> conscious activity
>>>>>>> * the ability to affect consciousness through physical means (drugs,
>>>>>>> trauma, etc)
>>>>>>> * the observations of an evolutionary continuum between small, simple
>>>>>>> brains, that clearly act according to physical laws, and more complex
>>>>>>> brains.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You essentially just assume that consciousness needs something "extra"
>>>>>>> - and you have provided no reasons for that proposition.

>>>
>>> No response here either. I'll keep reading.
>>>

>>>>>>>

>>>>>> When you say "if the above functions amount to consciousness" what do
>>>>>> you mean? Supposing something had no conscious experiences yet met your
>>>>>> functionality requirements, are you labelling it conscious, even if it
>>>>>> has no conscious experiences?

>>>>>
>>>>> It means "if the functions, put together at the observed level of
>>>>> complexity, equalled consciousness" ie if that combination of functions
>>>>> and complexity are what consciousness is. Something that performed
>>>>> those functions at that complexity would have consciousness.
>>>>>
>>>>> Don't just call this an assumption: show me why it is implausible.

>>>>
>>>> Consciousness isn't a function, or series of functions though, so
>>>> function doesn't equal consciousness, it doesn't even make sense.

>>>
>>> Why isn't it a function or the result of a sum of functions?
>>>
>>> Are you going to actually provide reasons for your views?
>>>

>>
>> So are you saying that a function is always the same as a result of
>> functions?

>
> The carrying out of functions always has results, do it not? Abilities
> to carry out functions may enable other things to be done?
>

>> If so perhaps you would state the function of consciousness?

>
> Consciousness either has a role in decision making (eg it is not just a
> projection, but in fact is the mind picture of the world and the
> memories and the process of matching them together to determine future
> action and the matching of the results with the decision), or it is a
> projection or incident of that process.
>

>> Oh that's right, you don't think it has one.

>
> You obviously have not been reading my posts. I have been arguing in
> the alternative (that consciousness is part of the decision making
> process, and that it isn't) ever since you admitted you believed it had
> a role in decision making.
>
> You better spit that gum out before you go for a walk: wouldn't want
> you falling over.
>

>> Notice the 'always' btw,
>> before you try to pretend you replied but didn't really, and just
>> posted garbage under the context that any reply regardless of whether
>> it addresses any issues is a reply.

>
> You'd know all about that.
>
> That was the essential question?
>

>>>> Even
>>>> from your perspective you would have to surely agree that consciousness
>>>> is related to awareness of experiences, and comes with the sensation of
>>>> 'will'.

>>>
>>> So is the question you're really asking about how athiests explain the
>>> subjective experience of free will?
>>>
>>> I wonder if you have responded to my answers on that point. I'll keep
>>> reading.
>>>

>>
>> No, the question is about the likelyhood of a 100%% correlation, given
>> no bias towards any correlation.

>
> There is a bias. We've called it labelling.
>
> And that's relevant only if you're wrong about conscious experience
> having a role in decision making. If it has a role, as you believe it
> does, the bias is called natural selection.
>

>> Haven't you got it yet. No offence but
>> shall we just play one question, one response? You can go first, what
>> do you say? No need to respond to this, just cut the lot and start
>> again, but we both know what has been said, and can go back and find it
>> and quote it if need be. Just for clarity. Sound reasonable?

>
> No. Do you spit or swallow (the gum, I mean)?
>

>>>> Can you seriously not see that you are just saying that if the
>>>> functions, and for some reason (which you have not explained)
>>>> complexity was an issue, equalled consciousness, then something which
>>>> performed those functions, and had the required degree of complexity,
>>>> would be conscious. Can you not see the circular nature of your
>>>> argument?

>>>
>>> No, as I am explaining why those functions equal consciousness. A point
>>> you have yet to answer. I'll keep reading.
>>>

>>>> The reason it is implausible is two fold, one the lack of any reason to
>>>> expect 'complexity' to have any bearing on the issue,

>>>
>>> Why? The more complex a sensory and decision making system, the more
>>> inputs it can handle, the better it is able to synthesise those inputs
>>> into a model of reality, the better able it is to match that model to
>>> previous learning and experience, and the more potentional outputs it
>>> has, and the better it is at coming up with the best one. That must
>>> start to get close to a sense of free will, of weighing choices, and of
>>> being aware of ourselves. And when you have a system with literally
>>> billions of connections it is blausible that those functions together
>>> equal what we experience as consciousness.
>>>

>>>> the other is
>>>> about the lack of any reason why one conscious sensation would have
>>>> been more likely than another, and thus any correlation between what
>>>> was consciously experienced, and what was desirable or not desirable
>>>> for the human organism that we experience being, and thus no reasoning
>>>> behind how what you suggest is just an illusion (that our conscious
>>>> experiences influence how the human we experience being behaves) could
>>>> possibly have been achieved by evolution.

>>>
>>> Let's see your arguments on that below.
>>>

>>>> The only reason you cling to
>>>> it, is because of your real assumption, which was blasphemous, that God
>>>> doesn't exist. You would require it to be true, for your blasphemous
>>>> assumption to be possible. It is however implausible, and that is
>>>> because your blasphemous assumption was wrong.

>>>
>>> Why is it implausible? I'm sure you must explain below.
>>>

>>>>>> Before you ask how we would know whether each other are conscious, the
>>>>>> reason is that there is no reason to think that others aren't, given
>>>>>> that you know you are.

>>>>>
>>>>> How would you know whether something you didn't expect to have
>>>>> consciousness in fact had it? Would you just assume that it didn't?
>>>>> What if it behaved as if it did? What behavior would convince you?

>>>>
>>>> What difference does it make to whether I think it had consciousness or
>>>> not, to whether it does have consciousness or not. If I think it does,
>>>> does it then become conscious? If I think it doesn't, but it does then
>>>> does it lose its consciousness?

>>>
>>> Exactly. Your opinion is irrelevant. So you can have an opinion
>>> completely divorced from reality.
>>>
>>> I mean, really.
>>>
>>> Answer the questions.
>>>

>>>> As for what I would expect to have consciousness, it isn't so much
>>>> relative to its behaviour, as my understanding of reality.

>>>
>>> I rest my case. Your views depend entirely on your assumptions,
>>> regardless of evidence or reason.
>>>

>>>>>> You were right about what my objection would be, but your follow up
>>>>>> reasoning seems strange, to say the least. It is worded so not to be
>>>>>> literally wrong, but to give an impression that would be wrong unless
>>>>>> the actual wording were looked at carefully.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "But if it is a physical process, the same set of inputs will cause the
>>>>>> same sensations. You feel being burnt the same way I do, as there are
>>>>>> common physical factors in play."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is ok (from your perspective), and I am not suggesting that there
>>>>>> is a difference in how we experience putting our hand into a fire for
>>>>>> example. It is not a case of that this would only be true if a physical
>>>>>> process were causing our consciousness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then you went on to say:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Further, if an animal found bodily injury pleasurable, and sought it
>>>>>> out, evolution would quickly eliminate the animal (all other things
>>>>>> being equal)."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Presumably you are talking about if the animal consciously experienced
>>>>>> a pleasurable sensation when being injured. If so, then why would this
>>>>>> have any influence over whether the animal sought it out or not, as you
>>>>>> have already stated numerous times throughout this debate, the
>>>>>> conscious experience in itself would have no influence on behaviour.
>>>>>> Though this was covered in your final statement in which you state some
>>>>>> reasonable things in the run up to your huge leap in reasoning.

>>>>>
>>>>> I was covering your view that consciousness affects behavior. The view
>>>>> that it doesn't is covered in the next sentence.
>>>>>

>>>>>> "Even if it could not seek the experience because consciousness does
>>>>>> not affect behavior, the animals would be conditioned by evolution
>>>>>> to avoid bodily injury: therefore the sensation of bodily
>>>>>> injury would be considered unpleasant, whatever that sensation was.
>>>>>> Same cause, same sensation, same effect. No coincidence.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To break it down for you, in your run up you say:
>>>>>> "Even if it could not seek the experience because consciousness does
>>>>>> not affect experience, the animals would be conditioned by evolution
>>>>>> conditioned to avoid bodily injury: therefore the sensation of bodily
>>>>>> injury would be considered unpleasant, whatever that sensation was."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> was ok, but then you as you start to launch you say:
>>>>>> "Same cause, same sensation, same effect"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The launch involved you reasurring yourself that your conclusion based
>>>>>> on your assumption was correct.

>>>>>
>>>>> What's you argument that it isn't correct? So far all you've done is
>>>>> said that my argument was OK and then called something a "launch".

>>>
>>> No response? I'll keep reading.
>>>

>>>>>> The leap itself came when you said:
>>>>>> "No coincidence"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When you have given no reason for why it would have been more likely to
>>>>>> have been a conscious experience of pleasure when putting your hand
>>>>>> into a fire, than a conscious experience of pain.
>>>>>>

>>>>> I don't have to show it is more likely, merely that it is plausible.
>>>>>
>>>>> And I have shown it is more likely, because the sensation is correlated
>>>>> to the injury (because it is caused by it). The injury is negative, so
>>>>> the feeling is considered negative. What's so hard to understand about
>>>>> that?
>>>>>
>>>>> Why is is plausible that putting your hand in fire would cause
>>>>> something sensed as pleasure (on a materialist perspective)?
>>>>>
>>>>> Why does that prove the opposite is not also plausible?
>>>>>

>>>> Yes you would have to show it is more likely.

>>>
>>> Good thing I did then. Good thing for you I am refraining from poiting
>>> out that you haven't addressed the point about my only have to show
>>> it's plausible. Oops, I just did. Sorry.
>>>

>>>> As there would have to be
>>>> a physical differentiation between what contributes a certain conscious
>>>> experience over another,

>>>
>>> There is. A fire is a fire, ice is ice. Following the laws of
>>> physics, fire should always cause the same sensation, ice should always
>>> cause the same sensation etc etc.
>>>

>>>> unless you were going to invoke the concept of
>>>> there being a translation layer between the various neural states and
>>>> what was consciously experienced. If you were to, would this
>>>> translation layer have a physical basis?

>>>
>>> Why do I need to have a translation layer? All I have to do is show
>>> that it is plausible that the brain would match the conscious
>>> experience of fire with being burnt. The brain is a pattern matching
>>> machine. I don't see why you think this is such a stretch.
>>>

>>>> The understanding of a non-physical translation layer is presumably off
>>>> bounds for the atheist perspective. A physical translation layer would
>>>> beg the question of why would it evolve. No translation layer but
>>>> actual physical differentiation for each type of conscious experience
>>>> (and then think of the range) would have to address the issue of:
>>>>
>>>> How if any one of the differentiations (which would require some
>>>> functional reason for the differentiation not associated with the
>>>> conscious experience side-effect) was equally likely to have been
>>>> associated with anyone of the possible conscious experiences, is it
>>>> that (from your perspective) we have a conscious experience that is so
>>>> closely correlated to what was beneficial not beneficial for example to
>>>> the mechanism.

>>>
>>> The being would need to tell fire from ice, and all grades in between.
>>> Why is the ability to differentiate senses such a problem for you?
>>>

>>>> Such that your perspective that our conscious experience that we
>>>> consciously effect the behaviour of the organism, and that we have
>>>> will, should be thought of as an illusion, were to be plausible.

>>>
>>> I've no idea what you are saying here. Maybe you are pointing out that
>>> I have to prove my case to the level of plausibility. I agree.
>>>

>>>> I will stop here. As I have answered your questions above, but you
>>>> seemingly still don't seem to be addressing my point.

>>>
>>> Maybe your responses to the things I've argued are further down. I'll
>>> keep reading.
>>>

>>>> Saying:
>>>> "And I have shown it is more likely, because the sensation is
>>>> correlated to the injury (because it is caused by it). The injury is
>>>> negative, so the feeling is considered negative. What's so hard to
>>>> understand about that?"
>>>>
>>>> Is not really addressing the issue, as it invokes some idea that there
>>>> is something ensuring that there is a correlation, yet you haven't
>>>> suggested why or how this could be the case.

>>>
>>> Yes I have. The fire would cause one sensation, always. Ice another
>>> sensation, always. This is because sensations follow the laws of
>>> physics. Same cause, same effect.
>>>

>>>> Before you have tried to
>>>> suggest that it would be labelled the same, but have now given up on
>>>> that,

>>>
>>> Can you read?
>>>

>>>> and yet really still need to address, when it would make no
>>>> evolutionary difference from your perspective, why there is anything
>>>> assuring that the experience of pain was associated with putting your
>>>> hand in a fire for example, and not an experience of pleasure.

>>>
>>> So what's wrong with the explanation of labelling. Maybe you explain
>>> further down.
>>>

>>>> Surely
>>>> it from your perspective it would simply have to be whatever conscious
>>>> experience happened to be associated with a given physical functional
>>>> differentiation.

>>>
>>> Is this agreeing with the "fire always feels like fire" point?
>>>

>>>>>>>>>> You are then going on to say if your conclusion that the organic
>>>>>>>>>> mechanism does determine behaviour (rather than your consciousness that
>>>>>>>>>> the evidence of our own experience suggests), then its function would
>>>>>>>>>> be indistinguishable from what we consciously experience our
>>>>>>>>>> consciousness being responsible for.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I think this is called assuming your own conclusion.

>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hang on, if you are now saying that conscious experience determines
>>>>>>>>> behavior (read your paragraph - and the bit in paretheses, carefully),
>>>>>>>>> then this entire discussion has been carried out on a false basis. If
>>>>>>>>> you now argue that consciousness affects behavior, you effectively
>>>>>>>>> destroy your argument that it is not an evolutionary advantage - even
>>>>>>>>> in and of itself.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In my view, it makes no difference whether consciousness is part of or
>>>>>>>>> is an effect of the decision making process. In other words, it
>>>>>>>>> doesn't matter to my argument whether decisons are made subsconsciously
>>>>>>>>> and manifested consciously and through behavior, or whether they are
>>>>>>>>> made consciously and manifested through behavior.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And by decision, I simply mean the process by which sensory inputs
>>>>>>>>> affect behavior. In other words, my use of the word decision is not
>>>>>>>>> intended to imply that there is necessarily an ability to choose
>>>>>>>>> between physically possible alternatives - the behavior could be
>>>>>>>>> predetermined by physics, or could have some element of randomness in
>>>>>>>>> accordance with physical laws. The point is that the brain, through
>>>>>>>>> evolution of complexity and sophistication, gets better at producing
>>>>>>>>> the right outcome for the animal.
>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It was from your perspective that I was saying that consciousness would
>>>>>>>> have no evolutionary advantage whatsoever. You may of noticed that I
>>>>>>>> don't hold your perspective. Hopefully that clears up that little
>>>>>>>> puzzle for you.

>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I realise that. But if consciousness affects behavior, it eliminates
>>>>>>> any argument based on the view that it is not an evolutionary
>>>>>>> advantage, does it not?
>>>>>>>

>>>>>>
>>>>>> If consciousness effected behaviour then it would be an evolutionary
>>>>>> advantage if it were also assumed that the physical were causing the
>>>>>> consciousness. This would be another potential atheist perspective
>>>>>> which we can go through once you have accepted that the atheist idea
>>>>>> that we are a biological mechanism whose behaviour can be explained in
>>>>>> terms of the mechanism and the laws of physics has been abandoned as
>>>>>> implausible.
>>>>>>

>>>>> We are going through it now, as well as the other "atheist"
>>>>> perspective. I can walk and chew gum at the same time.
>>>>>
>>>>> You acknoweldge that if consciousness affected behavior it would have
>>>>> evolved. The only question would be whether consciousness could be
>>>>> purely physical, and whether the effect on behavior complied with the
>>>>> laws of physics. I don't see how those issues are any different from
>>>>> the conversations we are having about those things now.
>>>>>
>>>>> The critical step you need to understand is what it means when we say
>>>>> "consciousness affects behavior": all it means is that consciousness is
>>>>> a step in the physical process of decision making: that is, that the
>>>>> organisation of sensory inputs into a model of the world, the matching
>>>>> of that model to past senses and series of events, and the mechanism
>>>>> which determines what action will be taken, must involve consciousness
>>>>> at least in part (that is essentially my "functions + complexity =
>>>>> consciousness" argument). Whether the action can actually be chosen by
>>>>> the animal outside the laws of physics is a different question: in
>>>>> short, consciousness is not the same as free will.
>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>>> Nor would it have been guided to have created whatever requirements
>>>>>>>>>>>> necessary to cause the experience of pleasure when the organism was
>>>>>>>>>>>> doing something that might be beneficial in some way. Nor to have
>>>>>>>>>>>> created the necessary requirements to cause the experience of pain when
>>>>>>>>>>>> the organism was doing something that was in some way harmful to
>>>>>>>>>>>> itself. There would have to be some other functional reason for the
>>>>>>>>>>>> differentiation. That the experience of one was pleasure, and the other
>>>>>>>>>>>> was pain, and these experiences were correlated with what was
>>>>>>>>>>>> potentially beneficial and harmful to the organism, such that it seemed
>>>>>>>>>>>> that we actually made our decisions based upon the conscious
>>>>>>>>>>>> sensations, would have to be purely coincidental.

>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Only if you assume there is no correlation between the input, the
>>>>>>>>>>> perception, the reaction and the sensation. It is more plausible to
>>>>>>>>>>> suppose that there is a correlation than it is to suppose there isn't,
>>>>>>>>>>> given that they share causal factors.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> For example, the brain structure that correlates being burnt with
>>>>>>>>>>> bodily damage would also correlate bodily damage with the feeling of
>>>>>>>>>>> being burnt. That feeling would be labelled something negative because
>>>>>>>>>>> the body evolved to avoid such damage. It would be called pain. Now
>>>>>>>>>>> because the fire and the body are common between individuals, it is
>>>>>>>>>>> also reasonable to assume that the same sensation is felt across
>>>>>>>>>>> individuals. So the pain doesn't cause the reaction, it is caused by
>>>>>>>>>>> the same thing that causes the reaction.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So it's not a coincidence.
>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Maybe I have gone to quickly for you here, and I should have remained
>>>>>>>>>> on the point in the diference between the labelling of pain to whatever
>>>>>>>>>> manifest experience was linked with you putting your hand in a fire,
>>>>>>>>>> and the actual experience that you get if you were to.

>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think we covered that more than adequately.
>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>> Why would the actual experience when putting your hand into a fire have
>>>>>>>>>> been more likely to have been the one you currently experience, rather
>>>>>>>>>> than the one which you currently label as pleasure? Note I am talking
>>>>>>>>>> about the actual experiences here, not the labelling.

>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Because they are causally related to the events that cause the
>>>>>>>>> sensation, and they are interpreted by the body as unpleasant because
>>>>>>>>> the body is programmed for self-preservation by evolution.
>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Are you suggesting that there is some sort of interpretation mechanism
>>>>>>>> for translation between mechanism state to conscious experience to
>>>>>>>> ensure a correlation between what is consciously preferable and what is
>>>>>>>> beneficial for the organism? If so, why did this mechanism evolve.

>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You have conceded the point by admitting that consciousness itself
>>>>>>> affects behavior.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Even on the view that consciousness is not of itself advantageous, but
>>>>>>> is caused by that which is advantageous, then it is plausible that the
>>>>>>> subconscious reaction to fire (avoidance) would correlate with
>>>>>>> unpleasant sensations (pain). Are you suggesting that it is possible
>>>>>>> for an animal to evolve in such a way as to subjectively find pleasure
>>>>>>> in bodily injury? How would THAT persist? How could the experience be
>>>>>>> interpreted as pleasurable if the mechanism evolved to avoid it?
>>>>>>>

>>>>>>
>>>>>> You cover a few points here. Firstly, we are just covering the
>>>>>> perspective that our behaviour can be explained in terms of the
>>>>>> biological mechanism and physics. So I would like to clear up that
>>>>>> atheist perspective before moving on to others, as I'm both of us
>>>>>> presumably are not trying to distract from the issues, and would like
>>>>>> to clear one perspective up before moving on to the next, less the
>>>>>> convolution of multiple perspectives muddied the waters, and thus
>>>>>> served as a distraction.

>>>>>
>>>>> See the above in relation to the meaning of "consciousness affects
>>>>> behavior". That is not meant to imply that consciousness can work
>>>>> outside the laws of physics. If that's what it means to you, I will
>>>>> try to be more careful with my expression.
>>>>>

>>>>>> Secondly, you have given no reason for why the mechanistic reaction to
>>>>>> fire (avoidance) would have been more likely to have been an unpleasant
>>>>>> sensation (pain) than a pleasant senstation (pleasure).

>>>>>
>>>>> Labelling. The sensation would be experienced whenever the bodily
>>>>> injury was experienced. The brain, pattern matcher extraordinaire,
>>>>> recognise that. The avoid reaction and the sensation would always
>>>>> correlate. The sensation would be considered negative, whatever it
>>>>> was.
>>>>>

>>>>>> Thirdly, as for your question for whether it would be possible for an
>>>>>> animal to evolve in such a way as to have a conscious experience of
>>>>>> pleasure rather than pain. It assumes your assumption to be correct in
>>>>>> its construction,

>>>>>
>>>>> How so? Aren't we assuming an atheist perspective and you are trying
>>>>> to show it's implausibility? Doesn't that mean I get to assume
>>>>> evolution is true? If that's not the assumption, what assumption are
>>>>> you talking about? That consciousness evolved? I have explained that
>>>>> if it affected behavior, it clearly could have evolved, and if it it
>>>>> didn't, it clearly could have been caused by the development of those
>>>>> functions that are an evolutionary advantage. Are you suggesting
>>>>> sensation is not an evolutionary advantage? All we are talking about
>>>>> is whether that sense would be interpreted as pleasure rather than
>>>>> pain. I have put my position on that repeatedly, and the only response
>>>>> so far is "that's a big coincidence".
>>>>>

>>>>>> it overlooks the likelyhood that your explanation of
>>>>>> being correct from a purely logical viewpoint is very slim (as it
>>>>>> relies on a massive coincidence in the way reality would be, i.e. that
>>>>>> there was a perfect correlation between what was consciously
>>>>>> preferable/unpreferable, and what was preferable/unpreferable for the
>>>>>> mechanism).

>>>>>
>>>>> Why is it a coincidence? You have to address my argument here.
>>>>>

>>>>>> I don't agree that it is even possible for some neural
>>>>>> states to have evolved to cause different conscious experiences.

>>>>>
>>>>> What do you mean, and why do you think that?
>>>>>

>>>>>> Perhaps in your explanation of why it would have been more likely for a
>>>>>> conscious experience of pain rather than a conscious experience of
>>>>>> pleasure that you would explain it to me.

>>>>>
>>>>> I've explained why sense evolved, and why it would be interpreted as
>>>>> pleasure or pain in a way that correlates to advantageous and
>>>>> disadvantageous bodily effects. What more do you want?
>>>>>

>>>>>> As for how the experience was interpreted in the first place into a
>>>>>> conscious experience, and that there might be a sort of interpretation
>>>>>> mechanism that does this, well that was my question. Why would that
>>>>>> have evolved (from the perspective that our behaviour is explainable in
>>>>>> terms of the mechanism and the laws of physics)? As I have said
>>>>>> previously in my reply for clarity it would be best not to convolute
>>>>>> two possible atheist perspectives into one currently, and so just
>>>>>> answer from the perpective that we are currently discussing, and we can
>>>>>> go through again on any alternative stories you wish to put forward.

>>>>>
>>>>> You overstretched my patience getting to this point, so I am not
>>>>> prepared to go through a dragged out step by step process like you did
>>>>> last time. I have today and tomorrow to finish this conversation. You
>>>>> want to talk about? Do so now. In my view the arguments are no
>>>>> different.
>>>>>

>>>>>>>> If not, then it is not clear why you would expect there to have been a
>>>>>>>> correlation between what is consciously preferable and what is
>>>>>>>> benefical for the organism. The organism would have been put together
>>>>>>>> without regard for whether a conscious experience was caused, and
>>>>>>>> without regard for what the resultant conscious experience would be
>>>>>>>> like from your perspective. So why would it have been more likely that
>>>>>>>> for mechanistic processes involved with the reaction to damage to the
>>>>>>>> organism would have the consciously undesirable experience we currently
>>>>>>>> have rather than the conscious experience we currently label as
>>>>>>>> pleasure. To repeat the note I gave above, I am talking about the
>>>>>>>> actual experiences here, not the labelling, just in case you were going
>>>>>>>> to overlook that and give a response from a labelling perspective.

>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have proved that the experience would be consisistent across animals.
>>>>>>> I have proved it would be labelled as pain by all animals. Why do I
>>>>>>> need to do more?

>>>>>
>>>>> No answer?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>

>>>>>>> Let me restate your argument (read the entire passage before responding
>>>>>>> - i don't mind where you respond, but I want you read the lot before
>>>>>>> you type a single word):
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. "There is no evolutionary advantage to any conscious experience in
>>>>>>> itself, at all"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You don't believe this yourself, as you believe conscious experience
>>>>>>> affects behavior.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. "Therefore evolution would not in any way have been influenced
>>>>>>> towards creating a 'special structure' that caused consciousness (as
>>>>>>> the creation of a conscious experience in itself was not an
>>>>>>> evolutionary advantage). That the 'special structure', which had
>>>>>>> evolved to funtion in such a way that the organism successfully
>>>>>>> propergated, caused a conscious experience would have been incidental."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If consciousness was evolutionary advantage, and it is physically
>>>>>>> possible, it could have evolved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If consciousness was caused by something that was an evolutionary
>>>>>>> advantage, it could have evolved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3. "Nor would it have been guided to have created whatever requirements
>>>>>>> necessary to cause the experience of pleasure when the organism was
>>>>>>> doing something that might be beneficial in some way. Nor to have
>>>>>>> created the necessary requirements to cause the experience of pain when
>>>>>>> the organism was doing something that was in some way harmful to
>>>>>>> itself. There would have to be some other functional reason for the
>>>>>>> differentiation. That the experience of one was pleasure, and the other
>>>>>>> was pain, and these experiences were correlated with what was
>>>>>>> potentially beneficial and harmful to the organism, such that it seemed
>>>>>>> that we actually made our decisions based upon the conscious
>>>>>>> sensations, would have to be purely coincidental."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If conscious experience affects behavior (as you believe), then
>>>>>>> pleasure and pain would drive actions. If they drove actions
>>>>>>> inappropriately, the animal would be disadvantaged and die.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If conscious experience was caused by that which affected behavior,
>>>>>>> then it is plausible that the sensation of fire would cause the
>>>>>>> behavior "avoid" and the perception of pain. I don't think it matters
>>>>>>> what the precise perception is (although I consider it implausible that
>>>>>>> it is different for different individuals or even for different species
>>>>>>> with similar neurology): the sensation would be associated with bodily
>>>>>>> injury and therefore be considered negative. Even if you prove that it
>>>>>>> is plausible that conscious experience and bodily injury do not
>>>>>>> necessarily correlate (and I don't believe you have even gotten that
>>>>>>> far - what would cause them not to correlate?), you do not thereby show
>>>>>>> that it is implausible that they do correlate. More than two
>>>>>>> explanations are plausible (except of course when you know the answer,
>>>>>>> and we don't). Now remember, we are considering the case where
>>>>>>> conscious experience does not affect behavior: so if it did correlate,
>>>>>>> then there would be no evolutionary pressure to make that correlation
>>>>>>> disappear.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 4. "The differentiation between the neural activity that contributes
>>>>>>> towards consciousness and the neural activity which doesn't contribute
>>>>>>> towards consciousness would have to serve some other function other
>>>>>>> than whether it contributed towards consciousness or not. That the
>>>>>>> result was such that it seemed that we were presented with the required
>>>>>>> information necessary to be able to make conscious decisions would
>>>>>>> again have to be purely coincidental."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If consciousness affects behavior, then any neural activity affecting
>>>>>>> consciousness affects evolutionary advantage, and it would be no
>>>>>>> surprise that we were conscious of those things which we thought were
>>>>>>> relevant to a decision. (By the way, how many times have you made a
>>>>>>> decision and then realised that you forgot to consider something you
>>>>>>> were already aware of, perhaps because you didn't appreciate its
>>>>>>> relevance? How many times has something relevant just popped into your
>>>>>>> head for no apparent reason - say when you were sleeping or on the
>>>>>>> toilet thinking about something unrelated? In other words, I question
>>>>>>> whether what you term a coincidence actually happens at the conscious
>>>>>>> level at all).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If consciousness was a result of that which affected behavior, then you
>>>>>>> seem to be asserting that:
>>>>>>> * there is some neural activity that only affects consciousness, and
>>>>>>> questioning why that would be, if consciousness was no advantage. In
>>>>>>> fact, consciousness is not localised in any particular part of the
>>>>>>> brain as a re other functions like senses, perception, speech, pattern
>>>>>>> recognition, body movement, vital functions, cognition. Consciousness
>>>>>>> involves the entire brain in some way. So it seems that there is no
>>>>>>> part of the brain specifically devoted to consciousness. (I've been
>>>>>>> reading!)
>>>>>>> * it is a coincidence that we are conscious of the factors that are
>>>>>>> relevant to behavior. First, this would not be surprising if
>>>>>>> consciousness was merely our pereception of our our own neural
>>>>>>> activity, which we correlate with the senses and the cognitive
>>>>>>> processes. In other words, consciousness may be a projection of brain
>>>>>>> function. We sense it in the same way we sense external stimuli, and
>>>>>>> just as we organise external stimuli into patterns that correlate with
>>>>>>> that which is being sensed, we correlated the sense of our neural
>>>>>>> activity with what that neural activity is doing. Second, as explained
>>>>>>> above, there may be no such coincidence.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 5. "It is hard to imagine how if we had experienced pain where we
>>>>>>> currently experience pleasure, and experienced pleasure where we
>>>>>>> currently experience pain,that we would be under the illusion that we
>>>>>>> were making conscious decisions, or if the visual neural activity
>>>>>>> hadn't of contributed towards our conscious experience, and yet we
>>>>>>> consciously heard ourselves talking about how beautiful the sunset
>>>>>>> looked, or why we bought the painting, that we would still be under the
>>>>>>> illusion that we make conscious decisions about how we behave."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As explained, it is implausible that we would feel beneficial things as
>>>>>>> pain and deleterious things as pleasure (actually we do: don't you love
>>>>>>> sugar, fat, sunbaking, salt and sex? Don't you feel pain when you
>>>>>>> exercise, work, or go to the dentist? - the xeplanation of course being
>>>>>>> that these things didn't exist (in such quantities) in the wild and
>>>>>>> would have been good/bad for us then).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In terms of free will, my perspective (regardless of whether decisions
>>>>>>> were made consciously or otherwise) is that the brain is so complex and
>>>>>>> elegant that, although it follows the laws of physics, the way it
>>>>>>> behaves is indistinguishable from free will. The inputs act on the
>>>>>>> brain, whose structure is a combination of what we were born with and
>>>>>>> the memory (conscious or otherwise) of our experiences and learning.
>>>>>>> What else do we use to make a decision? What is missing from the model
>>>>>>> that means it would behave differently from the way we actually behave?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We do marvel at beauty because it is a by-product of intelligence
>>>>>>> (abstract thought) and instinct (a beautiful sunset invariably occurs
>>>>>>> during calm, safe weather, does it not?).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 6. "So I put it to you, it is not just a question of coincidence of how
>>>>>>> finely tuned the universe we experience is, such that the human we
>>>>>>> experience being, exists within it. There would be a mass of
>>>>>>> coincidences implied in the suggestion that our whole conscious
>>>>>>> experience was put together with no regard for what the resultant
>>>>>>> conscious experience was. Evolution effectively would have had to have
>>>>>>> coincidentally scored 100%% on the conscious experience, in order to
>>>>>>> create the illusion that our decisions were based upon it, and it would
>>>>>>> have had to have done this effectively blind (being only guided by what
>>>>>>> would be an evolutionary advantage). Nor would there be any reason for
>>>>>>> the organism, on reaching this coincidental state, of not leaving it,
>>>>>>> as the functionality that coincidentally corresponded to the
>>>>>>> experiences that together make up the illusion evolved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Therefore your perspective that our whole conscious experience is just
>>>>>>> a coincidental deception (in that we also have the sensation of
>>>>>>> 'will'), created by evolution with no regard to what the resultant
>>>>>>> conscious experience was (as it was not in itself an evolutionary
>>>>>>> advantage) is implausible. As unless it had scored 100%% on the myriad
>>>>>>> of various differentiations, then it is hard to even imagine how the
>>>>>>> illusion would have been maintained."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The central theme of the above paragraphs is coincidence. As I have
>>>>>>> shown how these things are plausibly not coincidence, the point fails.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 7. "I presume you do live your life as though you make conscious
>>>>>>> decisions,and I also presume the conscious experience is such that it
>>>>>>> actually seems to be the case. Not that from your perspective you could
>>>>>>> tell me if it doesn't, presumably the mechanism would say it does,
>>>>>>> totally blind (uninfluenced) by the conscious experience itself :D"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If consciousness affects behavior, I do make conscious decisions. The
>>>>>>> question is whether I could have deliberately chosen to make a
>>>>>>> different decision.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If consciousness does not affect behavior, then I make subsconscious
>>>>>>> decisions that I sense being made, although the experience of making
>>>>>>> the decision is not part of the process but a result of it. The
>>>>>>> question of free will is the same.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Can you show that it is implausible that our decisions are not driven
>>>>>>> by the laws of physics? I have shown how consciousness seems to
>>>>>>> physical, and could have evolved, and manifests itself in physical
>>>>>>> activity in the brain. Can you show that it is implausible to think
>>>>>>> there is nothing more to it?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You haven't so far.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So whether or not consciousness is involved in the decision making
>>>>>>> process, whether or not consciousness affects behavior, I have
>>>>>>> demonstrated that it plausibly could have evolved. And I have
>>>>>>> demonstrated it most clearly in the case where, as you believe,
>>>>>>> consciousness affects behavior, albiet in accordance with the laws of
>>>>>>> physics.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The last piece of the puzzle is of course, how does this all work?
>>>>>>> What are the physical processes involved? I have given some armchair
>>>>>>> theories about chemical equilibrium, but they are most probably wrong.
>>>>>>> The honest answer is no one really knows. But I have pointed out that
>>>>>>> the brain is demonstratively complex, demonstratively physical, and
>>>>>>> demonstratively evolved from simpler mechanisms where the physics
>>>>>>> problems don't seem quite so insoluble.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That means that the brain as a purely physical, evolved mechanism is
>>>>>>> plausible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you disagree on the basis that I have not explained the mechanism,
>>>>>>> then your whole case rests on an argument from ignorance.

>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm sure you have put a lot of effort into this, but it is so full of
>>>>>> the same type of errors that I have pointed out above that I will
>>>>>> refrain from answering it in detail.

>>>>>
>>>>> Some debater you are.
>>>>>

>>>>>> Though there are a few questions
>>>>>> that I would like to repeat (as I thought we had already agreed upon
>>>>>> them, and now you seem to have forgotten about them, so it seems as if
>>>>>> I have to go through it again).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you willing to abandon the idea that human behaviour is explainable
>>>>>> in terms of the biological mechanism following the laws of physics?

>>>>>
>>>>> No.
>>>>>
>>>>> (By "Do" I assume you meant "Are")
>>>>>

>>>>>> If you are not, then can we go through that perspective and only that
>>>>>> perpective for now. From that perspective, there could be no
>>>>>> evolutionary advantage to consciousness. Do you agree?

>>>>>
>>>>> No. See the above explanation regarding the meaning of "affecting
>>>>> behavior". When I say it affects behavior, I am talking about
>>>>> consciousness being a necessary part of the ability to perform the list
>>>>> of functions described above, not affecting it in a way outside of
>>>>> physical laws.
>>>>>

>>>>>> As for the whole of our neural state contributing to conscious
>>>>>> experiences, are you denying any subconscious activity?

>>>>>
>>>>> No, I said that consciousness is not a localised function, but appears
>>>>> to involve musch of the brain acting together. That does not mean
>>>>> there is no subconscious, it's just evidence that the "special
>>>>> structure" producing consciousness is the sum of the special structures
>>>>> performing the other, clearly advantageous, functions. Exactly as I
>>>>> have have argued.
>>>>>

>>>>>> As for you
>>>>>> having done any reading on the subject, have you heard of the concept
>>>>>> of the Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC)? Below is a paper if you
>>>>>> are interested:
>>>>>> http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/Elsevier-NCC.html

>>>>>
>>>>> Wow! Evidence at last!
>>>>>
>>>>> What point do you draw from it? It's entirely consistent with my
>>>>> argument except point 1.3: I think that this is a false assumption, as
>>>>> it could have been caused by that which is useful, rather than being
>>>>> useful itself.
>>>>>
>>>>> My understanding is that they are looking for NCC, but they haven't
>>>>> found it.
>>>>>
>>>>> So?
>>>>>

>>>>>> I obviously don't agree with the overall perspective of the paper, but
>>>>>> I do recognise some of the problems they face, a few extracts:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "The major question that neuroscience must ultimately answer can be
>>>>>> bluntly stated as follows: It is probable that at any moment some
>>>>>> active neuronal processes in our head correlates with consciousness,
>>>>>> while others do not; what is the difference between them? The specific
>>>>>> processes that correlate with the current content of consciousness are
>>>>>> referred to as the neuronal correlate of consciousness, or as the NCC."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Any one subtype of NCC neurons would, most likely, be characterized by
>>>>>> a unique combination of molecular, biophysical, pharmacological and
>>>>>> anatomical traits. It is possible, of course, that all cortical neurons
>>>>>> may be capable of participating in the representation of one percept or
>>>>>> another, though not necessarily doing so for all percepts. The secret
>>>>>> of consciousness would then be the type of activity of a temporary
>>>>>> subset of them, consisting of all those cortical neurons which
>>>>>> represent that particular percept at that moment. How activity of
>>>>>> neurons across a multitude of brain areas that encode all of the
>>>>>> different aspects associated with an object (e.g. the color of the
>>>>>> face, its facial expression, its gender and identity, the sound issuing
>>>>>> from its mouth) is combined into a single percept remains puzzling and
>>>>>> is known as the binding problem."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Puzzling from their perspective, but then they are looking at it upside
>>>>>> down.

>>>>>
>>>>> How so?
>>>>>

>>>>>> Anyway just thought I'd point you in the direction of some
>>>>>> scientific papers that point out the issue. It would be handy if you
>>>>>> would follow through the reasoning that I am giving that the
>>>>>> perspective that human behaviour is explainable in terms of the
>>>>>> mechanism following the laws of physics is implausible,

>>>>>
>>>>> It'd be nice if you follwoed and addressed my reasoning too.
>>>>>

>>>>>> before bringing
>>>>>> in other perpectives such as those where the unobservable conscious
>>>>>> experience influences behaviour (from an atheist perspective) are
>>>>>> examined.

>>>>>
>>>>> For the reasons given, no.
>>>>>

>>>>>> If there is a particular bit you want me to address, then point it out
>>>>>> in your reply.

>>>>>
>>>>> If I didn't want you to address it, I wouldn't have written it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Go back and reply again to that part of my post "Let me restate your
>>>>> argument". Yes, I did go to a lot of trouble to synthesise the
>>>>> argument from disparate threads and I think you should do me the
>>>>> courtesy of responding, even if you think you might be repeating
>>>>> yourself. Can I also suggest that you reflect on what I have written
>>>>> and why I might think your responses did not answer my point.

>>>
>>> No more responses at all?
>>>
>>> There's only one conclusion to draw. You have lost the argument.
>>>
>>> Time for you to find another "canidate".
>>>
>>> Batter up, Kermit!

>
> And still no responses.
>
> I resign my position as candidate.
>
> Merry Christmas.