Sphere wrote:
> Ted King wrote:
>>> andy-k wrote:
>>>> "George Dance" wrote:
>>>>> andy-k wrote:
>>>>>> But, going back to Mr. Schwartz' definition, does this make "reality"
>>>>>> something other than a part of the framework of concepts (and the
>>>>>> relationships between them), something with which a correspondence
>>>>>> may be demonstrated?
>>>>>
>>>>> The argument doesn't make 'reality', 'appearance', 'stick,' or 'water'
>>>>> anything other than concepts (or anything other than words, FTM), if
>>>>> that's what you mean - as far as it goes, . the reality could be that
>>>>> 'stick' and 'water' are only concepts, or that something else as well.
>>>>> One would need other arguments to look at that question.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, that's what I mean. This makes me lean away from the
>>>> correspondence theory of truth and towards the pragmatic theory of truth.
>>>
>>> Perhaps then we're not as far apart as we we looked at first. My take
>>> on the two theories is: The correspondence theory gives the definition
>>> of truth; a true statement is one that says X is so, when X is so, and
>>> a false statement is one that says X is so when X is not so. But
>>> that's merely a definition; it doesn't tell one whether X is so or not,
>>> and therefore whether "X is so" is true or not; and in the same way its
>>> generalized versions (like "Truth is correspondence to reality") it
>>> says nothing about either what is true or what is 'reality.'
>>>
>>> For that, one needs criteria of truth rather than a definition - ways
>>> of telling what is true and what is not - which in my account is
>>> provided by the pragmatic theory: X is true iff experience of the
>>> world is such that X is true.
>>>
>>> For example, "The sun is shining here in Toronto today". That's true
>>> iff there is such a body up in the sky, sending out rays of light that
>>> are hitting Toronto - that's the definition. But it's true only if - I
>>> can see the light and shadow; I can feel the heat when I go out in it;
>>> if I stay out in it long enough, I'll get a tan, or (if longer) a burn
>>> - those are criteria.
>>
>> It seems as though these two theories are addressing two different
>> issues. The correspondence theory seems to be addressing an ontological
>> issue and the pragmatic theory an epistemic issue. That is, the
>> correspondence theory seems to define truth in such a way that it isn't
>> relativized to what one believes is the case and the pragmatic theory
>> seems to deal with the problem that remains, then, with what is the
>> proper way to judge whether or not what one believes to be the case
>> should be *considered* true. As such I wonder if you might contemplate a
>> modification to your formulation of the pragmatic theory: "X is
>> considered to be true iff experience properly leads us to believe X is
>> the way the world actually is" (or in the parlance I favor, "...believe
>> X is the actual way of being"). The "considered to be true" and "believe
>> X is the way the world actually is" express the pragmatic epistemic
>> nature of the theory as differentiated from the ontologic orientation of
>> the correspondence theory. It seems like the really tricky part of a
>> pragmatic theory is the "properly leads us to believe" part - what
>> should be the standards of what properly leads us to believe and what
>> does not properly lead us to belief?
>>
>> Ted
>
> Hmmm. I take a 'fact' as that which is believed
> to be true. I use the word 'fact' even though I
> believe there are no truths, so this definition
> is obviously a bit weak -- but I also don't
> believe any definition can be completely correct,
> so it doesn't really matter.
Oh, I think it matters a great deal. You've defined a fact to be the
same thing as what I and (I think Ted) calls a 'belief' - some
statement or idea thought to be true. Truth definitely is not a
correspondence with 'facts' like that, or beliefs.
In a discussion, we can (and probably would) look for points of
agreement, that we cold simply stipulate as 'facts.' (and premises
asserting them as true). However, where we disagree, we can't do the
same for both our beliefs - for instance, if we both believe that X is
not Y, but you believe X is Z and I believe Y is Z, we cannot logically
stipulate all three beliefs as facts (and all three premises as true).
Beliefs are beliefs about things - and the 'facts' being appealed to
(to dfine truth) are properties and relations of the things, as
distinct from anyone's beliefs about them.
> Seems to me that it is better to speak of
> facts, and leave 'truth' for the purpose of talking
> in circles.
The circularity comes in only when fact is defined the same as belief,
because 'belief' is defined in terms of truth. However, when a 'fact'
is defined as something else: the way (or part of the way) that a
particular thing is - one of its properties or characteristics -
there's no circularity involved.
> We need some representation for
> the notion of an absolute even if we believe there
> are no absolutes.
You've used the term 'absolute' several times (with other
correspondents); and I have to confess that I don't know what you mean
by it. Are you defining an 'absolute' truth as:
A) A true statement that is known for certain, beyond any possibility
of doubt?
or
B) A statement that is always and everywhere true?
When it comes to 'objective reality' - the mind-independent facts of
the 'external world' there's no reason to believe in absolutes in
either sense: All the facts we know empirically are falsifiable (not
just possibly but potentially false), and we claim to know them only up
to a confidence level; and it's consistent with empirical observations
that nothing stays the same way always and everywhere.
> ---
> No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
