On 11 Sep, 23:02, Ed
earthlink.net> wrote:> On Sep 10, 11:57Â pm, someone2
btinternet.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>>> On 11 Sep, 03:37, Ed
earthlink.net> wrote:>
>>> On Sep 10, 6:16Â pm, "andy-k" wrote:
>
>>>> Ed wrote:
>>>>> In all such discussions I am struck by the absence of clarity in the
>>>>> phrase "consciously experiencing". Â Other brain functions seem
>>>>> clearer; ideas like "remembering" or "recognizing" or even "deciding"
>>>>> seem relatively amenable to definition. Â "Consciously experiencing" on
>>>>> the other hand never seems to get defined.
>
>>>>> What distinguishes "consciously experiencing" from "experiencing"?
>>>>> Suppose I'm concentrating really hard on a math problem while eating a
>>>>> candy. Â After I solve the problem I notice the aftertaste of the candy
>>>>> in my mouth. Â Did I "consciously experience" the taste of the candy?
>>>>> When? Â There's no question that the taste buds were stimulated,
>>>>> signals were sent to the brain etc, I just didn't notice at the time.
>
>>>>> Have you ever had the experience of walking down the street and
>>>>> suddenly stopping and turning back because you realize you saw
>>>>> something that caught your interest but you took several steps before
>>>>> you realized it? Â When you saw it did you "consciously experience"
>>>>> it? Â You couldn't "consciously experience" it later when you stop, by
>>>>> that time it's not an experience, it's a memory of an experience. Â On
>>>>> the other hand it makes a mockery of the word "consciously" to say you
>>>>> "consciously experienced" it when you saw it but you weren't conscious
>>>>> of it at that time.
>
>>>>> Examples like this make me believe that I, at least, do not know what
>>>>> "consciously experiencing" actually involves.
>
>>>> Try this Ed:
>
>
>>> That was great! Â Thank you for the reference. Â I have no idea if her
>>> specific take is correct but I'm delighted to find that people are
>>> looking beyond the "usual suspects" in consciousness study.
>
>>> Her ideas on consciousness need to be melded with new ideas on
>>> identity. Â If there are processes going on all the time but 'I" am
>>> only conscious of some of them what am "I"? Â I'm not the "whole
>>> person"; that entity would be aware of all the processes.
>
>> In the paper consciously experiencing was defined where it said:
>
>> "For the purposes of this discussion, if something is referred to as
>> consciously experiencing is will mean that it is like something to be
>> that thing. Such that it could be said that the cinematic device used
>> in the Terminator movie for the robot suggested that it was
>> consciously experiencing."
>
>
>> Hopefully that it is like something to be you, but not a teddy bear,
>> is clear to you, and as such so should what consciously experiencing
>> means in the paper. I assune it was just that at a glance you
>> overlooked where , as it is meant in the
>> paper, was defined.
>
> No, I saw it.
> I'm just not sure what it means. Â Being a teddy bear is very much like
> being a stuffed tiger, at least so far as I can observe. So there is
> something it is like to be a teddy bear, it's just different than it's
> like being me. Â I suspect that Nagel et al would say that's not what
> they mean, my problem is they never say exactly what they do mean.
>
> When I'm really lost in a daydream am I consciously experiencing? Â If
> not then there is nothing that it's like to be me daydreaming and I'm
> more like the teddy bear and stuffed tiger. Â And yet, that's not how
> it seem to me. Â If I am consciously experiencing, what am I
> experiencing? Â Is someone locked in a self referential loop
> consciously experiencing? Â If so consciously experiencing robots ought
> to be easy to make.
>
Yes, it is like something to be you daydreaming. With regards to what
it is like to be you, while I could attempt to substantiate what I am
discussing, by mention of such things such as sensations, perceptions
etc, these would just be substantiative not definitional to
consciously experiencing, which is defined in the paper as that it is
like something to be that thing.
Many would disagree with you that it is like anything to be a teddy
bear. I'm not sure how your observations gave you an insight to what
it would be like to be a teddy bear. Perhaps you could explain what
you meant about it what it would be like to be a teddy bear? That
there was something to be like the robot in the Terminator movie was
made apparent by the film sequences where there where scenes
depicting a first person perspective for the robot as mentioned in
the paper. Such that it is suggested that there would be a sensation
of being the Terminator, and as Nagel suggests a sensation of being a
bat, whereas few would suggest that there would be any sensation of
being a teddy bear (thus it not being like anything to be a teddy
bear). To understand the points made in the paper doesn't require that
you agree that it wouldn't be like anything to be a teddy bear, it
would only require for you to understand what it being suggested.
So does this help you, or perhaps any of the papers I quoted help you,
or is it that you can't comprehend that some suggest that while you
experience sensations of a physical world that a teddy bear doesn't.
Thus they would be suggesting it is like something to be you, but not
a teddy bear.
Have you ever heard of the zombie argument by the way? If you did were
you able to understand what was being suggested, or was it a mystery
to you?
