On 11 Sep, 03:37, Ed
earthlink.net> wrote:> On Sep 10, 6:16Â pm, "andy-k" wrote:
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>> Ed wrote:
>>> In all such discussions I am struck by the absence of clarity in the
>>> phrase "consciously experiencing". Â Other brain functions seem
>>> clearer; ideas like "remembering" or "recognizing" or even "deciding"
>>> seem relatively amenable to definition. Â "Consciously experiencing" on
>>> the other hand never seems to get defined.
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>>> What distinguishes "consciously experiencing" from "experiencing"?
>>> Suppose I'm concentrating really hard on a math problem while eating a
>>> candy. Â After I solve the problem I notice the aftertaste of the candy
>>> in my mouth. Â Did I "consciously experience" the taste of the candy?
>>> When? Â There's no question that the taste buds were stimulated,
>>> signals were sent to the brain etc, I just didn't notice at the time.
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>>> Have you ever had the experience of walking down the street and
>>> suddenly stopping and turning back because you realize you saw
>>> something that caught your interest but you took several steps before
>>> you realized it? Â When you saw it did you "consciously experience"
>>> it? Â You couldn't "consciously experience" it later when you stop, by
>>> that time it's not an experience, it's a memory of an experience. Â On
>>> the other hand it makes a mockery of the word "consciously" to say you
>>> "consciously experienced" it when you saw it but you weren't conscious
>>> of it at that time.
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>>> Examples like this make me believe that I, at least, do not know what
>>> "consciously experiencing" actually involves.
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>> Try this Ed:
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> That was great! Â Thank you for the reference. Â I have no idea if her
> specific take is correct but I'm delighted to find that people are
> looking beyond the "usual suspects" in consciousness study.
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> Her ideas on consciousness need to be melded with new ideas on
> identity. Â If there are processes going on all the time but 'I" am
> only conscious of some of them what am "I"? Â I'm not the "whole
> person"; that entity would be aware of all the processes.
>
In the paper consciously experiencing was defined where it said:
"For the purposes of this discussion, if something is referred to as
consciously experiencing is will mean that it is like something to be
that thing. Such that it could be said that the cinematic device used
in the Terminator movie for the robot suggested that it was
consciously experiencing."
The issue of "what it is like" was first mentioned by Nagel I believe
(
http://members.aol.com/Neonoetics/Nagel_Bat.html), though
it is understood by Dennet, he uses it in his paper What RobotMary
Knows (
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm)
as mentioned. It has also been used by philosophers such as David
Chalmers in his definition of qualia (
http://consc.net/papers/
nature.pdf) to overcome Dennet's points in his paper Quining Qualia
(
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm).
Hopefully that it is like something to be you, but not a teddy bear,
is clear to you, and as such so should what consciously experiencing
means in the paper. I assune it was just that at a glance you
overlooked where consciously experiencing, as it is meant in the
paper, was defined.
