> Daniel Dennet in 'What RobotMary Knows' made the claim that:
>
> 'If materialism is true, it should be possible (“in principle!”) to
> build a material thing–call it a robot brain–that does what a brain
> does, and hence instantiates the same theory of experience that we
> do.' [2]
>
> Certainly such ideas have been in circulation for a while. A popular
> science fiction film called the Terminator used the cinematic device
> of depicting a first person perspective for a robot from the future to
> suggest what it would be like to be the robot. This simple cinematic
> depiction illustrating it isn't simply a linguistic issue [1].
>
> What this paper aims to do, is highlight some general problems with
> accounts that suggest that it might be like something to be a
> mechanism explainable by our current understanding of physics.
>
> For the purposes of this discussion, if something is referred to as
> consciously experiencing is will mean that it is like something to be
> that thing. Such that it could be said that the cinematic device used
> in the Terminator movie for the robot suggested that it was
> consciously experiencing.
> To help with this, we shall make use of a thought experiment robot. As
> Dennet pointed out "thinking in terms of robots is a useful exercise,
> since it removes the excuse that we don't yet know enough about brains
> to say just what is going on that might be relevant, permitting a sort
> of woolly romanticism about the mysterious powers of brains to cloud
> our judgement".
>
> So to avoid any sort of woolly romanticism about what we know, and
> about the mysterious powers of any mechanism to cloud our judgement,
> let us avoid the assertion that we could build a robot brain that does
> what a brain does. Let us base our thought experiments around
> technology that we have, such that we can be clear about the issues we
> are discussing. Let us consider our robot have an artificial neural
> network [6] as robot brain, which can be thought of as having billions
> of times more nodes than an average human being has neurons, and which
> could easily pass the Turing Test, and that if its external physical
> appearance was as a human, that it could pass as one without internal
> investigation. It can be known to perform certain mathematical
> functions that it is doubted that the human brain performs, though
> simply because it is not asserted that it does what a brain does, does
> not require the assertion that it doesn't. We can consider the
> operation of the robot and the robot brain to be explainable given our
> current understanding of physics.
> So let us consider whether the robot brain in the thought experiment
> would be consciously experiencing.
>
> To help us investigate we shall construct potential stories which fall
> with a general category that assumes that something that does
> consciously experience could have its behaviour described in terms of
> the same laws of physics that would describe the behaviour of
> something that doesn't. It should be highlighted that the theories put
> forward here aren't individually important. They are for illustration
> only. There are potentially billions of similar folk stories that
> could have been put forward within the general catergory mentioned
> above. Any of these could be substituted for the ones mentioned here,
> without altering the point which is made when we consider the
> implications of the folk stories from the general category below.
>
> Firstly let us consider a school of thought that asserts that what we
> have defined as consciously experiencing is an identity of mechanism
> function. They assert that regardless of the operation of the
> mechanism to produce this function, if the function was achieved, the
> mechanism would be consciously experiencing. They assert that as the
> robot must be behaviourally equivalent to a human to pass the test,
> the functions governing the behaviour of the robot must be equivalent
> to human brain functions. As such they assert that the robot brain
> would be consciously experiencing, as the functioning of it would be
> equivalent to functioning which has such an identity. This will be
> referred to as Theory A.
>
> Secondly let us consider a school of thought that asserts that what we
> have defined as consciously experiencing is an identity of mechanism
> function. They assert that regardless of the operation of the
> mechanism to produce this function, if the function was achieved, the
> mechanism would be consciously experiencing. They suspects that the
> processing in the robot brain functions in a different way in order to
> get the same behavioural outcome as a human brain. As such they don't
> regard the two to be functionally equivalent. As such they suggest
> that the robot would not have a first person perspective. Let us refer
> to this functionalist theory, Theory B.
>
> The third school of thought offers a suggestion along the lines
> suggested by Christof Koch and Francis Crick, that there must be a
> physical difference between neurones that contribute towards the
> conscious experience and those that don't. Furthermore they go onto
> suggest that there must be a physical difference between neurons that
> contribute towards phenomenal properties which are publicly labelled
> as auditory, and those which are publicly labelled as visual. They
> suggest that due to the undifferentiated nature of the nodes within
> the artificial neural network, that while there the robot brain might
> be consciously experience, the experience would likely consist of
> variations of a single phenomenal property, such as fluctuations of
> the colour green for example. Let us refer to this as Theory C.
>
> The fourth school of thought, suggests that the conscious experience
> of humans is due to fluctuations in a magnetic field in the brain,
> which they hold to be responsible for the seemingly spontaneous neural
> firings. Since the architecture is not the same in the robot, and its
> functioning is not influenced by fluctuations in a unifying magnetic
> field, they suggest that the robot could not be consciously
> experiencing.  Let us refer to this as Theory D.
>
> When attempting to distinguish scientifically between the claims of
> these different theories within the category by experimentation on the
> robot, we find that the null hypothesis for the suggested phenomenal
> identity of each, yields no expected behavioural difference. It must
> clearly be noted, that in question is the difference in expected
> behaviour whether reality was as suggested by the theory with regards
> to the robot's phenomenal experiences or not, it is clearly not a
> question of if the suggested reality were assumed to be true, would
> the theory expect that there would need to be a difference in the
> robot for there not to be the phenomenal reality suggested for it.
>
> At this point, while it might seem like a divergence, it would seem an
> apt time to investigate a comment Dennet made in his RobotMary paper.
> Dennet commented regarding a counter by Robinson to his comments on
> Jackson's Mary thought experiment [5]:
>
> Robinson (1993) also claims that I beg the question by not honoring a
> distinction he declares to exist between knowing “what one would say
> and how one would react” and knowing “what it is like.” If there is
> such a distinction, it has not yet been articulated and defended, by
> Robinson or anybody else, so far as I know. If Mary knows everything
> about what she would say and how she would react, it is far from clear
> that she wouldn’t know what it would be like. [2]
>
> Regarding our robot, the theorists putting forward theories A to D can
> be considered as knowing what it would say and how it would react.
> That doesn't distinguish between the four folk theories mentioned
> above. Therefore it doesn't tell them whether the robot brain would be
> consciously experiencing or not, much less specifically what the
> conscious experience would be like. The distinction mentioned by
> Robinson is quite clear, as illustrated.
>
> Though returning to the discussion of the four folk theories, and the
> general category that they represent. Any theories within this general
> category should acknowledge themselves as folk metaphysical theories,
> and no attempts to suggest any scientific evidence for any one theory
> within the category should be made given no expected difference in
> behaviour for the null hypothesis to their suggested phenomenal
> reality.
>
> Proponents of stories such as those put forward in Theory A and Theory
> B might suggest that as consciously experiencing is an identity of
> mechanism function it is incorrect to even conceptually separate the
> conscious experience from the functioning. They may feel that such a
> counter excuses them from having to acknowledge the point made.
> Seemingly using this very approach, it is reported Dennet once wrote,
> regarding philosophical zombies:
>
> Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove
> consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact — a quite
> standard but entirely bogus feat of imagination — is like supposing
> that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while
> leaving all bodily functions and powers intact. … Health isn’t that
> sort of thing, and neither is consciousness. [3]
> Though quite how such an approach would hold regarding the robot isn't
> clear, since the question of whether it is consciously experiencing or
> not clearly exists.
>
> There might be some that would attempt to stipulate through assertion
> that the robot we have been considering would be consciously
> experiencing, and attempt to make a similar defence against
> considerations that the robot might not be consciously experiencing,
> as Dennet did in the zombie discussion. Though there is a difference.
> In Dennet's application, rejection of the consideration of the null
> hypothesis of if we didn't have a first person perspective can be
> based upon the rejection of the null hypothesis through experience.
> The same cannot be said of the robot. It can be argued that the
> contemplation of whether another human being has consciousness, is the
> same as the contemplation of whether a robot has consciousness. Though
> it can be suggested that you would have no objective reason to
> consider the null hypothesis for another human being, while rejecting
> it for yourself. The same cannot be said for the robot.
>
> To illustrate, let us consider an objection that could be made to the
> suggestions of those proposing Theory A, by those proposing Theory D.
> They point out that their story convolutes processing and function,
> hiding an assumption that the processing has a particular
> representation regardless of the context it takes place in.
> Furthermore to have the first person perspective of a tree,
> information held discretely in the nodes of the neural network in
> question would be required simultaneously. Yet the processing results
> of the artificial neural network responsible for response to inputs,
> could be maintained even if each individual node were separated by
> miles, and the nodal firings were communicated by laser to the other
> nodes within the system. Nor would it affect the processing results if
> nodes from a different system were interspersed spatially in between
> the nodes of the distributed robot brain. Nor if each node were a pod
> containing a with a person inside. These pod people working in a
> strictly need to know basis. Each pod person being taught a different
> code language, and having a manual in that language containing
> information required for the calculations to be performed upon the
> inputs messages received by the pod, and a list of codes which when
> typed in to the output computer, along with the results, would provide
> the information for which pods should receive the outgoing laser
> communications.
>
> They then consider an array of 100 pods, each having information
> regarding a single pixel in a 10 x 10 picture communicated to it by a
> laser firing, and also information of a single pixel in a different 10
> x 10 picture in the manual. They suggest that without a physical means
> to access the information regarding the pixel in the second picture in
> the manual, the information must be regarded as inaccessible. As such,
> if a story required access to such information from 10 separate pods
> at the same time, then without access to such information, the story
> must be false.
>
> They then consider that at any one point in time, there would be no
> means of distinguishing which pods belonged to which system, without
> access to the node firing codes stored within the manuals within the
> pods. They then question why information for the first person
> perspective would originate from purely one of the systems.
> Furthermore they suggest that without accessibility to information
> within the pods, the accessible processing would change, if where the
> processing took place changed. Any suggestions that the over all
> processing would be derivable from any accessible processing would
> open up to questioning where it was suggested that the processing for
> these reactive derivations took place.
>
> Furthermore they consider a pod which communicated by light to two
> separate pods each of which were a light year away in opposite
> directions. Certain subsequent processing which was going on in
> parallel was separated by two light years of distance, yet the
> information for the first person perspective would be required
> simultaneously. Which they suggest further illustrates the
> implausibility of the story, requiring either faster than light
> communication of information, or some recording of past events, such
> that the first person perspective can be realised after the event.
> Which serves to illustrate that there are objective reasons for
> considering that reality were indeed a physicalist one, that there
> wouldn't be a consciousness experiencing an overview of a particular
> functional perspective of what the activity of some of the pods
> potentially represented. Though the representation issue, which is
> hinted at here, is beyond the scope of this paper.
>
> Conclusion:
>
> Claims of the folk stories, that fall within the category of assuming
> that something that does consciously experience could have its
> behaviour described in terms of the same laws of physics that would
> describe the behaviour of something that doesn't, may differ with
> regards to suggestions of consciousness, yet not in behavioural
> expectations. So it is evident that if the assumption of the category
> was correct, that there would be no scientific means to distinguish
> between the folk stories based upon what is known of the brain such as
> stories A, B and D. Though stories such as C which make an assumption
> additional to the category assumption about the operation of the brain
> could have their additional assumption proved to be wrong. Therefore
> any folk stories within this category, if they are to avoid fallacious
> dogmatic "reasoning", must hold there to be an epistomological
> distinction between the operation of the mechanism and whether it is
> consciously experiencing, as this would be implicit to the category to
> which the folk story belongs.
>
> This leaves the potential assertion that this doesn't reflect a
> distinction in reality between certain operations and consciously
> experiencing, it is simply a limit of our potential knowledge of
> reality.
> Though due to the inability to distinguish between the folk stories
> within the category, any claims by stories within the category about
> whether the robot would be consciously experiencing or not can only be
> assertions. Any assertion that it is consciously experiencing would
> also be an admission that the story suggests something that is
> consciously experiencing behaves as it would be expected without the
> assertion, and if the reality, which would be beyond our potential
> knowledge, were that it wasn't. In other words, something that
> consciously experiences behaves as it would be expected to if it
> didn't. Thus highlighting the categories suggestion that consciously
> experiencing has no influence on behaviour, thus there being no
> potential for scientific evidence of an influence, and being able to
> distinguish between the stories within the category.
>
> Though if the phenomenal reality does not influence behaviour as the
> group assumption suggests, then why are we even considering whether a
> robot might have a first person perspective as depicted in the
> Terminator movie? We know the existence of the phenomenal reality
> through experience of it, and mentioning it at all is evidence that
> the existence of such a reality is influencing our behaviour, else it
> would require a coincidence that the phenomenal reality expressed in
> behaviour existed (the behaviour being uninfluenced by its existence),
> which makes the option implausible.
>
> References
> [1] Chalmers, D, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
> Attitudes,  Journal of Philosophy, 78, no. 2. Feb., 1981, 23 pages
> [2] Dennet, D, What RobotMary Knows,http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm
> [3] Kirk, R, Zombies,http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
> [4] Koch, C & Crick, C,     Consciousness, neural basis of,http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/Elsevier-NCC.html
> [5] Jackson, F, Epiphenomenal Qualia,http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/epiphenomenal_qualia.html
> [6] Stergiou, C and Siganos, D,   Neural Networks,http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~nd/surprise_96/journal/vol4/cs11/report.html