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Author: someone2someone2 Date: Sep 10, 2008 07:34
Daniel Dennet in 'What RobotMary Knows' made the claim that:
'If materialism is true, it should be possible (“in principle!”) to
build a material thing–call it a robot brain–that does what a brain
does, and hence instantiates the same theory of experience that we
do.' [2]
Certainly such ideas have been in circulation for a while. A popular
science fiction film called the Terminator used the cinematic device
of depicting a first person perspective for a robot from the future to
suggest what it would be like to be the robot. This simple cinematic
depiction illustrating it isn't simply a linguistic issue [1].
What this paper aims to do, is highlight some general problems with
accounts that suggest that it might be like something to be a
mechanism explainable by our current understanding of physics.
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Author: EdEd Date: Sep 10, 2008 13:09
On Sep 10, 10:34 am, someone2 btinternet.com> wrote:> Daniel Dennet in 'What RobotMary Knows' made the claim that:
>
> 'If materialism is true, it should be possible (“in principle!”) to
> build a material thing–call it a robot brain–that does what a brain
> does, and hence instantiates the same theory of experience that we
> do.' [2]
>
> Certainly such ideas have been in circulation for a while. A popular
> science fiction film called the Terminator used the cinematic device
> of depicting a first person perspective for a robot from the future to
> suggest what it would be like to be the robot. This simple cinematic
> depiction illustrating it isn't simply a linguistic issue [1].
>
> What this paper aims to do, is highlight some general problems with
> accounts that suggest that it might be like something to be a
> mechanism explainable by our current understanding of physics.
>
> For the purposes of this discussion, if something is referred to as
> consciously experiencing is will mean that it is like something to be ...
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Date: Sep 10, 2008 15:16
Ed wrote:
> In all such discussions I am struck by the absence of clarity in the
> phrase "consciously experiencing". Other brain functions seem
> clearer; ideas like "remembering" or "recognizing" or even "deciding"
> seem relatively amenable to definition. "Consciously experiencing" on
> the other hand never seems to get defined.
>
> What distinguishes "consciously experiencing" from "experiencing"?
> Suppose I'm concentrating really hard on a math problem while eating a
> candy. After I solve the problem I notice the aftertaste of the candy
> in my mouth. Did I "consciously experience" the taste of the candy?
> When? There's no question that the taste buds were stimulated,
> signals were sent to the brain etc, I just didn't notice at the time.
>
> Have you ever had the experience of walking down the street and
> suddenly stopping and turning back because you realize you saw
> something that caught your interest but you took several steps before
> you realized it? When you saw it did you "consciously experience"
> it? You couldn't "consciously experience" it later when you stop, by
> that time it's not an experience, it's a memory of an experience. On ...
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Author: jonathanjonathan Date: Sep 10, 2008 17:39
"someone2" btinternet.com> wrote in message
news:fa988324-c645-45e3-bbae-ecdd2d105190@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
Daniel Dennet in 'What RobotMary Knows' made the claim that:
>'If materialism is true, it should be possible ("in principle!") to
>build a material thing-call it a robot brain-that does what a brain
>does, and hence instantiates the same theory of experience that we
>do.' [2]
No it shouldn't be possible at all to build a human brain from non living
machines. Nature creates by allowing the final product to emerge
as it will from a highly cyclic and random process. The minute
you decide in advance what you want the final product to be
you've destroyed any chance of reaching life-like behavior.
It's like the difference between a man-made commercial forest
and the Congo. It may seem at first blush the two are very close.
But the predefined system cannot behave the same way
as the naturally evolved ecosystem.
And it's not just a matter of 'someday' our computers will become
good enough.
There's a Catch-22 with building life-like robots.
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Author: turtoniturtoni Date: Sep 10, 2008 17:40
On Sep 10, 6:16 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
"I asked at the outset 'What is all this? What is all this stuff - all
this experience that I seem to be having, all the time?'. I have now
arrived at the answer that all this stuff is a grand illusion. This
has not solved the problems of consciousness, but at least it tells us
that there is no point trying to explain the difference between things
that are in consciousness and those that are not because there is no
such difference. And it is a waste of time trying to explain the
contents of the stream of consciousness because the stream of
consciousness does not exist." - Blackmore
"Julian Jaynes has emphasized that "consciousness is not the same as
cognition and should be sharply distinguished from it. ... The most
common error ... is to confuse consciousness with perception." He
says, "Mind-space I regard as the primary feature of consciousness."
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Author: EdEd Date: Sep 10, 2008 19:37
On Sep 10, 6:16 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
> Ed wrote:
>> In all such discussions I am struck by the absence of clarity in the
>> phrase "consciously experiencing". Other brain functions seem
>> clearer; ideas like "remembering" or "recognizing" or even "deciding"
>> seem relatively amenable to definition. "Consciously experiencing" on
>> the other hand never seems to get defined.
>
>> What distinguishes "consciously experiencing" from "experiencing"?
>> Suppose I'm concentrating really hard on a math problem while eating a
>> candy. After I solve the problem I notice the aftertaste of the candy
>> in my mouth. Did I "consciously experience" the taste of the candy?
>> When? There's no question that the taste buds were stimulated,
>> signals were sent to the brain etc, I just didn't notice at the time.
>
>> Have you ever had the experience of walking down the street and
>> suddenly stopping and turning back because you realize you saw
>> something that caught your interest but you took several steps before
>> you realized it? When you saw it did you "consciously experience"
>> it? You couldn't "consciously experience" it later when you stop, by ...
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Author: someone2someone2 Date: Sep 10, 2008 20:57
On 11 Sep, 03:37, Ed earthlink.net> wrote:> On Sep 10, 6:16 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>> Ed wrote:
>>> In all such discussions I am struck by the absence of clarity in the
>>> phrase "consciously experiencing". Other brain functions seem
>>> clearer; ideas like "remembering" or "recognizing" or even "deciding"
>>> seem relatively amenable to definition. "Consciously experiencing" on
>>> the other hand never seems to get defined.
>
>>> What distinguishes "consciously experiencing" from "experiencing"?
>>> Suppose I'm concentrating really hard on a math problem while eating a
>>> candy. After I solve the problem I notice the aftertaste of the candy
>>> in my mouth. Did I "consciously experience" the taste of the candy?
>>> When? There's no question that the taste buds were stimulated,
>>> signals were sent to the brain etc, I just didn't notice at the time. ...
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Author: ZerkonXZerkonX Date: Sep 11, 2008 08:16
On Wed, 10 Sep 2008 07:34:07 -0700, someone2 wrote:
> 'If materialism is true, it should be possible (“in principle!”) to
> build a material thing–call it a robot brain–that does what a brain
> does, and hence instantiates the same theory of experience that we do.'
'In principle' the mind will never build itself. Maybe something it calls
'a mind' like the 'great brain' computers of the recent past.
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Author: EdEd Date: Sep 11, 2008 15:02
On Sep 10, 11:57 pm, someone2 btinternet.com> wrote:> On 11 Sep, 03:37, Ed earthlink.net> wrote:
>
>
>>> On Sep 10, 6:16 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
>
>>> Ed wrote:
>>>> In all such discussions I am struck by the absence of clarity in the
>>>> phrase "consciously experiencing". Other brain functions seem
>>>> clearer; ideas like "remembering" or "recognizing" or even "deciding"
>>>> seem relatively amenable to definition. "Consciously experiencing" on
>>>> the other hand never seems to get defined.
>
>>>> What distinguishes "consciously experiencing" from "experiencing"?
>>>> Suppose I'm concentrating really hard on a math problem while eating a
>>>> candy. After I solve the problem I notice the aftertaste of the candy
>>>> in my mouth. Did I "consciously experience" the taste of the candy?
>>>> When? There's no question that the taste buds were stimulated,
>>>> signals were sent to the brain etc, I just didn't notice at the time. ...
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Author: someone2someone2 Date: Sep 12, 2008 00:54
On 11 Sep, 23:02, Ed earthlink.net> wrote:> On Sep 10, 11:57 pm, someone2 btinternet.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>>> On 11 Sep, 03:37, Ed earthlink.net> wrote:>
>>> On Sep 10, 6:16 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
>
>>>> Ed wrote:
>>>>> In all such discussions I am struck by the absence of clarity in the
>>>>> phrase "consciously experiencing". Other brain functions seem
>>>>> clearer; ideas like "remembering" or "recognizing" or even "deciding"
>>>>> seem relatively amenable to definition. "Consciously experiencing" on
>>>>> the other hand never seems to get defined.
>
>>>>> What distinguishes "consciously experiencing" from "experiencing"?
>>>>> Suppose I'm concentrating really hard on a math problem while eating a ...
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