>> Tobacco funded Mass. researchers
>> Philip Morris defends grants; critics call the results tainted
SplendIt brau;
http://youtube.com/watch?v=T6CeHb1TUIM
You might like this guy's approach, I do;
Paul Feyerabend: Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise:
theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to
encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives.
This is shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an
abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only
principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes.
For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed
theories and/or well-established experimental results. We may advance
science by proceeding counter-inductively.
The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree with
accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older
theory, and not the better theory. Hypotheses contradicting well-
confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any
other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while
uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also endangers the
free development of the individual.
There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of
improving our knowledge.
The whole history of thought is absorbed into science and is used for
improving every single theory. Nor is political interference rejected.
It may be needed to overcome the chauvinism of science that resists
alternatives to the status quo.
No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not
always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older
ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of
progress. It is also a first step in our attempts to find the
principles implicit in familiar observational notions.
As an example of such an attempt I examine the tower argument which
the Aristotelians used to refute the motion of the earth. The argument
involves natural interpretations - ideas so closely connected with
observations that it needs a special effort to realise their existence
and to determine their content. Galileo identifies the natural
interpretations which are inconsistent with Copernicus and replaces
them by others.
The new natural interpretations constitute a new and highly abstract
observation language. They are introduced and concealed so that one
falls to notice the change that has taken place (method of anamnesis).
They contain the idea of the relativity of all motion and the law of
circular inertia.
Initial difficulties caused by the change are defused by ad hoc
hypotheses, which thus turn out occasionally to have a positive
function; they give new theories a breathing space, and they indicate
the direction of future research.
In addition to natural interpretations, Galileo also changes
sensations that seem to endanger Copernicus. He admits that there are
such sensations, he praises Copernicus for having disregarded them, he
claims to have removed them with the help of the telescope. However,
he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope should be expected
to give a true picture of the sky.
Nor does the initial experience with the telescope provide such
reasons. The first telescopic observations of the sky are indistinct,
indeterminate, contradictory and in conflict with what everyone can
see with his unaided eyes. And, the only theory that could have helped
to separate telescopic illusions from veridical phenomena was refuted
by simple tests.
On the other hand, there are some telescopic phenomena which are
plainly Copernican. Galileo introduces these phenomena as independent
evidence for Copernicus while the situation is rather that one refuted
view - Copernicanism - has a certain similarity with phenomena
emerging from another refuted view - the idea that telescopic
phenomena are faithful images of the sky.
Galileo prevails because of his style and his clever techniques of
persuasion, because he writes in Italian rather than in Latin, and
because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed to the
old ideas and the standards of learning connected with them.
Such 'irrational' methods of support are needed because of the 'uneven
development' (Marx, Lenin) of different parts of science.
Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science
survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past.
Galileo's method works in other fields as well. For example, it can be
used to eliminate the existing arguments against materialism, and to
put an end to the philosophical mind/body problem (the corresponding
scientific problems remain untouched, however).
The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between
a context of discovery and a context of justification and disregarding
the related distinction between observational terms and theoretical
terms. Neither distinction plays a role in scientific practice.
Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences.
Finally, the discussion in Chapters 6-13 shows that Popper's version
of Mill's pluralism is not in agreement with scientific practice and
would destroy science as we know it. Given science, reason cannot be
universal and unreason cannot be excluded. This feature of science
calls for an anarchistic epistemology. The realisation that science is
not sacrosanct, and that the debate between science and myth has
ceased without having been won by either side, further strengthens the
case for anarchism.
Even the ingenious attempt of Lakatos to construct a methodology that
(a) does not issue orders and yet (b) puts restrictions upon our
knowledge-increasing activities, does not escape this conclusion. For
Lakatos' philosophy appears liberal only because it is an anarchism in
disguise. And his standards which are abstracted from modern science
cannot be regarded as neutral arbiters in the issue between modern
science and Aristotelian science, myth, magic, religion, etc.
Moreover, these standards, which involve a comparison of content
classes, are not always applicable. The content classes of certain
theories are incomparable in the sense that none of the usual logical
relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold between
them. This occurs when we compare myths with science. It also occurs
in the most advanced, most general and therefore most mythological
parts of science itself.
Thus science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is
prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have
been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is
conspicuous, noisy, and impudent, but it is inherently superior only
for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or
who have accepted it without having ever examined its advantages and
its limits. And as the accepting and rejecting of ideologies should be
left to the individual it follows that the separation of state and
church must be supplemented by the separation of state and science,
that most recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatic religious
institution. Such a separation may be our only chance to achieve a
humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realised.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/feyerabe.htm
Paul Feyerabend, in writing this book during the anti-authoritarian,
hippie infested, mid 60's was, like Kuhn, just asking for heavy
misinterpretation. This should make us want to read the book all the
more. Feyerabend, as you will discover, is NOT anti-science,
Feyerabend is NOT anti-reason and for god's sake, FEYERABEND IS NOT A
SUBJECTIVIST! What he is advocating is scientific anarchism, meaning:
science does not proceed by any set of rules, criterion or methods.
So, as may suprise you, Feyerabend is not even that contraversial.
Feyerabend supports himself like this. Science operates from theories
which inextricably use observation, preconcieved theories (like "the
earth is moving right now"), language and subject-dependent vantage
point. Since none of these are completely, or ever could be, accurate,
no theory can ever be proved, and so many theories would be refuted
because of changing paradigms, preconceptiois and world-views
affecting all of the above, science would never make any progress.
Thus, if there are any rules, they are pragmatic hence science is
purely instrumental meaning it can only be judged in retrospect and
rules only exist situationally. All may be broken.
So how is Feyerabend not contraversial? Between Popper (all theories
are inextricable from preconceptions that sometimes are shown
erroneous), Dewey (science is pragmatic and instrumental) and Kuhn
(paradigm shifts mark heavy changes in science and because of their
scope, make scientific change excruciating and unreliable), all of
these Feyerabendian critiques have been made before. The other
detriment is that while he makes strategic points against method, it
would've helped his credibility if he guided us to a new starting
point. If we can only judge science in retrospect, but still can't
even be sure that are preconceptions won't get in the way, than how
could we even do THAT. An attempt at an answer (even in guess form)
would have been nice.
To his credit, the book is written well (certainly not difficult to
read), is thought provoking (this coming from a Popperian) and does
make some good adjustments to what came before. Popper's insistence
that theories, when replacing others, need to be at least as
explanative as the old ones. Feyerabend smartly answers with a quick
retort - 'Why? Why couldn't a new theory solve most of the problems so
well, that we use it assuming the rest will be figured out in due
course?' There is also a brilliant post-script where Feyerabend
advocates 'seperation of science and state' and makes a beautiful case
for science education that teaches many 'hows' instead of many
'whats'. Also his "postscript on relativism" and three prefaces
(original, third edition and chinese edition) give a much deserved
slap in the face to those that still look at Feyerabend as a
relativist and non-believer in science. They need to read this book
like they should've the first time. You should read it too.
Against Method
by Paul Feyerabend
http://www.amazon.com/Against-Method-Paul-Feyerabend/dp/0860916464
