>
> tooly wrote:

>> "Immortalist" yahoo.com> wrote in message
>> news:1164135814.780484.132240@e3g2000cwe.googlegroups.com...

>>>
>>> Ray Eston Smith Jr wrote:

>>>> What holds a society together? What is it that makes people want to
>>>> be part of a particular society?
>>>>
>>>> A person wants what he wants. Therefore he does not want to be part
>>>> of
>>>> a society which uses force or fraud to prevent its members from
>>>> pursuing their individual goals. Therefore any society which condones
>>>> the intiation of force or fraud will have a tendency to come unglued.
>>>>
>>>> The glue that holds a society together is the common belief that it is
>>>> immoral for any individual or group to initiate force or fraud.

>>>
>>> In some herd species there is this total equality and safety in
>>> numbers. In other species there are social relationships of rank, or
>>> dominence hierarchies, or pecking orders. Humans and other "social
>>> animals" like primates and birds tend towards dominence hierarchies,
>>> but you say we should stop this? You prescribe more of a herd like
>>> behavior, and whichever way it goes, deal with it?
>>>

>>
>> Social heirarchy versus herd? How many 'herding animals' have any
>> developed
>> mind to it?
>>

>
> They certainly don't have as complex social interactions as primates,
> canines and felines.
>

>> Funny though on a related comment. Anyone ever find themselves caught up
>> in
>> 'mob action'? It is exhilerating. A movement takes place, but has no
>> real
>> direction to it. Usually, it is bent upon destroying and not really
>> caring
>> as to what...just whatever is in it's path. One caught up in it takes on
>> a
>> persona not of individuality, but simply of the 'herd'. It is a
>> mindlessness really. Only in hindsight, one looks back and wonders what
>> the
>> 'hey' happened. Once unleashed, there is no control of a mob.
>>

>
> Groupthink Computations (Things Happen Of Their Own Accord) 1. Genghis
> http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/browse_thread/thread/a554e802aa3ac.../
>

>> Watching birds react, leadership changes from moment to moment. Fear is
>> the
>> motivator of that first bird, and trepidation makes the rest follow.
>> Herds
>> are too susceptible to stampede for this reason I would imagine, and
>> thusly
>> perhaps some of nature's reason to the selection of heirarchy in
>> creatures
>> more of a mind, where leaders less imbimbed of their fears, creates
>> greater
>> stability. ?
>>

>
> Adam Smith might claim that increasing the degree of the division of
> labor produces a more complex and more quantitative output than a herd
> re-inventing wheels daily enmass.
>
> The invisible hand:
>
> "Every individual...generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the
> public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring
> the support of domestic to that of foreign industry he intends only his
> own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its
> produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and
> he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to
> promote an end which was no part of his intention."
>
> Adam Smith:
> The Wealth of Nations, Book IV Chapter II
> http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b4-c2.htm
>
> As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase that we obtain from one
> another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in
> need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives
> occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds
> a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more
> readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them
> for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last
> that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he
> himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own
> interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his
> chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in
> making the frames and covers of their little huts or movable houses. He
> is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours, who reward
> him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he
> finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment,
> and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third
> becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or
> skins, the principal part of the nothing of savages. And thus the
> certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the
> produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption,
> for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have
> occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular
> occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or
> genius he may possess for that particular species of business.
>
> The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much
> less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears
> to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity,
> is not upon many occasions so much the cause as the effect of the
> division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar
> characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for
> example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, custom,
> and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or
> eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very much alike, and
> neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable
> difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in
> very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be
> taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the
> philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But
> without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must
> have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which
> he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same
> work to do, and there could have been no such difference of employment
> as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents.
>
> The Wealth of Nations, Book I Chapter II
> http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b1-c2.htm
>
> Adam Smith: An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of
> Nations 1776 Entire Book:
> http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-index.htm
>
> ...Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do
> this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you
> want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that
> we obtain from one another the far greater art of those good offices
> which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the
> butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from
> their regard to their own interest.
>
> As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase that we obtain from one
> another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in
> need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives
> occasion to the division of labor. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a
> particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more
> readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them
> for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last
> that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he
> himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own
> interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his
> chief business, and he becomes a sort of armorer, etc......
>

>>From a Niffty Summary of Book I, Chapter 2:

> http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/adamsmith-summary.html
>

>> I argue that the foundation to human aggregation is
>> familial...clanish...tribal. The true essence of a national identity lay
>> not in borders nor even of style of government, but of the foundations of
>> those tribal beginnings.
>>

>
> We may have various drives and instincts which can manage the way we
> learn things in our world about who is what to us. I like the hard core
> and soft core altruism dicotomy since the hard core part is the family
> and the soft core part is the reciprical interactions which
> aquaintences deal with each other as opposed to completely unknown
> strangers.
>
> In his book, On Human Nature, Wilson argues that behaviours and
> cultural beliefs as diverse as altruism, religion and hope can be
> explained by evolutionary biology. Many of the examples of altruistic
> behaviour where one animal seems to sacrifice itself for the survival
> of others is now thought to be due to "kin selection", a variant of
> natural selection. This is the term given to the behaviour of an animal
> which favours the survival of another animal that shares a proportion
> of its DNA. Thus, a parent may sacrifice for an offspring "knowing"
> that the offspring shares half the DNA and has only to have two
> children to make the sacrifice genetically worthwhile. Similarly
> siblings share 50%% of their genes, nephews and nieces have 25%% and so
> on.
>
> Kin selection seems to explain much of what Wilson calls "hard-core
> altruism". This includes the song-call of birds to warn others of the
> presence of predators, that would seem to put the singer at risk. It
> includes the curious stotting of gazelles, whereby one will jump into
> the air to warn the troop of an approaching predator. Colonies of the
> social insects which are divided into one reproducing queen,
> reproducing males and non-reproducing worker females presumably also
> rely on the fact that the queen's DNA is identical to that of the
> non-reproducing females. Closer to home, the adoption by chimpanzees of
> orphans of near relatives is the prototype of much human "altruistic"
> behaviour.
>
> In addition to this " hard-core altruism", Wilson argues for a
> "soft-core altruism" on the basis of reciprocal advantage. This
> explains behaviour that seems to offer little immediate genetic
> survival value but seems more like an insurance policy against later
> possible risk.
>
> Such reciprocal altruism seems to be evident in the behaviour of apes
> but becomes most significant in the behaviour of humans. Blood
> donations are the classic example. Human sacrifice for others not
> genetically related does not always occur in circumstances where the
> deed will be recorded so that praise and status will be accorded to the
> family of the altruist.
>
> On Human Nature - Edward O. Wilson 1978
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/067463442X/qid=1036537594/
> http://www.google.com/search?q=altruism+hard+soft+core
>

>> The more societies veer from that foundation, the less binding the social
>> forces become. Systemic machinery keeps things together in the larger
>> aggregate for a time, but all the while if the society has become
>> disparate
>> in it's makeup [such as multiculturism creates], the seams of the binding
>> fabric start to become undone.

>
> As long as the State interacts with more basic familial and community
> instincts/feelings it may survive and itself become emotionally
> represented instinctually if not already so.
>
> Promethean Fire - Reflections on the Origins of Mind
> Charles J. Lumsdem - E.O. Wilson - 1983
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1583484256/
>
> ...genes and culture are held together by an elastic but unbreakable
> leash. As culture surges forward by means of innovation and the
> introduction of new ideas and artifacts from the outside, it is
> constrained and directed to some extent by the genes. At the same time,
> the pressure of cultural innovation affects the survival of the genes
> and ultimately alters the strength and torque of the genetic leash.
>
> ...Gene-culture coevolution is a radical process. The differences among
> individuals made possible by higher intelligence and culture enormously
> increase the potential for natural selection and genetic evolution. No
> longer do the genes dictate one or a very few behaviors-instead the
> mind intervenes decisively. Ranging widely, it creates a much greater
> array of actions. It permits each combination of genes to have multiple
> expressions and offers alternative solutions to most problems within a
> single lifetime. Because the mind judges the circumstances of the
> moment and reflects on the broader implications of its own decisions,
> it can address the ordinary contingencies of life with greater
> moment-to-moment competence than the tightly programed responses of
> animals. In effect, the mutation rate of behavioral responses is vastly
> increased, and the genes that capacitated the responses are tested more
> rapidly than in ordinary, instinct-guided species.
>
> As a result, evolution is accelerated. The genes continue to hold
> culture on a leash; in each generation the prevailing epigen-etic rules
> of mental development affect which cultural innovations will be
> invented and which will be adopted. Yet culture is not just a passive
> entity. It is a force so powerful in its own right that it drags the
> genes along. Working as a rapid mutator, it throws new variations into
> the teeth of natural selection and changes the epigenetic rules across
> generations.
>
> ...do moral codes exist in the absence of organic evolution? If there
> are such guideposts, the is/ought distinction is preserved. What the
> human species is at each stage in its evolution cannot be confused with
> what it ought to be. But if there are no such guideposts, the
> distinction does not exist.
>
> A few modern philosophers, in recognizing this dilemma, have argued
> that the evolutionary explanation of human ethical values cannot by
> itself disprove the existence of absolute values outside the mind.
> Human beings may well be in the process of tracking the external truths
> by both genetic and cultural means. Just as a primitive ability to
> count objects and form abstract concepts has led to the discovery of
> elaborate mathematical theorems far beyond the needs of human survival,
> further moral reasoning could uncover ethical precepts that hold true
> for any genetic constitution that the human species may choose for
> itself in future generations. Once discovered, such adamantine truths
> can then serve as the lodestar of further cultural and genetic change.
>
> But the philosophers and theologians have not yet shown us how the
> final ethical truths will be recognized as things apart from the
> idiosyncratic development of the human mind. In the meantime, by
> appealing to the core principles of neurobiology, evolutionary theory,
> and cognitive science, practitioners of a new human science can reach a
> deeper understanding of why we feel certain courses of action to be
> intrinsically correct. They can help us to understand why we have moral
> feelings. For now, though, the scientists can offer no guidance on
> whether we are really correct in making certain decisions, because no
> way is known to define what is correct without total reference to the
> moral feelings under scrutiny. Perhaps this is the ultimate burden of
> the free will bequeathed to us by our genes: in the final analysis,
> even when we know what we are likely to do and why, each of us must
> still choose.
>
> The challenge to science and philosophy to solve this dilemma is very
> great-in our opinion, there is none greater. Society, through its
> laws and institutions, already regulates behavior. But it does so in
> virtual blind ignorance of the deep reaches of human nature. By relying
> on moral intuition, on those satisfying visceral feelings of right and
> wrong, people remain enslaved by their genes and culture. Their minds
> develop along the channels set by the hereditary epigenetic rules, and
> while they exercise free will in moment-by-moment choices, this faculty
> remains superficial and its value to the individual is largely
> illusory. Only by penetrating to the physical basis of moral thought
> and considering its evolutionary meaning will people have the power to
> control their own lives. They will then be in a better position to
> choose ethical precepts and the forms of social regulation needed to
> maintain the precepts.
>
> Social engineering has the potential of profoundly altering every part
> of human behavior. It will not always affirm the status quo, as in the
> case of incest avoidance. Some very human propensities, which may have
> been of great adaptive value in the stone age, are now largely
> self-destructive. The most virulent of these, aggression and
> xenophobia, can be blunted. Other equally human propensities for
> altruism and cooperation might be enhanced. The value of institutions
> and forms of government can be more accurately judged, alternative
> procedures laid out, and steps cautiously suggested. Economists and
> corporate planners, once aware of the facts of human nature and
> measuring more than material transactions, should be able to devise
> more effective policies.
>
> Close self-examination and the planned manipulation of values can be a
> distasteful exercise. But in a world growing steadily more complicated
> and dangerous, the alternatives are not promising. A society that
> chooses to ignore the existence of the innate epigenetic rules will
> nevertheless continue to navigate by them and at each moment of
> decision yield to their dictates by default. Economic policy, moral
> tenets, the practices of child-rearing, and almost every other social
> activity will be guided by inner feelings whose origins are beyond
> comprehension. Such a society cannot effectively challenge the ancient
> hereditary oracle dwelling within the epigenetic rules. It will
> continue to live by the "conscience" of its members and by "God's
> will." Such an archaic procedure just might, by fantastic good fortune,
> lead in the most direct and untroubled manner to a stable and wholly
> benevolent world. More likely, it will perpetuate conflict and continue
> to drag humanity relentlessly along what is at best a tortuous and
> agonizing path.
>
> On the other hand, the deep scientific study of the epigenetic rules
> will call the oracle to account and translate its commands into a
> precise language that can be understood and debated. People who know
> human nature in this way are more likely to agree on universal goals
> within the constraints of that nature and recognize absolute ethical
> truths, if such can be shown to exist. And though societies cannot
> escape the inborn rules of epigen-esis, and would lose the very essence
> of humanness if they even came close to succeeding, they can employ
> knowledge of the rules to guide individual behavior and cultural
> evolution to the ends on which their members may someday agree.
>
> Promethean Fire - Reflections on the Origins of Mind
> Charles J. Lumsdem - E.O. Wilson - 1983
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1583484256/
>