> herbzet wrote:

>>s.j.lagoe@googlemail.com wrote:

>>> On Sep 18, 1:57 pm, Josip Almasi vrspace.org> wrote:

>>>> s.j.la...@googlemail.com wrote:

>>[...]

>>>>> Below is a dialogue arguing that traditionals view of objects,
>>>>> endurance, perdurance in philosophy and logic are incorrect. I would
>>>>> be interested to hear your comments, whether you see flaws in its
>>>>> argument or what the extensions of it may be. Sigmund.

>>>>
>>>> Extensions are pointing to flaws.
>>>> Like JJ said, it was clay all the time, but it's changing properties
>>>> (attributes).

>>>
>>> Sure, but a statue can be repaired when it becomes damaged resulting
>>> in the same statue but with different material composition. Then of
>>> course it is the statue that's properties have changed. There is
>>> nothing special about the clays objecthood compared to the figures
>>> objecthood - they are both valid things right, and the both "exist"?
>>>

>>>> This may be nice intro story for dialectic reasoning:)
>>>> Relation of subject and object and attributing attributes to objects etc.
>>>>
>>>> Regards...

>>
>>In Quine's "Mathematical Logic" he says something like (quoting from
>>from memory):
>>
>> "It's not at all evident what constitutes a thing, i.e., is a man
>> a thing, or is an event a thing, and a man a collection of events?"
>>
>>In set theory and (I think) in mereology we have that a collection
>>of things is itself a thing.

>
> Obviously a thing is a concept and a concept is a thing.
> What if one dispenses with shaky conceptualism?