Ah yes, this might be a problem of Suprviniance or at least something
like that combined with the set of all set paradoxes and the problem
of the criterion or meta-justification. It is hard to tell because
your position has a vague relationship between predicate logic
justification and physics theory;
In philosophy, supervenience is a kind of dependency relationship,
typically held to obtain between sets of properties. According to one
standard definition, a set of properties A supervenes on a set of
properties B, if and only if any two objects x and y which share all
properties in B (are "B-indiscernible") must also share all properties
in A (are "A-indiscernible"). That is, A-properties supervene on B-
properties if being B-indiscernible implies being A-indiscernible. The
properties in B are called the base properties (or sometimes subjacent
or subvenient properties), and the properties in A are called the
supervenient properties. Equivalently, if two things differ in their
supervenient properties then they must differ in their base
properties. To give a somewhat simplified example, if psychological
properties supervene on physical properties, then any two persons who
are physically indistinguishable must also be psychologically
indistinguishable; or equivalently, any two persons who are
psychologically different (e.g., having different thoughts), must be
physically different as well. Importantly, the reverse does not follow
(supervenience is not symmetric): even if being the same physically
implies being the same psychologically, two persons can be the same
psychologically yet different physically: that is, psychological
properties can be multiply realized in physical properties.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience
Supervenience: A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B
just in case no two things can differ with respect to A-properties
without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan
form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”.
As we shall see, this slogan can be cashed out in many different ways.
But to illustrate the basic idea, imagine that there is a perfect
forger. Her copies of paintings not only fool the art dealers, but are
in fact exact duplicates of the originals down to the precise
placement of every molecule of pigment—indeed, down to every
microphysical detail. Suppose that she produces such a copy of El
Greco's A View of Toledo. It is of course different from the original
in various respects—it is a forgery, it was not painted by El Greco,
it is worth quite a bit less at Sotheby's, and so forth. But the
forgery is also exactly like the original in other respects. It is the
same shape, size, and weight. The surface of the canvas contains the
same arrangements of colors and shapes—a blue rectangle here, a green
swirl there. Indeed, it looks just the same, at least to a single
viewer under identical lighting conditions and so forth. Perhaps it is
even just as beautiful as the original, though that is more
controversial.
The properties that the forgery is guaranteed to share with the
original are those that supervene upon its microphysical properties.
Two paintings that are microphysically just alike are guaranteed to be
just alike in the arrangement of colors and shapes on their canvases.
That is, you cannot change the arrangement of colors and shapes on a
painting's canvas without changing its microphysical properties. This
is just to say that the arrangement of colors and shapes supervenes on
its microphysical properties.
Supervenience is a central notion in analytic philosophy. It has been
invoked in almost every corner of the field. For example, it has been
claimed that aesthetic, moral, and mental properties supervene upon
physical properties. It has also been claimed that modal truths
supervene on non-modal ones, and that general truths supervene on
particular truths. Further, supervenience has been used to distinguish
various kinds of internalism and externalism, and to test claims of
reducibility and conceptual analysis.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/
Russell's paradox is the most famous of the logical or set-theoretical
paradoxes. The paradox arises within naive set theory by considering
the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Such a set
appears to be a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of
itself, hence the paradox.
Some sets, such as the set of all teacups, are not members of
themselves. Other sets, such as the set of all non-teacups, are
members of themselves. Call the set of all sets that are not members
of themselves "R." If R is a member of itself, then by definition it
must not be a member of itself. Similarly, if R is not a member of
itself, then by definition it must be a member of itself. Discovered
by Bertrand Russell in 1901, the paradox has prompted much work in
logic, set theory and the philosophy and foundations of mathematics.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell-paradox/
In Epistemology, the problem of the criterion is an issue regarding
the starting point of knowledge. This is a separate and more
fundamental issue then the Regress argument found in discussions on
justification of knowledge.
Roderick M. Chisholm in his Theory of Knowledge details the problem of
the criterion with two sets of questions:
1. What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge?
2. How do we know? or What is the criteria of knowing?
An answer to either set of questions will allow us to devise a means
of answering the other. Answering question set 1 first is called
Particularism. The inverse is called Methodism.
Particularist theories organize things already known and attempt to
use these particulars of knowledge to find a method of how we know
thus answering question set 2. Methodist theories propose an answer to
question set two and proceed to use this to answer question set one.
Empericism is an example of methodism.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_the_criterion
