According to physicalism, all there is is the physical.

The conscious experiences would have to be experiences of the physical
activity the brain.

Yet we know we don't consciously experience all brain activity, thus
the conception of subconscious brain activity (activity that isn't
consciously experienced).

It is not known why some physical activity would consciously
experience itself, and not others.

Here is a thought experiment to show the implications of physicalism.
Supposing an alien robot arrived on Earth, which could pass the Turing
Test. Supposing it came with instructions on how it worked. We could
understand how it worked, and why its behaviour was as it was, but
still not knowing why some physical activity would consciously
experience itself, we wouldn't know for certain whether it consciously
experienced or not.

So on understanding how it worked, it could be said to be behaving as
expected given its build, regardless of what the answer was as to
whether it was consciously experiencing (a possibility from the
physicalist perspective) or not.

On Sep 13, 5:29 am, someone3 btinternet.com> wrote:

On 13 Sep, 11:38, tg earthlink.net> wrote:

"someone3" btinternet.com> wrote in message
news:1189675794.681410.257010@19g2000hsx.googlegroups.com...

On 13 Sep, 13:58, "brian fletcher" bigpond.net.au> wrote:

On 13 Sep, 10:29, someone3 btinternet.com> wrote:

Conscious experienes would have to be the physical activity of the
brain. They
wouldn't have to be "of" (aboutnesss, intentionality) physical
activity of the brain.

Conscious experience is not "of" brain activity as such.
When I look at an apple I ahve apple-related experiences. In order
to experience neurons, I would have to look at a brain-scan.

On Sep 13, 9:17 am, someone3 btinternet.com> wrote:

On 13 Sep, 14:38, 1Z yahoo.com> wrote:

On Sep 13, 5:29 am, someone3 btinternet.com> wrote:

http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/strawson3.htm