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Date: Jan 24, 2007 04:42
"If we rigorously and systematically discriminate subject and object often
enough, long enough, and on sufficiently various occasions, it is likely to
dawn on us sooner or later that the subject is not an object. The subject is
not any particular object or any combination of objects. The chief barrier
to drawing this conclusion is conceptual. That is, our models of reality may
impose constraints on empirical investigation. We get attached to our
models, particularly if we have worked hard on them, and we may want to
avoid looking in a direction which threatens them.
"Issues at the core of current consciousness debates are variations of the
problem of subjectivity, such as the 'hard problem', the problem of other
minds, and the zombie problem. Progress on these issues would seem
to presuppose some understanding of the subject/object distinction. The
proposition that the subject is not an object has radical implications for
current tendencies in the philosophy of mind or consciousness studies.
It means that 'consciousness' is not to be identified with, or explained in
terms of, any entities or processes to be found as objects of attention in
the world. It means that any attempt to understand 'consciousness' as a
property of some kind-whether a property of systems or a property of
states-is fundamentally misguided."
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Author: $$$$$$ Date: Jan 24, 2007 06:04
andy-k wrote:
> "If we rigorously and systematically discriminate subject and object often
> enough, long enough, and on sufficiently various occasions, it is likely to
> dawn on us sooner or later that the subject is not an object. The subject is
> not any particular object or any combination of objects. The chief barrier
> to drawing this conclusion is conceptual. That is, our models of reality may
> impose constraints on empirical investigation. We get attached to our
> models, particularly if we have worked hard on them, and we may want to
> avoid looking in a direction which threatens them.
>
> "Issues at the core of current consciousness debates are variations of the
> problem of subjectivity, such as the 'hard problem', the problem of other
> minds, and the zombie problem. Progress on these issues would seem
> to presuppose some understanding of the subject/object distinction. The
> proposition that the subject is not an object has radical implications for
> current tendencies in the philosophy of mind or consciousness studies.
> It means that 'consciousness' is not to be identified with, or explained in
> terms of, any entities or processes to be found as objects of attention in
> the world. It means that any attempt to understand 'consciousness' as a
> property of some kind-whether a property of systems or a property of ...
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Author: EdEd Date: Jan 24, 2007 06:49
On Jan 24, 7:42 am, "andy-k" wrote:
> "If we rigorously and systematically discriminate subject and object often
> enough, long enough, and on sufficiently various occasions, it is likely to
> dawn on us sooner or later that the subject is not an object. The subject is
> not any particular object or any combination of objects. The chief barrier
> to drawing this conclusion is conceptual. That is, our models of reality may
> impose constraints on empirical investigation. We get attached to our
> models, particularly if we have worked hard on them, and we may want to
> avoid looking in a direction which threatens them.
>
> "Issues at the core of current consciousness debates are variations of the
> problem of subjectivity, such as the 'hard problem', the problem of other
> minds, and the zombie problem. Progress on these issues would seem
> to presuppose some understanding of the subject/object distinction. The
> proposition that the subject is not an object has radical implications for
> current tendencies in the philosophy of mind or consciousness studies.
> It means that 'consciousness' is not to be identified with, or explained in
> terms of, any entities or processes to be found as objects of attention in
> the world. It means that any attempt to understand 'consciousness' as a
> property of some kind-whether a property of systems or a property of ...
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Date: Jan 24, 2007 07:50
I strongly believe that consciousness must involve not only passivity in the
form of perception, but activity in the form of self-understanding--activity
of both the brain and the body. What we see and what we do are related. And,
what is mysterious, and what every physicist knows, the laws of nature
import mathematical intelligence to us.
"andy-k" wrote in message
news:LuIth.46108$RL5.12824@newsfe2-gui.ntli.net...> "If we rigorously and systematically discriminate subject and object often
> enough, long enough, and on...
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jan 24, 2007 13:49
> "Issues at the core of current consciousness debates are variations of
> the problem of subjectivity, such as the 'hard problem', the problem of
> other minds, and the zombie problem.
Dead right.
> Progress on these issues would seem
> to presuppose some understanding of the subject/object distinction.
True, but unhelpful.
> The
> proposition that the subject is not an object has radical implications
> for current tendencies in the philosophy of mind or consciousness
> studies. It means that 'consciousness' is not to be identified with, or
> explained in terms of, any entities or processes to be found as objects
> of attention in the world.
Dead wrong. Consciousness is not the subject. The subject is conscious, but
so are many objects. The fallacious assumption there is that the primary
evidence for consciousness is first-person evidence.
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Date: Jan 24, 2007 15:22
"Publius" wrote:
>> "The proposition that the subject is not an object has radical
>> implications for current tendencies in the philosophy of mind or
>> consciousness studies. It means that 'consciousness' is not to be
>> identified with, or explained in terms of, any entities or processes to
>> be found as objects of attention in the world."
>
> Dead wrong. Consciousness is not the subject. The subject is conscious,
> but so are many objects. The fallacious assumption there is that the
> primary evidence for consciousness is first-person evidence.
Edey writes in an article in JCS 4.5/6:
"When I realize that I am, or am conscious, I'm not realizing anything about
any objects or contents of mind or awareness. I realize consciousness
(or awareness, or subjectivity) itself. My realization that I am conscious
is not tied to awareness of any particular objects. Indeed, it has more to
do with realizing the potential absence of any particular object or objects.
In realizing the potential absence of any particular objects, I realize
myself or my being ('I am') as distinct from all objects."
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Date: Jan 24, 2007 15:23
"Ed" wrote:
>> "The proposition that the subject is not an object has radical
>> implications for current tendencies in the philosophy of mind or
>> consciousness studies. It means that 'consciousness' is not to be
>> identified with, or explained in terms of, any entities or processes to
>> be found as objects of attention in the world. It means that any attempt
>> to understand 'consciousness' as a property of some kind-whether a
>> property of systems or a property of states-is fundamentally misguided."
>
> Well, it *looks* like a property; my dog displays consciousness, my
> shoes do not.
> My dog is solid, so are my shoes, but my cigarette smoke is not.
> Consciousness seems to fit the way we talk about properties...
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Author: PubliusPublius Date: Jan 24, 2007 16:35
> "When I realize that I am, or am conscious, I'm not realizing anything
> about any objects or contents of mind or awareness. I realize
> consciousness (or awareness, or subjectivity) itself.
That is circular. "Realize" means the same thing as "conscious of." So he
is conscious of consciousness. Tells us nothing.
---------------
I shall begin by boldly declaring what consciousness is. That is, I shall
give a definition which I trust captures the ordinary intension of that
term, and supplies the criteria upon which we normally rely when deciding
when and to what to apply it --- in other words, its truth conditions. I
shall trust also that everyone understands that such a truth-functional
definition is not an analytical definition; it is not an *explanation* of
consciousness. It does not specify how consciousness comes about in a
physical or any other system, or what else must be true of a system ---
what other properties the system must have --- in order for it to become
conscious.
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Author: EdEd Date: Jan 24, 2007 19:13
On Jan 24, 6:23 pm, "andy-k" wrote:
> "Ed" wrote:
>>> "The proposition that the subject is not an object has radical
>>> implications for current tendencies in the philosophy of mind or
>>> consciousness studies. It means that 'consciousness' is not to be
>>> identified with, or explained in terms of, any entities or processes to
>>> be found as objects of attention in the world. It means that any attempt
>>> to understand 'consciousness' as a property of some kind-whether a
>>> property of systems or a property of states-is fundamentally misguided."
>
>> Well, it *looks* like a property; my dog displays consciousness, my
>> shoes do not.
>> My dog is solid, so are my shoes, but my cigarette smoke is not.
>> Consciousness seems to fit the way we talk about properties, what is it
>> about it that makes it not a property?Edey writes in an article in JCS 4.5/6:
>
> "Obviously, as a practical matter I use behavioural clues as evidence to
> answer the question: are you conscious? But those clues do not define the
> meaning of my question or of my conclusion. What then is that meaning? ...
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Date: Jan 25, 2007 02:28
"Publius" wrote:
>> "When I realize that I am, or am conscious, I'm not realizing
>> anything about any objects or contents of mind or awareness.
>> I realize consciousness (or awareness, or subjectivity) itself.
>
> That is circular. "Realize" means the same thing as "conscious of."
> So he is conscious of consciousness. Tells us nothing.
It tells us there's been a radical change of state. Edey proposes that this
change of state is a consequence of the emergence of a sense of self.
Strawson, in an article in the same issue of JCS, gives some interesting
quotes such as:
"_What_ was I before I came to self-consciousness? . . .
_I_ did not exist at all, for I was not an I. The I exists only
insofar as it is conscious of itself. . . . _The self posits itself_,
and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it exists. (Fichte 1794-5)"
"The ego continuously constitutes itself as existing. (Husserl 1929)."
"The self which is reflexively referred to is synthesized
in that very act of reflexive self-reference. (Nozick 1981)".
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