"andy-k" wrote in
news:S7Gmk.228110$oo.49349@newsfe09.ams2:
> So the theory of stellar dynamics tells us nothing about the nature
> of the UR.
Not a thing.
> Then the only purpose served by the postulate of the UR is to satisfy
> a prejudice against solipsism.
It is more than a prejudice. In postulating a realm of existence beyond
the ER, we provide ourselves with something to speculate about (that's
why it is more fun). And by indulging in those speculations we sometimes
find that we have acquired a better grip on the ER, on the world we
actually experience. We become better able to anticipate its antics and
manipulate them, thus extending, stabilizing (as understood in
complexity theory), and perhaps eventually reproducing the improbable
phenomena we (the ER) represents. Each of those successes adds
credibility to the posit (of a UR), but tells us nothing more about it.
All we ever have is its current "stand-in," the CR of our own devising,
which we accept, not because it "accurately portrays" the UR, or
"approaches" or "approximates" or "corresponds with" the UR --- all
comparatives we cannot possibly make --- but because it works for us,
better than any available alternative.
>> Perfectly correct. The success of the CR *affirms (but does not
>> prove) the posit* (of the existence of a UR), but it tells us nothing
>> more about it.
>
> You'll need to present an argument regarding any affirmation of the
> UR.
Easy enough.
1. Something X exists external to the ER. (Posit).
2. Atoms exist external to the ER (hypothesis, instantiation of 1).
3. If atoms exist, the such-and-such will be observed in the ER
(definition/theory of atoms).
4. Such-and-such is observed within the ER. (empirical observation).
5. The existence of atoms is now more probable (induction from 3 and 4).
6. 1 is also now more probable, because one of its possible instances is
more probable.
But neither 1 nor 2 are ever "proved."
>> But the solipsist cannot do science without that posit --- not if he
>> wishes to postulate any existents not discernible within the ER ---
>> e.g., subatomic particles, fields, any "bodies" whatsoever. Each time
>> he postulates such an entity, he instantiates the UR (something which
>> exists external to the ER and is the cause of the ER or of some
>> particular phenomenon within it). A solipsistic scientist who
>> declares "There are electrons and black holes, but no UR" has
>> contradicted himself.
>> The UR supplies our "license" (so to speak), our warrant, for
>> postulating such entities, forces, and processes.
> I disagree -- we can propose hypotheses concerning the data of the ER
> and if testable then we can perform those tests. None of this demands
> a UR. The conceptual objects of science need be nothing more than aids
> to understanding.
That's indeed all they are! But if they are not observed within the ER,
then they are external to it, *perforce*.
Do not confuse the hypothesis with the thing hypothesized here. The
hypothesis resides firmly within the ER. But that which is hypothesized,
e.g., the atom, does not --- by hypothesis, of course. *We are
hypothesizing the existence of something we do not experience.*, i.e.,
something external to the ER (the ER being all of that which we
experience).
> Only metaphysical realism places upon these objects
> the interpretation that they correspond to some 'reality' external to
> the ER+CR, and metaphysical realism is not required in order to pursue
> the scientific enterprise (though most scientists are, by default,
> metaphysical realists).
Exactly right! That's why we make no claim that they "correspond" to the
UR. Hypothesized entities which entail verifiable ER consequences become
more probable, and though they *inter alia* also render the UR more
probable, we cannot claim they "correspond" to it.
>> Really? If we can't explain "why there is something rather than
>> nothing," then there is no point in asking why particular things
>> exist? You don't think questions of the latter type might be easier
>> to answer than the former?
>>
>> Are all of the answers we've come up with for particular existents
>> --- why do hurricanes exist, why do humans exist, why does bubonic
>> plague exist, why do volcanoes exist, etc. --- inadequate? Incorrect?
>
> Your examples provide a bad analogy -- no metaphysical speculation is
> required in order to explain the existence of hurricanes, humans,
> bubonic plague, volcanoes, etc. We indulge in metaphysical speculation
> regarding the place of the ER in some bigger picture, but whatever is
> arising within the ER cannot be used in support of that bigger picture
> -- it would all be arising just the same whether solipsism were the
> case or metaphysical realism were the case (I'm not suggesting those
> two views are exhaustive).
No more metaphysical speculation is required to explain the existence of
the ER within a bigger picture than for explaining hurricanes. The only
metaphysical posit we need in either case is the posit of a UR --- that
something exists beyond the ER, which causes ER phenomena. Whatever is
posited beyond that belongs to the CR, particularly, to whatever theory
we've constructed to explain that particular phenomenon.
And we certainly can explain the ER via entities which arise within the
ER + CR --- because *we've hypothesized them to exist outside the ER +
CR.*
When something is hypothesized to exist outside the CR, then it does,
for explanatory purposes, even though it has arisen within the CR. We
then test that hypothesis by seeing what consequences follow from it,
and whether those can be verified within the ER. To the extent they can
be verified, the hypothesis is confirmed (but not proved).
We can freely speculate, postulate, theorize about existents beyond
ourselves, beyond the ER. No circularity is involved. What we cannot do
is "get outside ourselves" to verify any of those speculations or
theories. So instead we confirm them inductively, by observing the
consequences they are predicted to have within the ER.
>> I'm also curious about your comment, "I impose no constraint that
>> nothing can be said about the UR." Of course, we can *say* anything
>> we like about it --- "it is blue," "it is spherical," "it is
>> omniscient," etc. But I take it you think we might be able to
>> substantiate some such claims. How do you imagine we'd do that?
>
> We can do no such thing, but we indulge in metaphysical speculation
> all the same.
Do we indulge in these speculations for some purpose, other than their
entertainment value?
> I don't feel the need to postulate the existence of the UR as a
> *cause* of the ER, and still I don't dispense with that postulate --
> simply because it grounds my prejudice against solipsism. It provides
> the possibility of a bigger picture in which the ER may be placed.
Well, that opens several possibilities.
1. The ER is uncaused, though perhaps part of a bigger picture.
2. The ER is caused by something outside both itself and the UR (which
may be the cause of both the ER and the UR).
3. Both the ER and the UR are uncaused.
In all cases, the ER and UR are related, though the relationship is not
one of cause and effect.
What would that relationship be? If the ER is uncaused (1 and 3), then
how does one account for its (apparent) short duration?
>> Let me give you my take on causality, which I think answers Hume's
>> objection. The "necessary connection" between a cause and its effect
>> is identical to the "necessary connection" between the front and back
>> bumpers of an automobile. The connections between the elements of
>> both pairs lies in their being elements of a single coherent pattern.
>
> Replace "single coherent pattern" with "single process" and you have
> my take as I described it above (though that's not a criticism of your
> wording).
OK. I don't quarrel with the gist of the process guys' arguments
(Whitehead et al), except that they tend to overstate their case (as
does nearly everyone else who has a good idea). Whether we postulate
processes or objects as explanatory devices depends mainly on the
particular phenomena to be explained (whatever works).
Note, however, that on the view I've been peddling, neither processes
nor objects are metaphysical posits. We don't impute either to the UR.
They are always *sui generis* inventions of ours, contrived to relate
some set of phenomena into a coherent pattern. If the pattern
constructed is reliable and informative, then we incorporate it into the
CR.
> I'm proposing that the order manifest in the ER is *not* entirely
> separate from the order manifest in the CR. The distinction between
> the ER and the CR is a conceptual distinction -- there is not an ER, a
> distinct CR, and a distinct "observer/constructor" that takes data
> from the ER as input and provides data for the CR as output (though
> that is precisely how the situation is presented within the CR). There
> is what I call (for want of a better turn of phrase) a "subjective
> perspective upon a world", and this perspective exhibits order. It is
> conceptually divided into the ER+CR, though this distinction is itself
> a story told in the CR (chicken-and-egg scenario). Furthermore, the
> "observer/constructor" is also a story told in the CR (chicken-and-egg
> scenario). One is not 'cause' of the other but rather they are all
> part of a "single coherent pattern" as you put it, namely the data
> arising within the subjective perspective upon a world.
The distinction between the ER and the CR, and the orders attributed to
them respectively, is more than a conceptual distinction, if you mean
merely a verbal distinction or a distinction that is in some other sense
arbitrary or artificial. The elements of the ER and the order found
among them are *observable* (that is what makes them elements of the
ER). The elements of the CR, and any order attributed to them, are
*nonobservable,* they are conceivable only.
I'll elaborate a little. Common tangible objects (trees, bricks, birds,
etc.), are coherent patterns, all of whose elements are observables
(visible patches of color with definite shapes, accompanied by tangible
textures, sounds, odors, and often characteristic behaviors). A bird is
an ordered arrangement of all those "qualia."
The order we *conceive* to exist among all matter by virtue of the
periodic table, however, is *not* observable. It does not consist in
coherent arrangements of qualia. Different species of matter are
conceived to be related by virtue of their conceived relationships to
the unobservable entities postulated by the periodic table. That is an
unobservable order (an order attributed to nonobservable entities is
itself nonobservable).
As for the "observer/constructor" (the "I"), I agree that is also a
construct, but one we cannot set aside and remain able to philosophize.
It is Descartes' *cogito* premise, one we must assume in order to be
able to ask any questions at all. But though asking any questions
assumes there is a "someone" asking them, how this "someone" came to be
is among the questions we can fairly ask.
We escape the chicken-and-egg problem by positing an external world. We
then have, by hypothesis, something besides the chicken and the egg. We
then proceed to test various hypotheses regarding the workings of that
external world, by seeing how well they predict whether we will next see
a chicken or an egg.
>> Huh? The order observed in the solar system, or among the Galapagos
>> finches, is in no need of explanation?
>
> I'm addressing the presence of order _per se_, not the presence of a
> particular manifestation of order.
If we have explained all the particular manifestations, have we not
explained order *per se*? What would be left?
>>> Property dualism doesn't presume two metaphysically disjoint
>>> realms any more than mass and electrical charge may be
>>> considered metaphysically disjoint.
>>
>> Mass and charge are not metaphysically disjoint because they are not
>> metaphysical posits; they are theoretical ones. They are not imputed
>> to the UR, but are postulated as fundamental properties in the CR.
>> They are placed at the base of the CR hierarchy ("fundamental
>> properties") because they have observable, measurable effects in all
>> matter. Consciousness could be placed there too, if its explanatory
>> role were equally ubiquitous.
>
> The explanatory role of panpsychism is to provide a logically
> consistent alternative to the troublesome 'emergence' hypothesis.
Think we've covered that. Merely being logically consistent does not
render an EF viable.
Doesn't address the point, either, which was whether dualism implies
metaphysically disjoint realms.
>> That is mere sleight-of-hand. You do not "bring consciousness into
>> the 'physical domain'" by merely asserting its presence there. It is
>> not in the "physical domain" unless it has measurable, observable
>> effects wherever it is alleged to exist in that domain. That is what
>> is meant by "the physical domain." You are trying to smuggle a
>> nonphysical (nonobservable, nonmeasurable, empirically
>> inconsequential) property into the "physical domain" by hiding it in
>> a sealed container where it may lurk undetected until it leaps out
>> into some conscious system. It is dualism-by-stealth.
> There's no smuggling going on -- Strawson's conjecture is all quite
> up-front and open, and his reasoning is cogent. If consciousness
> cannot be explained in terms of the relationships between the
> constituents of physical theory, then we cannot justifiably dismiss
> the possibility that consciousness is a property of those
> constituents.
Several claims there, all of which we've covered:
1. Consciousness cannot explained in terms of the relationships between
constituent components of a physical system.
A1. Those relationships can explain (meaning can describe and predict)
everything about consciousness which can be described, with sufficient
precision to allow construction of conscious systems from nonconscious
components (in principle). It cannot describe or predict the experienced
character of the subjective states such a system will experience,
because those will not be describable by the system experiencing them
(whether in our own case or in the case of a system we've constructed).
We can also explain why those subjective states will not be describable,
and predict which arrangements of components will experience such
indescribable states.
2. Panpsychism provides an alternative explanation of consciousness.
2A. Imputing proto-consciousness (an undefined term, BTW) to the
nonconscious components of a conscious system does not explain the
consciousness exhibited by that system, unless it can explain why some
systems containing those proto-conscious components exhibit
consciousness and others do not. If the response is, "Well, they exhibit
consciousness if the components are arranged in a certain way," then the
assumption of proto-consciousness is redundant --- the relationship, not
the postulated property, is what is doing the explaining.
3. We cannot justifiably dismiss the possibility of proto-conscious
atoms or other components of a system.
3A. We can justifiably dismiss a proposed property of a theoretical
construct if that property has no explanatory power --- if it does not
allow us to predict the behaviors of the entities alleged to possess
that property. Moreover, a property alleged to be fundamental, adhering
to all matter, must have observable consequences in all matter. If it
does not have consequences for all matter, then it is gratuitous to
describe it as "fundamental;" it is an *ad hoc* conjecture arbitrarily
imputed to all matter in an attempt to avoid explaining why a phenomenon
observed in only a small class of systems is observed in those systems
but not others.
> None of that can be asserted of an investigation in advance of
> undertaking that investigation.
You still haven't explained how such an investigation might proceed, if
the phenomenon to be investigated has no detectable consequences.
> You'll have to present an argument as to how metaphysics "supports
> science".
A metaphysic which asserts no more than "Something X exists which causes
our experiences" supports science by inviting us to explore possible X's
which would have consequences discernible within our experience. A
metaphysic which postulates entities or processes or properties which
imply no discernible consequences within our experience are gratuitous
and can be distracting, by diverting attention and efforts to pondering
noncognitive propositions ("How many angels can dance on the head of a
pin?").
>> But you do agree that constructing a conscious system, per the above,
>> would serve to explain the phenomenon?
>
> We could only build such a system if we understood how consciousness
> emerges from non-conscious parts, and so "questions about how
> consciousness emerges would be idle if we understood how consciousness
> emerges". How is it possible to disagree?
But would you take such a construction to be evidence that we do,
indeed, understand how to do that?
>> (Did you ever read that Howell piece?)
>
> Yes. He writes:
>
> "My version of the knowledge argument shows that any objective theory
> must be incomplete, and to the extent that physics is such a theory,
> it is incomplete."
>
> And:
>
> "The responses to the knowledge argument all depend upon a relation
> such as acquaintance being involved in a complete understanding of the
> world. This violates the necessary condition for a complete objective
> theory of the world, so there can be no complete objective theory of
> the world. To the extent that physicalism claims that physics is an
> objective theory and can completely describe the world, physicalism
> is shown false by the knowledge argument against objectivism."
Yes. No objective theory can *completely* describe the world; it cannot
describe the subjective states which lie at the foundation of any
objective theory. It is Goedel's result all over again, reached from a
different approach.
But --- an objective theory need not describe those states to account
for their existence.
Physicists should be cognizant of that subjective basis upon which all
their theories rest. It might instill some humility in them. :-)
> Here's another paper by the same author, but I have to admit that
> I find it heavy going. Howell seems to be saying that we shouldn't
> be too quick to dismiss panpsychism as a more coherent account
> of consciousness than emergentism (but I'll be the first to admit that
> I may have misinterpreted him):
>
>
http://www.rjhjr.com/joomla/files/Superemergeten.pdf
Had not read that. But a quick glance suggests a dualistic premise from
the outset ("two domains of properties").
Will read it thoroughly (I think Howell is a sharp guy). Might be worth
discussion in its own thread.
>> Can you spell out what you take to be the differences between such a
>> system and a system with a subjective perspective upon the world?
>
> The subjective perspective upon a world is the "single coherent
> pattern" within which a model of itself arises as being internally
> divided into the ER and the CR. Language cannot encapsulate it --
> language can only be used in order to allude to it, and if that fails
> then there is no possibility of meaningflu debate about it. To assert
> an identity between this and an information processing system that
> can't describe its internal states is utterly incomprehensible.
You have not cited a single thing that would not also be true of an
information processing system designed as I have described.
> Yes, if that property is abducted from observed behavior. The idea of
> (phenomenal) consciousness is not abducted from observed behavior,
> so we can't employ the same rules for its attribution.
We don't *experience* our own subjective perspective on the world, in
the same act, so to speak, wherein we experience the resistance of some
bodies to movement?
