"andy-k" wrote in message
news:Cmqlk.36226$hR4.34557@newsfe24.ams2...
>> Aaaargh! If a UR is posited to be something external to and existing
>> prior to the ER + CR, and the cause of the ER, then that is what it
>> is! It makes no sense to say it "may be something else." It is
>> whatever we who posit it say it is, just as the rules of a game are
>> whatever the inventor of the game says they are, or the meaning of a
>> new word is whatever its coiner says it is.
> That's not what I'm getting at. Yes, it's a posit, but there are other
> posits too, and we need some way of selecting amongst these posits.
Agreed.
> Empirical testing is out of the question since the ER is not the UR
> that we wish to test for.
Correct. We don't test the posit of a UR by making an empirical observation.
We test it by seeing whether it is a logically necessary condition for
certain hypotheses which are empirically testable.
>> We then "test" that posit by seeing whether it leads to useful
>> results.
>
> What "useful results" do you have in mind?
The posit is required by, and underlies, theories which yield empirically
testable hypotheses.
> The ER+CR exhibits order, and the problem you seem to be raising is
> that of accounting for this order. By postulating an ordered but
> unknowable UR as the cause of that order we have *added an entity* but
> still wind up with the same problem -- how to account for order (but
> this time in the UR). The UR seems to be another name for god in the
> old argument that the world is ordered because that's the way that (an
> ordered) god created it.
No, accounting for observable order within the ER is only part of the
problem (a small part). The fundamental motivation for postulating the UR is
to account for the *existence* of the ER, and for many of the particular
phenomena observed within it. No cause for these phenomena, or of the ER as
a whole, is apparent within the ER. Hence we have a choice:
1. Either the ER and its varied contents have a cause external to the ER, or
2. The ER and its varied contents have no cause.
Postulating the UR is to opt for #1. The postulate claims nothing beyond the
existence of something external to the ER which is the latter's cause. It is
not posited to be monistic, dualistic, pluralistic, eternal, sentient,
"omniscient," homogeneous, composite, or anything else. I.e., nothing is
assumed about it beyond what is explicitly stated. We may then proceed to
construct a *theory* of this posited entity, which we test by seeing how
coherently and elegantly it unifies known ER phenomena, and predicts other
phenomena not hitherto encountered within the ER.
We may always opt for #2 here, of course, thus indicating we are content
with solipsism.
>> Are you proposing panpsychism as a fundamental metaphysical axiom?
> Yes, of course I am -- it does not admit of empirically testable
> predictions *because* it's a metaphysical axiom. If we are to discard
> it simply for being a metaphysical axiom then it becomes irrelevant as
> to what kind of investigation we might subsequently pursue -- the
> discussion has been nipped in the bud.
This is strange. You are proposing dualism as a fundamental metaphysical
axiom, but (I gather from your comment below) this axiom has no causal role
in the existence of the ER or its various phenomena?
> We can only investigate the *logical* consequences of the postulate
> since it does not admit of empirical testing. But before we can move
> to that next stage we have to agree that further investigation is not
> excluded on grounds that the postulate does not admit of empirical
> testing (which seems to be your position).
I'm not clear on the purpose of this proposed axiom. It seems to be a
variant of the bare-bones Kantian UR, but with dualism built-in by
hypothesis. Yet you do not regard the axiom as furnishing an external cause
of the ER (which explains why you don't think it important that it have
empirical consequences). But if it is not posited to furnish a cause for the
ER, then why *is* it posited?
We could, to be sure, investigate the logical consequences of the posit, and
erect an elaborate and consistent theory of "reality" upon that posit, but
what purpose would such a theory serve, if not to enable us to better
understand the phenomena we encounter in the ER, and thus anticipate those
phenomena?
I'm puzzled by two aspects of this. First, a posit of dualism (or of monism,
sentience, or any other preconceived property) should not be built into the
UR, since the inquiry is then prejudiced at the outset. If dualism is
suspected of being a useful hypothesis it should be placed in the *theory*
of the UR, where whatever explanatory power it has can be investigated
empirically.
But (secondly) you seem not to think the purpose of the posit is explaining
the existence and behavior of the ER anyway. So then what *is* its purpose?
> It seems I have to keep repeating that by 'testable' I mean by the
> methods of science, since that was our point of departure in this
> conversation. So that just leaves an investigation of the *logical*
> consequences of these conceptual artefacts. As I said before, if
> 'testable' refers to logical consistency then panpsychism is indeed
> 'testable' and passes all the tests.
Logical consistency is a *necessary* condition of a viable theory of
"reality," but it is not a *sufficient* condition. Nowhere near it.
>> This aspect of the discussion does raise another question --- well, I
>> guess we touched on it earlier, but I didn't fully grasp your answer.
>> If an explanation of consciousness is not expected to be scientific,
>> to entail testable consequences, knowledge of which better equips us
>> to prepare for and deal with the world, then what is the *value* of
>> that "explanation"? What would make it interesting and attractive to
>> anyone? Is is just an aesthetic appeal?
> An explanation must be less enigmatic than the enigma it is intended
> to explain.
Does "less enigmatic" just mean "simpler"?
>> Some posits may be proved wrong, e.g., empirical hypotheses ("There
>> is life on Mars"). Axioms are never "proved wrong." Nor are theories.
>> They are just abandoned because they lack explantory power, or are
>> supplanted by theories with more explanatory power. E.g., Euclid's
>> Parallel Postulate.
> The posit of the UR as the cause of the ER+CR cannot be proven wrong
> or right, but it does compete with other posits. Perhaps I should
> emphasize that I'm debating the idea of the UR as the *cause* of the
> ER+CR, not the *existence* of the UR (which is an untestable posit
> that I already accept by virtue of my prejudice against solipsism).
This seems to get to the heart of the matter. If the UR (bare-bones or
dualistic) is not posited as the cause of the ER, then what is the reason
for positing it?
If it *is* posited as the cause of the ER, then it (via a theory of the
nature of the UR) must be empirically testable (the causal mechanisms the
theory proposes must be shown to actually produce the effects in the ER the
theory predicts). If no effects are predicted, or if predicted effects are
not observed, then the theory fails as "stand-in" for the UR, which is
presumed to be the cause of the ER and its diverse phenomena.
Kinda gets us back to the question of the value of such a theory, and the
point just above: is a less enigmatic theory one that is simpler? Do you
think being simpler is *sufficient* reason to prefer one theory over
another?
I myself take simplicity (Occam's principle) as a secondary criterion for a
successful theory, the primary criteria being consistency, coherence (which
is a kind of simplicity), and explanatory power (the capacity to predict
future phenomena). All of those criteria are relative, except consistency,
i.e., theories admit of more-or-less of each of them, and the theory with
the best overall "score" on all scales gets the philosophical nod.
>> As mentioned, we can take such propositions as *postulates*, or
>> axioms, posit them to be either true or false, then see what happens
>> consequentially.
> So what you're saying is that we can take an empirically untestable
> proposition and investigate it's logical consequences? Then why do
> you object to investigating the empirically untestable proposition
> that consciousness may be fundamental?
Not saying that at all. Consistency of theories is a given. But being merely
able to draw logically consistent theorems from a posit is not sufficient
reason to adopt the posit. Logically consistent theorems can be drawn from
any posit, provided the posit is not self-contradictory.
But that gets back to the purpose of this particular posit, which I take to
be providing a causal explanation of ER phenomena. A theory accomplishes
that to the extent it satisifies the criteria above.
In short, we need theories of "reality" to be empirically testable because
empirical phenomena is what we are trying to explain --- the phenomena
encountered within the ER, and the very existence of the ER (which is itself
an empirical phenomenon).
But if you do not take that to be the purpose of the posit and whatever
theories may be erected upon it, then I can see why empirical testability of
those theories may not seem important.
>> But it has. A system will experience a subjective perspective upon
>> the world if it models the states of its subsystems with 1-bit
>> tokens, and takes that model to represent itself and its world (it
>> "takes the model to represent itself and its world" if it acts in
>> response to the model, not the "real" external world).
> We are no longer discussing the enigmatic existence of a subjective
> perspective upon a world, and instead we are discussing information
> processing. The question that needs addressing is why a particular
> kind of information processing system should consciously experience
> some subset of the information that is being processed. No mechanism
> has been forthcoming regarding the production of a subjective
> perspective upon a world.
Well, the theory outlined proposes that subjective perspectives upon a
world, including the one you experience, are indeed a certain kind of
information processing carried out by systems of a certain design. You are
*presuming* that what you experience is something other than that, because
of an *a priori* commitment to dualism which impels you to believe that what
you experience occupies a different ontological realm from "physical"
phenomena (as it is envisioned from a perspective of metaphysical realism).
But there are no grounds for supposing that what you experience and
information processing (of the required kind) are different. That is a
metaphysical assumption that is unwarranted and which leads to explanatory
absurdities or dead ends.
>> What is odd about this notion is that it overlooks our starting
>> point: the ER. Every element of the CR is constructed from "raw
>> materials" we encounter within the ER --- those very subjective
>> states, or qualia, which we now think it impossible to rationally
>> explain. Isn't explaining them the reason we constructed this
>> elaborate artifact, the CR, to begin with? *In what sense* are qualia
>> "metaphysically different" from the artifacts we have constructed
>> from them? Every one of those artifacts are constructed from those
>> very qualia, and from the abstractions and idealizations we make from
>> them!
>
> The subjective perspective upon a world is the ground within which all
> of "this" is arising -- it is not radical, mysterious, other-worldly,
> nor "spirit stuff". Such descriptions are total nonsense, and, being
> charitable, their use is evidence of misunderstanding.
I agree it is not mysterious (you're the one who has been claiming that it
is!) But all of those adjectives have been ascribed to it by one variety of
mysterian or another.
> The world
> arising within this subjective perspective is a world of objects, and
> a world within which no other subjective perspectives are arising.
Not sure what you mean there. Don't we observe other persons, animals, who
also have subejctive perspectives? Don't they arise (and disappear) on a
regular basis?
Do you mean we don't *experience* the subjective perspectives of others as
we experience our own? Do you think we should be able to?
> Physical theory is very successful in accounting for the appearance
> and behavior of objects arising in the world, but it cannot be asked
> to account for what is not arising within that world -- i.e. other
> subjective perspectives.
Are you suggesting that we ourselves are not objects within a world? That we
ourselves have not arisen within an external world ?
Now you can certainly take that position, and be entirely consistent in
doing so. That is equivalent to rejecting Option #1 above, and opting for #2
instead (solipsism). But if we go for #1 we are presuming a world external
to us which somehow caused our own existence. Therefore we come into a
pre-existing world; we are not worlds-unto-ourselves. Our theories are aimed
to explain how we, and all that we experience, came into being via
mechanisms we have *presumed*, via Option #1, to exist prior to our own
arrival on the scene.
> If we make the assumption that matter is devoid of consciousness, then we
> must accept that consciousness arises as a consequence of the
> relationships between the constituents of matter.
Not all matter is devoid of consciousness, just most of it (which is what
the evidence suggests).
> Only a radical mechanism could account for this kind of emergence.
It will only need to be "radical" if consciousness, subjective states, a
subjective perspective on a world, etc., are *presumed* to be phenomena
occupying a different, metaphysically disjoint realm of existence from
"physical matter," rather than being phenomena predictably exhibited by
certain arrangements of "physical matter."
> Imputing consciousness to the fundamental building blocks of the world
> is to bring consciousness into the "physical domain", thereby
> rendering any charge of dualism impotent. That is the choice before us
> -- radical emergence or revised physicalism.
Yes, it does. It imputes a property observed in only a small domain of
systems to all matter, where it serves no explanatory purpose whatsoever,
and where its presumed presence is superfluous.
